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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to provide an explanation of what I call the Basic Principle about 
Perceptual Justification which states that if a subject S has a perceptual experience as 
of a mind-independent object x being F (or in which it appears to him as if an x is F), 
and forms the belief that an x is F on the basis of having an experience of this 
phenomenological sort, then (perhaps provided certain further conditions obtain) S‘s 
belief that an x is F is prima facie justified for S. I distinguish between two 
conceptions of epistemic justification. Roughly, on an objective conception, a 
subject S has a justified belief that p if he bases this belief on grounds that entail or 
make likely the truth of p, while on a subjective conception a subject S has a justified 
belief that p if he forms this belief on the basis of his occupying a perspective from 
which a situation obtains that entails or makes likely the truth of p. I argue that the 
truth of the Basic Principle can be derived, in part, from facts about the phenomenal 
character of perceptual experience. In particular, I argue that the Basic Principle can 
be explained by saying that the subject‘s perceptual experience can provide him with 
justification for believing that an x is F in the subjective sense and that it does so, in 
part, in virtue of its phenomenal character. I also address the question of whether 
perceptual experiences can provide us with immediate justification for believing 
propositions about our environment, that is, with justification that does not depend 
on our having independent justification for believing other propositions such as the 
proposition that perceptual experiences are generally reliable. To this end, I consider 
the so-called problem of easy knowledge and argue that the issues concerning this 
problem should not compel us into thinking that perceptual justification cannot be 
immediate.  
  
4 
 
Contents 
 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................... 5 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 7 
Phenomenology and the Basic Principle .................................................................. 7 
Bonjour‘s Challenge............................................................................................... 15 
Motivating a Phenomenological Approach ............................................................ 26 
Outline of the Thesis .............................................................................................. 29 
Chapter 1 .................................................................................................................... 32 
Introduction ............................................................................................................ 32 
Global Reliabilism ................................................................................................. 37 
Bergman‘s Proper Function Account ..................................................................... 45 
Burge‘s Anti-Individualist Account ....................................................................... 51 
Evaluating Bergman‘s and Burge‘s Views ............................................................ 60 
Chapter 2 .................................................................................................................... 67 
Introduction ............................................................................................................ 67 
Foley‘s Conception of an Epistemically Rational Belief ....................................... 72 
McDowell‘s Conception of Perceptual Justification.............................................. 82 
E-Representing the Obtaining of a Mind-Independent Fact ................................ 100 
Chapter 3 .................................................................................................................. 107 
Introduction .......................................................................................................... 107 
McDowell‘s Response to Scepticism about the External World ......................... 112 
Wright‘s Response to McDowell‘s Anti-Scepticism ........................................... 116 
Perceptual Knowledge and Conclusive Warrants ................................................ 127 
Chapter 4 .................................................................................................................. 144 
Introduction .......................................................................................................... 144 
The Closure Problem............................................................................................ 150 
The Bootstrapping Problem ................................................................................. 161 
Knowing vs. Claiming to Know........................................................................... 174 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 180 
 
 
  
5 
 
Acknowledgements  
I would like to thank all my supervisors over the years, Mark Kalderon, Christopher 
Peacocke, Paul Snowdon, and Jose Zalabardo, for helpful comments on different 
parts of this thesis and for guiding me through various issues in epistemology and 
the philosophy of perception.  Any mistakes or misconceptions that the thesis may 
contain are, of course, entirely my responsibility. I would also like to thank the 
Philosophy Department at UCL for their financial support and Rory Madden and 
Jose for helping me to secure a much-needed extension to my original submission 
deadline. 
Finishing this thesis would not have been possible if I had not received the 
help of friends and family in taking care of my two sons, Han and Tang. So a warm 
and heartfelt thank you goes to Midori Ainoura, Sally Holyland, Takatomo 
Kashiwabara, Katie Kelly, Michelle King, Stephen Ooi, Anne Stranne-Petersen, 
Oliver Willhoft, Udo Willhoft, and Ana Yerill. I cannot thank enough my mother, 
Tuti Willhoft, and my mother-in-law, Ellen King, both of whom stayed with us for 
extended periods of time, took care of us, showered the kids with love, and kept 
things together for us.  
I owe the most to my wife, Laura King. She has made great sacrifices and 
worked tirelessly to allow me to pursue my goals. In return, I have stretched her 
patience to the limit by missing several personal deadlines. But our ‗shared custody‘ 
arrangement, in which I have the kids during the week and she has them during the 
weekend, is now at an end and we can finally be a proper family. Without Laura, 
little of what I do would be possible and none of it would be worthwhile. And so, 
with gratitude and apologies but above all with love, I dedicate this thesis to her.  
6 
 
 
 
 
 
To Laura 
  
7 
 
Introduction  
 
 
Do perceptual experiences contribute to the epistemic justification of beliefs about 
the external world? And if they do, how and under what circumstances do they do 
so? These are the questions that I will be addressing in this thesis. I will begin with 
some natural and intuitive thoughts, first, about the nature of perceptual experiences 
and, second, about their epistemic role in regards to external world beliefs.  
 
Phenomenology and the Basic Principle  
 
We can begin with an insight by P.F. Strawson, who claims that ―mature experience 
(in general) presents itself as, in the Kantian phrase, an immediate consciousness of 
the existence of things outside us.‖ (Strawson, 1979, p. 47) Strawson‘s claim here is 
about how perceptual experience presents itself to us when we reflect on, or 
introspect, its nature, and it is a claim that can be divided into two parts. The first is 
that, on reflection, a perceptual experience presents itself as a conscious awareness 
of certain ‗things‘ or objects. The second is that these objects are ‗things outside us‘ 
or mind-independent in the sense that they exist independently of our conscious 
awareness of them. If we take the first part first, what exactly is involved in the 
(seeming) conscious awareness of objects that we attribute to perceptual experience? 
A helpful formulation of what is involved here is provided by John Searle in the 
following passage: 
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If, for example, I see a yellow station wagon in front of me, the experience I 
have is directly of the object. It doesn‘t just ―represent‖ the object, it provides 
direct access to it. The experience has a kind of directness, immediacy and 
involuntariness which is not shared by a belief I might have about the object in 
its absence. (Searle, 1983, pp. 45-6) 
 
Searle‘s aim in this passage is to capture certain features of perceptual experiences 
that he designates with the use of words like ‗directness‘ and ‗immediacy‘. Thus the 
seeming conscious awareness that we find in perceptual experience when we reflect 
on them is a kind of direct presentation to us of these objects; in having a perceptual 
experience, it is, to put it differently, as if we are directly confronted with certain 
objects as being right there before us (an idea that is also captured by Strawson‘s 
formulation of experience as involving a seeming consciousness of the existence of 
things outside us) and, though this is not mentioned by Searle in this passage, as 
having certain properties. Call this feature the presentational character of 
experience. In having this feature, perceptual experiences essentially differ from 
other mental states such as thoughts or beliefs. For example, in thinking about a 
yellow station wagon, it need not be the case that it is to one as if a yellow station 
wagon is right there in front of one.  
Consider now the second part of Strawson‘s claim. The idea here was that 
perceptual experience, on introspection, presents itself as a conscious awareness of 
mind-independent objects. In making this claim, part of Strawson‘s point is to say 
that a description of perceptual experience which is ‗faithful‘ to ‗experience as we 
actually enjoy it‘ (Strawson, 1979, p. 43) will essentially involve the use of concepts 
for mind-independent objects. Thus when asked to give a description of his current 
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visual experience, a person might say, for example, that he sees ‗the red light of the 
setting sun filtering through the black and thickly clustered branches of the elms...the 
dappled deer gazing in groups on the vivid green grass...‘ (ibid, p. 43) Of course, this 
description of the visual experience in terms of the person‘s seeing certain mind-
independent objects involves a commitment to the existence of those objects. 
Strawson insists, however, that even if one were to shed this kind of commitment, a 
faithful description of the person‘s visual experience would still involve the very 
same concepts for mind-independent objects involved in the original description. 
Thus the person might say instead that he ‗had a visual experience such as it would 
have been natural to describe by saying that [he] saw [the red light of the setting 
sun...]...‘ (ibid, pp.43-4) 
Call this feature the world-directedness of perceptual experience. Together the 
presentational character of a perceptual experience and its world-directedness yield a 
description of perceptual experience as a seeming confrontation with the external 
world – where how things are in the world seems to be made manifest to one in 
having the visual experience. An important point to note is that we find both of these 
two features in perceptual experiences that amount to genuine perceptions of an 
object in the external world object as well as in experiences that do not amount to 
genuine perceptions. For example, when we see a red ball, reflection on this 
experience would present this experience as an immediate conscious awareness of a 
red ball that exists independently of our conscious awareness of it. However, these 
observations apply equally to non-veridical experiences such as hallucinations. Thus 
we can imagine being in a state that, from the inside, would appear just to be the 
same as a genuine veridical perception of a red ball but where there is in fact no red 
ball before us to be seen. Still, even if there is no relevant object to be seen, the 
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experience – when described from a subjective point of view – presents itself as an 
immediate conscious awareness of a red ball. 
These very natural thoughts are thoughts essentially about the phenomenal 
character of perceptual experiences. They are meant to capture what it is like for us, 
from our own subjective point of view, to undergo such experiences. Thus, 
phenomenologically speaking, veridical (visual) perceptions as well as (visual) 
hallucinations seem to involve a conscious awareness of mind-independent objects 
and some of their properties.  
Apart from these natural thoughts about the phenomenal character of perceptual 
experience, there are also some very natural thoughts about the epistemic role of 
perceptual experiences. Thus it is very natural to think that many of our beliefs about 
our surroundings that we form on the basis of our perceptual experiences are 
epistemically justified for us. Suppose, for example, that as a result of seeing a red 
ball one forms the belief that there is a red ball in front one. Under normal 
circumstances, a belief of this kind seems to be entirely justified. To be sure, one‘s 
justification here may be defeated or undermined at a later point. For example, one 
may acquire evidence that epistemically supports the belief that one is not genuinely 
perceiving, in which case the justification provided by the perceptual experience may 
be undermined. But in the absence of any countervailing evidence, it seems to be 
epistemically appropriate for us to hold our perceptually based beliefs. Perceptions 
of mind-independent objects, therefore, seem to provide us with prima facie 
justification for believing certain propositions about those objects.  
These thoughts seem to apply equally to perceptual experiences that do not 
amount to fully veridical perceptions of mind-independent objects. Intuitively, these 
too seem to have the capacity to provide us with some prima facie justification for 
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beliefs about our surroundings. If, for example, one unwittingly suffers from a highly 
deceptive hallucinatory experience in which it appears to one as if there is a red ball 
in front of one when there is in fact no red ball for one to be seen and on the basis of 
having this experience forms the belief that there is such an object in front of one, 
then this belief too may be entirely justified for one. Of course, such a belief may 
well be false. Still, in the absence of reasons for thinking that one is in fact suffering 
from a hallucination, it seems to be entirely appropriate, from an epistemic point of 
view, for one to believe that there is a red ball in front of one.  
These intuitive thoughts about the phenomenal character and epistemic role of 
perceptual experiences can be combined to formulate the following principle about 
perceptual justification:  
 
If a subject S has a perceptual experience as of a mind-independent object x 
being F (or in which it appears to him as if an x is F), and forms the belief that an 
x is F on the basis of having an experience of this phenomenological sort, then 
(perhaps provided certain further conditions obtain) S‘s belief that an x is F is 
prima facie justified for S.  
 
I will refer to this principle as the Basic Principle about Perceptual Justification (or 
the Basic Principle for short). The antecedent of this principle is to be taken as 
making a claim about a subject enjoying a perceptual experience with the kind of 
phenomenal character that was described a moment ago. Thus a perceptual 
experience as of a mind-independent object x being F (or in which it appears to one 
as if an x is F) is an experience which involves a seeming conscious awareness of a 
mind-independent object x instantiating the property F.  
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The first point to note about this principle is that, stated as it is, it records a 
certain intuition about when a subject can have a prima facie justified belief about 
his surroundings. The intuition is that when a subject enjoys a perceptual experience 
of an x being F and forms the belief that an x is F on the basis of it then that belief is 
prima facie justified for him. The Basic Principle as such, however, does not have 
any implications on what makes such a belief epistemically justified for a subject; 
nor does it have any implications on what the role is of the perceptual experience in 
accounting for the justification of the belief. It also leaves open the possibility that 
further specific conditions have to obtain, other than the presence of a relevant sort 
of perceptual experience, in order for a belief based on this experience to have the 
status of being prima facie justified for one.  
Another point to note is that this principle is a principle about what is usually 
referred to as doxastic justification. It thus states certain conditions under which a 
particular belief of a subject can have the property of being justified for him. In 
general we can say that for a subject‘s belief that p to have this property is for the 
subject to possess adequate grounds in support of believing that p and for him to 
form the belief that p on the basis of these grounds. The notion of doxastic 
justification so understood is different from the notion of propositional justification. 
The latter notion picks out a property that a proposition rather than a belief can have 
for a subject. Thus one can have propositional justification for believing a 
proposition p if one possesses adequate grounds in support of believing that p 
without thereby having to have a justified belief that p. This could be, for example, 
when one does not in fact form the belief that p despite having adequate grounds for 
believing that p, or when one does have the belief that p without however having 
based the belief on the grounds one possesses. 
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We can of course formulate the Basic Principle in terms of the notion of 
propositional justification. The result would be the following:   
 
If a subject S has a perceptual experience as of a mind-independent object x 
being F (or in which it appears to him as if an x is F), then (perhaps provided 
certain further conditions obtain) S has some prima facie justification for 
believing that an x is F.  
 
This thesis will consider various explanations of why the Basic Principle in either of 
these two forms is true. However, of particular interest will be the relation between 
this principle and the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. One question 
to be addressed is thus whether the truth of the Basic Principle can be derived from 
facts about what it is like for a subject to undergo the perceptual experience in such 
way that we can say that the perceptual experience contributes to the justification of 
his belief in virtue of its having the phenomenal character that it does. I will refer to 
accounts that attempt to explain the Basic Principle, at least in part, by appeal to 
facts about the phenomenal character of experiences as phenomenological accounts 
of, or phenomenological approaches to, the Basic Principle. An endorsement of 
such an account has recently been given by James Pryor. Thus Pryor states:  
 
My view is that our perceptual experiences have the epistemic powers...they 
have because of what the phenomenology of perception is like.  
I think there's a distinctive phenomenology: the feeling of seeming to 
ascertain that a given proposition is true. This is present when the way a 
mental episode represents its content makes it feel as though, by enjoying that 
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episode, you can thereby just tell that that content obtains...When you have a 
perceptual experience of your hands, that experience makes it feel as though 
you can just see that hands are present. It feels as though hands are being 
shown or revealed to you. (Pryor, 2004, pp. 356-7) 
 
Pryor makes a number of claims in this passage that need not be adopted by all 
proponents of a phenomenological approach. For one, he assumes that perceptual 
experiences are mental states with representational contents and that it is in virtue of 
their having such contents (and the way these contents are represented in experience) 
that perceptual experiences have the phenomenal character that they do. Moreover, 
he seems to think that the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences involves 
different kinds of ‗feelings‘ such as the feeling of seeming to ascertain a proposition 
or the feeling that one can just tell that a proposition is true. Finally, he believes that 
it is in virtue of these phenomenological facts that perceptual experiences have the 
capacity to provide us with justification for believing certain propositions about the 
external world.  
None of these claims, however, are essential to the phenomenological approach. 
Thus the kind of intentionalism about the nature of perceptual experience that Pryor 
assumes here is only one of several competing accounts of what constitutes the 
phenomenal character of experience. Furthermore, we might have doubts about the 
contention that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience involves the 
kinds of feeling that Pryor describes and, more generally, the contention that it 
involves any feelings at all. At the end of the passage, though, Pryor suggests that it 
is because in having the relevant perceptual experience it feels to one as if hands are 
being shown or revealed that such an experience can provide one with justification 
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for believing that there are hands in front of one. If we shed the notion that there is a 
kind of ‗feeling‘ involved in having the perceptual experience, we can simply take 
this to reflect the features of the phenomenal character of experience we identified 
earlier, namely its presentational character and world-directedness. From the 
subjective point of view, when one sees one‘s hands, it is to one as if there are hands 
right before one. The suggestion is then that it is in virtue of the perpetual experience 
having these phenomenal features that it provides one with justification for believing 
that there are hands in front of one.  
The question of course is why we should think that this is the case. And more 
fundamentally: what exactly is it to say that it is in virtue of the phenomenal 
properties of a perceptual experience that this experience can provide one with 
justification for believing propositions about the external world? Pryor himself does 
not provide us with any answers to these questions, at least not in the foregoing 
passage. In what follows, I want to approach these questions by considering a 
particular challenge that we might pose to the proponent of a phenomenological 
approach. 
 
Bonjour’s Challenge  
 
This challenge is expressed by Laurence Bonjour in the following passage:  
 
It is easy to see how the way in which material objects seem to be simply 
presented or, as one might even be tempted to say, given in perceptual 
experience could lead to the view that is usually (and plausibly) ascribed to at 
least the most naive level of common sense, namely that there is no problem 
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at all about the justification or indeed truth of the resulting beliefs. But...this 
presentational character of experience has to do with the way in which 
physical objects are represented or depicted in experience, but has no obvious 
bearing on whether such representations or the beliefs that reflect them are 
true. A presentational representation is no doubt more vivid, more striking, in 
something like the way in which a picture is more compelling than a merely 
verbal description. But pictures are just as capable of being mistaken as 
anything else, and so the pictorial character of a representation seems to be 
simply irrelevant to the issue of justification; my suggestion is that we have 
so far seen no clear reason not to say the same thing about the intuitively 
presentational character of perceptual experience. (Bonjour, In Search of 
Direct Realism, 2004, pp. 354-5)  
 
The first point to note about this passage is that the analogy to pictures that Bonjour 
draws here is entirely misguided. As we have seen, a phenomenological approach to 
explaining the Basic Principle claims that it is, at least in part, in virtue of the 
phenomenal properties of a perceptual experience that the experience provides us 
with justification for believing a proposition about the external world. These 
phenomenal properties are properties of what it is like for a subject to undergo the 
perceptual experience. They belong to the general class of properties of what it is 
like for a subject to be in a conscious state. Such properties, however, are simply not 
attributable to pictures; that is, there is nothing it is like for a subject to be a picture. 
(Of course, there is the property of what it is like for a subject to be consciously 
aware of a picture but this is irrelevant to the issue at hand)  So whatever kind of 
‗presentational character‘ a picture can have it is not the same kind as the 
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presentational character that we have identified as a feature of the phenomenal 
character of experience. Hence, even if there are reasons for doubting that the 
presentational character of a picture has any relevance at all with respect to the 
question of whether such pictures provide us with any justification for believing 
propositions about the world, we should not expect that these problems apply to 
perceptual experiences and their phenomenal character. 
However despite the fact that the analogy to pictures is misguided, Bonjour still 
raises an important point in this passage. His central claim is that the presentational 
character of a perceptual experience, and presumably its phenomenal character as a 
whole, has no obvious bearing on the truth of the propositions that this experience 
purportedly provides us with justification for believing. And if it has no obvious 
bearing on the truth of the relevant propositions, then there is no (obvious) reason for 
thinking that it is in virtue of its phenomenal character that a perceptual experience 
can provide us with justification for believing those propositions to be true. Of 
course, even if there are no obvious reasons for thinking this, this does not mean that 
there are no such reasons or that such reasons cannot be discovered upon deeper 
reflection.  
How then could a proponent of the phenomenological approach respond to 
Bonjour‘s challenge? Before we can answer this question, we first need to be clear 
about how exactly this challenge should be understood. The questions we need to 
address at this point are these: in what way should the phenomenal character of a 
perceptual experience ‗bear on the truth‘ of the propositions for which such an 
experience provides us with justification for believing if it is in virtue of its 
phenomenal character that the experience has the given epistemic properties? And 
why should the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience bear on the truth of 
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the relevant propositions in this way in order for the experience to provide us with 
justification for believing those propositions? Finally, why should we think that the 
phenomenal character of perceptual experiences does not bear on the truth of the 
relevant propositions in the required way?  
These questions need to be answered against the backdrop of certain assumptions 
about the concept of epistemic justification in general. One basic assumption about 
this concept is that it is essentially connected in some way with the concept of truth. 
This assumption in turn can be seen as being grounded in the general assumption 
that a belief essentially aims at truth. In fulfilling this aim, one will believe a 
proposition p only if p is true. Given this aim of belief, we can then understand the 
concept of epistemic justification as a specific kind of evaluative notion:  a given 
belief is epistemically justified only if it is in some relevant sense appropriate with 
respect to the aim of believing a proposition p only if p is true. A theory of epistemic 
justification will therefore have to attempt to spell out the conditions under which it 
is appropriate in the relevant sense to hold a given belief. Following Stewart Cohen
1
, 
we can assume that there are two general approaches we can take towards spelling 
out these conditions, one of which yields an objective notion of epistemic 
justification, while the other yields a subjective notion.  
Take the former notion first. Suppose a belief that p is based on a ground g, such 
as a perceptual experience. We can then say that g provides one with justification for 
believing that p only if forming the belief that p on the basis of g reliably results in 
that belief‘s being true. Another way of formulating an objective notion of epistemic 
justification is in terms of belief-forming processes rather than grounds for believing. 
Thus, a belief-forming process produces justified beliefs only if this process reliably 
                                                 
1 (Cohen, Justification and Truth, 1984) 
19 
 
produces beliefs that are true. Of course, the objective notion of justification 
understood in this way raises the question as to the degree of reliability that is 
required for there to be epistemic justification for believing that p, but we can set this 
question aside here. At the extreme end of objective conceptions of epistemic 
justification, a ground g provides one with justification for believing that p only if 
forming the belief that p on the basis of g necessarily results in the belief‘s being 
true. (Or, if we prefer a formulation in terms of processes: a belief-forming process 
pr produces justified beliefs only if pr necessarily produces beliefs that are true)  
Alternatively, on a subjective notion of justification, we can think of epistemic 
justification not as a matter of one‘s having a ground g which is in fact reliably 
connected with the truth of p but rather as a matter of how things are from the 
subject‘s own perspective. Here, we can initially think of a perspective as being 
constituted by a subject‘s beliefs. Thus Cohen himself suggests as a version of the 
subjective notion of epistemic justification that a subject has justification for 
believing that p only if he has an ‗impeccable belief‘ that a proposition q distinct 
from p obtains and that q makes likely the truth of p. (Cohen, Justification and Truth, 
1984, p. 285) In general, a subjective conception of epistemic justification stipulates 
that a subject has justification for believing that p only if from his own perspective a 
situation obtains which makes likely the truth of p.
2
 An objective conception of 
epistemic justification, on the other hand, stipulates that a subject has justification for 
believing that p only if the ground on the basis of which he forms the belief is such 
that it is (in some sense) reliably connected with the truth of p independently of 
whether or not it does so from the subject‘s own perspective.  
                                                 
2  Later on, in Chapter 2, I will claim that on a subjective conception, a subject can also have 
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Now both the objective and subjective notions of epistemic justification as 
formulated face a number of problems. However, my present concern is not to 
address these problems but rather to try to understand Bonjour‘s objection to the 
phenomenological approach to the Basic Principle. How then should we understand 
Bonjour‘s claim that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience has no 
bearing on the truth of the relevant proposition that we take the experience to provide 
justification for believing?  
Suppose we accept some objective conception of epistemic justification. Perhaps 
we can then take Bonjour to be claiming that a perceptual experience with its 
characteristic phenomenal character is not as a matter of fact reliably connected with 
the truth of the relevant proposition. It should be immediately clear, however, that 
this is not the way we should understand Bonjour‘s challenge to the 
phenomenological approach. For this would be to say that a typical perceptual 
experience, in which it is to us as if a mind-independent object x has a certain 
property F, is not in fact reliably connected with the truth of the proposition that an x 
is F. But not even a radical sceptic about perceptual knowledge and justification 
would make this assumption. Nor, for that matter, would a proponent of the 
phenomenological approach want to be understood as saying that the Basic Principle 
can be explained by assuming merely that when one has a perceptual experience 
with a phenomenal character such that it is to one as if a mind-independent object x 
is F, such experiences are reliably connected with the truth of the proposition that an 
x is F.  The problem here is, as far as the phenomenological approach is concerned, 
that this does not capture the claim that it is in virtue of a perceptual experience‘s 
phenomenal character that this experience provides one with epistemic justification 
for believing a certain proposition about one‘s environment. At issue, therefore, at 
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least insofar as we are assuming an objective conception of epistemic justification, is 
the question of what precisely accounts for the fact that a perceptual experience of a 
certain phenomenological sort is reliably connected with the truth of the relevant 
external world propositions.  
Now in general, we can perhaps assume that if a type of perceptual experience is 
reliable with respect to the truth of the proposition p then it is because token 
experiences of this type are more likely than not caused by the fact that makes p true. 
But if this is all that we can assume, then at best what we can infer in epistemic 
terms is that the perceptual experience has the epistemic properties that it does in 
virtue of its being reliably caused by the fact that makes p true rather than in virtue 
of its intrinsic phenomenal properties. One way of understanding Bonjour‘s 
challenge, therefore, is as follows: if perceptual experiences provide us with any 
justification at all for believing propositions about our environment it is because 
these experiences are reliably connected with the truth of those propositions. 
However, there is nothing about the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences 
in virtue of which perceptual experiences are reliably connected with the truth of 
propositions about our environment or on the basis of which we could explain such 
reliable connections.  
Given this understanding of Bonjour‘s challenge to phenomenological accounts 
of the Basic Principle, what options are there for a proponent of such an account? 
One option here is to turn to the metaphysics of perceptual experience or, more 
precisely, to the question of what constitutes an experience‘s phenomenal character. 
There are in fact various theories about the metaphysics of experience that are on 
offer. For example, following a sense-datum theorist, we might hold that a 
perceptual experience has the phenomenal character that it does as a result of the 
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subject‘s standing in some relation (e.g. of acquaintance or awareness) with a certain 
kind of mind-dependent object or entity. Though not popular these days, versions of 
the sense-datum theory still have their proponents.
3
  Alternatively, following an 
intentionalist theorist such as Pryor, we might think that a perceptual experience has 
the phenomenal character that it does in virtue of its being an intentional state with a 
certain representational content. Thus, when we have a perceptual experience which 
from the subjective point of view is such that a mind-independent object x is right 
before us having a certain property F, we are having an experience which represents 
an object x as being right before us and as having F.
4
 Finally, following a naive 
realist, we might think that a perceptual experience, at least when it is genuinely 
veridical and non-deceptive, has the phenomenal character that it does in virtue of 
the subject‘s standing in an irreducible relation of awareness to a mind-independent 
object and some of its properties. Thus, when we have an experience in which, 
subjectively speaking, a mind-independent object presents itself to us as having a 
property F, this, in the veridical non-deceptive case, is precisely because such an 
object and the instantiation by this object of some of its properties are constituents of 
the experience. Naive realism formulated as such, of course, cannot explain how 
certain kinds of hallucinations can have the phenomenal character that they do. It is 
natural, therefore, to combine this view with a disjunctivist conception of perceptual 
experience. On one such conception, a perceptual experience in which it appears to 
one as if an x is F can be either, in the veridical case, a perceptual experience whose 
                                                 
3  See, for example, (Jackson, 1977) and (Robinson, 1994) 
4  We might want to distinguish here between what we might call strong-intentionalism and weak-
intentionalism. Thus the strong intentionalist claims that a perceptual experiences has the 
phenomenal character that it does entirely as a matter of its having certain representational 
properties, whereas the weak intentionalist claims that the phenomenal character of a perceptual 
experience can be a matter of both its representational and non-representational properties. For 
defences of the former view see (Dretske, 1995), (Harman, 1990), and (Tye, 1995). For a defence 
of the latter view see (Peacocke, 1983) 
23 
 
phenomenal character is a matter of the subject‘s standing in some relation of 
awareness to a mind-independent object and some of its properties or, as in the 
hallucinatory case, a perceptual experience whose phenomenal character is a matter 
simply of this experience being subjectively indistinguishable
5
 from a veridical 
experience of an x being F.
6
  
Now, given these three alternatives, it is not obviously clear how a sense-datum 
theorist or an intentionalist could explain how it is in virtue of its phenomenal 
character that a perceptual experience, in which it is to the subject as if a mind-
independent object x is F, is objectively connected in the right sort of way to the 
truth of the proposition that an x is F. Matters, however, are different with the naive 
realist and the disjunctivist. Thus, at least in the veridical and non-deceptive case, 
these theorists say, as we have seen, that a perceptual experience has the phenomenal 
character that it does in virtue of the subject‘s standing in a certain relation to an 
object and some of its properties. If that is so, however, then a perceptual experience 
in which it is to the subject as if an x is F, will have as its constituents the object x 
and the instantiation by x of the property F and as such will entail (or if one prefers, 
be necessarily connected with) the truth of the proposition that an x is F. This form 
of naive realism, therefore, has the potential to make good on the claim that it is in 
virtue of its phenomenal character that a perceptual experience can provide us with 
epistemic justification for believing a proposition about the external world in the 
objective sense. Of course, more would need to be done to fill out a 
phenomenological account of the Basic Principle along these lines and, furthermore, 
some explanation would have to be given of how perceptual experiences can provide 
                                                 
5  To say that an experience e is subjectively indistinguishable from another experience e1 is to say 
that one cannot know on the basis of introspection and reflection alone that e is distinct from e1.  
6  For discussion of this form of disjunctivism, see (Martin, The Limits of Self-Awareness, 2004) 
and (Martin, On Being Alilenated, 2006). For other discussions on disjunctivism, see (McDowell, 
Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge, 1982) and (Snowdon, 1980) 
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us with epistemic justification for believing propositions about the external world 
when these experiences are not veridical and deceptive. For moment, however, I 
want to leave this issue aside and turn to the question of how we can understand 
Bonjour‘s challenge if we presuppose a subjective conception of epistemic 
justification.  
Recall that on one understanding of this conception, a subject has epistemic 
justification for believing a proposition p to the extent that, from his own subjective 
perspective, a situation obtains which entails or makes likely the truth of p. Earlier I 
suggested that, for the moment, we can think of the relevant subjective perspective 
as being constituted by some of the subject‘s beliefs. A subject, therefore, will have 
justification for believing a proposition p if he has an appropriate belief to the effect 
that a situation obtains which entails or makes it likely that p is true. Suppose then 
that we assume such a subjective conception of epistemic justification. If this is the 
case, we can perhaps understand Bonjour‘s challenge to consist in the claim that 
facts about the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience in which it is to the 
subject as if an object x is F do not provide the subject with any reasons for thinking 
that the proposition that an x is F is true.
7
 This means, in other words, that there is no 
reasonable or acceptable argument that the subject could provide, or any relevant 
piece of evidence that he could point to, that would show that facts about the 
phenomenal character of a perceptual experience in which it appears to one as if an x 
is F entail or make it likely that the proposition that an x is F is true. And it follows 
from this, so Bonjour might continue, that the subject cannot have an appropriate 
belief about the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience he is having 
                                                 
7 I take it that this is how Bonjour himself understands the challenge. 
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which would provide him with justification for believing the relevant proposition in 
the subjective sense.  
Once again the question at this point is how a proponent of the 
phenomenological approach could respond. Without arguing for it here, I want to 
suggest that the proponent of this approach should concede to Bonjour that we 
cannot in fact provide a reasonable or otherwise acceptable argument, or point to any 
relevant piece of evidence, that would show that the phenomenal character of a 
perceptual experience in which it is to the subject as if an x is F entails or makes it 
likely that the proposition that an x is F is true. However, this concession to Bonjour 
need not entail the failure of the phenomenological approach, even on the 
assumption that the concept of epistemic justification should be understood in the 
subjective sense. For one option for the proponent of this approach to take here is to 
drop the assumption, which earlier we made provisionally, that a relevant subjective 
perspective on the basis of which a subject has any epistemic justification for 
believing a proposition p can only be constituted by some of the subject‘s beliefs. 
Instead, we might suggest that a relevant perspective can also be constituted by other 
mental states such as a subject‘s perceptual experiences (as well as his memories, 
intuitions, etc.) Furthermore, a proponent of the phenomenological approach might 
insist that it is precisely because of its phenomenal character that a perceptual 
experience can constitute a relevant subjective perspective on the basis of which a 
subject has some justification for believing a proposition p. Thus, it is because, in 
having a perceptual experience, it is to the subject as if a mind-independent object x 
has a property F that he occupies a perspective from which a situation obtains which 
entails or makes likely the truth of the proposition that an x is F.  
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Motivating a Phenomenological Approach  
 
Again, the explanation of the Basic Principle about Perceptual Justification that was 
just sketched would need to be developed in more detail. But we have now seen, in a 
rough way, how a proponent of the phenomenological approach to the Basic 
Principle might attempt to address the challenge that Bonjour has presented to us.  
At this point, however, we might ask: why should we take a phenomenological 
approach toward explaining the Basic Principle at all? One source of motivation for 
taking this approach, or so I would suggest, lies in the issues that arise from what we 
might call the new evil demon problem. To see what this problem amounts to, it will 
help to compare it to the familiar problem of Cartesian scepticism, which we might 
also call the old evil demon problem. Essentially, the latter is the problem of whether 
or not it is possible for us to have any perceptual justification for believing (and, 
ultimately, of whether or not it is possible for us to have any perceptual knowledge 
of) propositions about the external world. For the Cartesian skeptic, this problem 
about the possibility of perceptual justification, and ultimately of perceptual 
knowledge, arises from the assumption that we can have no justification for 
believing, and therefore no knowledge of, the proposition that we are not in fact 
victims of a certain kind of evil demon, who is responsible for our having the 
perceptual experiences that we in fact do and for our forming mostly false beliefs 
about our environment. Thus, the Cartesian sceptic assumes, for example, that we 
can have no justification for believing that we are the victim of an evil demon who is 
responsible for our having perceptual experiences as of there being mind-
independent objects right before us and for our having beliefs about such objects 
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when in fact there are no such objects for us to be perceived. And it follows from 
this, so the skeptic contends, that we cannot have any perceptual justification for 
believing, and therefore cannot have any perceptual knowledge of, mundane 
propositions about the external world.  
Now in contrast to this form of Cartesian scepticism, the new evil demon 
problem does not as such put into question the possibility of our having 
epistemically justified perceptual beliefs, or of our having any perceptual knowledge, 
about the external world. What it does put into question, however, is the viability of 
specific theories of perceptual justification and knowledge and, in particular, of 
theories that rely on the notion that a justified perceptual belief is one that is based 
on reliable grounds or produced by a reliable process. The problem here is nicely 
summarised by Ernest Sosa in the following passage:  
 
What if twins of ours in another possible world were given mental lives just like 
ours down to the most minute detail of experience or thought, etc., though they 
were also totally in error about the nature of their surroundings, and their 
perceptual and inferential processes of belief acquisition accomplished very little 
except to sink them more and more deeply and systematically into error? Shall 
we say that we are justified in our beliefs while our twins are not? They are quite 
wrong in their beliefs, of course, but it seems somehow very implausible to 
suppose that they are unjustified. (Sosa, 1991, p. 132)  
 
The intuition expressed in this passage, which I will refer to as the new evil demon 
intuition, is that a victim of an evil demon can have perceptually justified beliefs 
about his environment despite the fact that the perceptual grounds or processes on 
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the basis of which he forms these beliefs are highly unreliable. What seems to follow 
from this intuition is that the reliability of grounds or processes on the basis of which 
a subject forms his beliefs cannot be a necessary condition for these beliefs to be 
epistemically justified for him. More generally, what the new evil demon intuition 
seems to imply is that our perceptual beliefs cannot be justified in the objective sense 
of epistemic justification that we outlined earlier.  
Now I take it that a phenomenological account of the Basic Principle of 
Perceptual Justification has to be motivated at least in part by its ability to provide an 
acceptable accommodation of the new evil demon intuition. And, on the surface, 
taking a phenomenological approach towards explaining how perceptual beliefs can 
be epistemically justified for us does seem promising in this respect. After all, what 
we and the subjects in the evil demon scenario seem to have in common is the fact 
that we both enjoy perceptual experiences that are of the same phenomenological 
kind.
8
 Thus if epistemic conclusions about how perceptual beliefs can be justified for 
us can be derived from facts about the phenomenal character of our experiences, then 
these conclusions are likely to apply not only to us but also to our counterparts in the 
evil demon scenario. Of course, none of this may turn out to be a conclusive reason 
for adopting a phenomenological account, even if such an account can be sustained. 
Thus, there may well be, for instance, other facts about the perceptual experiences of 
an evil demon victim or about the situation he finds himself in that equally apply to 
our experiences or the situation that we find ourselves in from which the relevant 
                                                 
8  This claim would need to be qualified if a disjunctivist conception of perceptual experience is 
correct. Thus, on this conception, it may be right to say that a veridical perception and a 
hallucination belong to the same phenomenological kind in the sense that both experiences are 
subjectively indistinguishable from the veridical experience. But, according to one particular form 
of disjunctivism a veridical perception and a hallucination essentially also belong to two different 
phenomenological kinds since the phenomenal character of the former, but not the latter, is 
constituted in by a relation to a mind-independent object  
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epistemic conclusions about how our perceptual beliefs are justified for us can be 
derived. 
However, the new evil demon intuition does, I believe, provide a different 
motivation for adopting a phenomenological approach to the Basic Principle. For one 
point to note is that the presentation of the evil demon scenario from which we elicit 
the intuitive judgments about when a perceptual belief can be epistemically justified 
for a subject is based in large part on the assumption that the victims of the evil 
demon have perceptual experiences that are, phenonenologically speaking, just like 
the perceptual experiences that we enjoy.
9
 In other words, it is precisely because of 
the assumption that the victims of the evil demon have perceptual experiences that 
are phenomenologically just like our perceptual experiences that we form the 
intuitive judgment that they, like us, have perceptual beliefs about their environment 
that are epistemically justified. This would seem to suggest that insofar as the new 
evil demon intuition is true and justified for us that it is because of the phenomenal 
character of their perceptual experiences that the victims of the new evil demon have 
perceptual beliefs that are epistemically justified for them. And if it is in virtue of the 
phenomenal character of their perceptual experiences that these victims have 
perceptual beliefs that are justified for them, it may seem reasonable to assume that 
the same conclusion applies to our perceptual beliefs as well. 
 
   
Outline of the Thesis 
 
                                                 
9 Again, see n. 8 
30 
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 1, I will consider the question of 
whether it is possible to provide an explanation of the Basic Principle in terms of the 
objective conception of epistemic justification. As we have seen such an explanation 
is essentially confronted with the new evil demon problem. I will thus consider 
potential accounts of the Basic Principle in terms of the objective conception of 
epistemic justification that specifically attempt to accommodate the new evil demon 
intuition. I will be concerned, in particular, with the accounts given by Michael 
Bergman and Tyler Burge and argue that neither of these provides a successful 
account of perceptual justification.   
In Chapter 2, I will turn to potential accounts of the Basic Principle in terms 
of the subjective conception of epistemic justification. I first consider and reject as a 
possible account Richard Foley‘s conception of epistemic rationality. I then turn to 
John McDowell‘s conception of perceptual justification, which I show can be taken 
to provide an explanation of the Basic Principle in terms of both the objective and 
subjective conception of epistemic justification. While this conception is ultimately 
unsatisfying, I suggest that it can illuminate a conception of perceptual justification 
in terms of the subjective conception of epistemic justification that can successfully 
accommodate the new evil demon intuition. Crucially, this account (like, in fact, the 
McDowellian one) appeals to the phenomenal character of perceptual experience.  
In Chapter 3, I consider potential connections between the metaphysics and 
epistemology of experience. In particular, I consider the potential epistemological 
implications of a disjunctivist conception of perceptual experience. Since on such a 
conception, the phenomenal character of a veridical perceptual experience is 
constituted differently than the phenomenal character of a hallucination, a 
disjunctivist account, insofar as perceptual justification is a matter of the phenomenal 
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character of an experience at all, leaves potential room for the claim that in the 
veridical case, perceptual experiences can provide one with a kind of justification 
that is not available in the hallucinatory case. I analyse some arguments in 
McDowell‘s writings that can be taken to support the claim that veridical perceptual 
experiences can, and should be taken to be able to, provide a kind of justification 
unavailable in the hallucinatory case. In turn, these arguments, if sound, might 
ultimately be taken to support the claim that veridical experiences can provide a kind 
of justification unavailable in the hallucinatory case because of the way the 
phenomenal character of the veridical experiences is constituted. I argue, however, 
that McDowell‘s arguments fail. 
In the final Chapter 4, I turn away from considerations about the phenomenal 
character of perceptual experience and turn instead to the question of whether or not 
perceptual experiences can provide us with a kind of immediate justification, that is, 
with justification that does not depend on our having independent justification for 
further beliefs, for example, for the belief that perceptual experience are generally 
reliable. I address this question in terms of the problem of easy knowledge as it is 
discussed by philosophers like Cohen. I argue that the problems Cohen raises need 
not compel us into thinking that perceptual justification cannot be immediate. As 
such, at least as far as the issues concerning easy knowledge are concerned, the Basic 
Principle can be taken to be made true by the fact that perceptual experiences can 
provide us with epistemic justification that does not depend on our having 
independent justification for further beliefs.  
  
32 
 
Chapter 1  
 
Introduction   
 
What we seek in this thesis is an explanation for the truth of the Basic Principle 
about Perceptual Justification. This principle, in its doxastic form, states that:  
 
If S has a perceptual experience as of a mind-independent object x being F 
and forms the belief that an x is F on the basis of this experience, then S‘s 
belief that an x is F is prima facie justified for S. 
 
The notion of justification mentioned in this principle is epistemic and therefore an 
evaluative notion, which can be understood in the following sense: to say that a 
belief that p is justified is to say, among other things, that it is appropriate in some 
sense with respect to the cognitive aim of believing p only if p is true. On an 
objective conception of justification, this may mean that a belief that p is justified 
only if it is based on grounds that in fact reliably indicate the truth of p or, 
alternatively, only if it is produced by a belief-forming process which in fact reliably 
produces true beliefs. On a subjective conception of justification, it may mean that a 
belief that p is justified only if the subject has an appropriate belief to the effect that 
conditions obtain that make it more likely than not that p is true. In this chapter, I 
address the question of whether it is possible to provide an explanation of the Basic 
Principle of Perceptual Justification in terms of the objective conception of epistemic 
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justification. I will refer to such explanations of the Basic Principle as objectivist 
explanations.  
One such explanation is what we might call a standard form of reliabilism about 
perceptual justification. This form of reliabilism holds that the Basic Principle is true 
insofar as a perceptual experience of an x being F is a reliable indication that an x is 
F or insofar as the belief that an x is F when formed on the basis of such a perceptual 
experience is formed by a belief-forming process that reliably produces true beliefs 
to effect that an x is F. Standard forms of reliabilist accounts of epistemic 
justification, however, face several well-known problems. One of these is the 
problem of clairvoyance as it is presented by Bonjour.
10
 This problem concerns a 
subject who is capable of forming reliably true beliefs on the basis of a clairvoyant 
power. Bonjour considers various cases of a clairvoyant subject each differing in 
terms of the subject‘s having or lacking evidence against having such powers, etc. 
The appeal to these cases is supposed to show that there can be instances in which a 
subject forms beliefs on the basis of highly reliable grounds or processes but lacks 
any justification for having these beliefs. If this really is the consequence of cases 
involving such a clairvoyant subject, it will mean that reliability of grounds or 
processes cannot be a sufficient condition for having justified beliefs formed on the 
basis of these grounds or processes.  
Another problem that is faced by standard forms of reliabilism is the new evil 
demon problem introduced earlier. As we have seen, this problem seems to show 
that reliability of grounds or processes cannot be a necessary condition for having 
justified beliefs formed on the basis of these grounds and processes. It is this 
                                                 
10 (Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, 1985) 
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problem, and the way it confronts objectivist explanations of the Basic Principle in 
general, that I want to address in this chapter.  
If we accept the intuition that a victim of an evil demon is capable of having 
justified perceptual beliefs and therefore reject any form of standard reliabilism 
about perceptual justification, there seem to be two possible options we can take in 
order to explain the Basic Principle while retaining at least in part an objectivist 
conception of epistemic justification. The first of these options appeals to the idea 
that there are two senses in which a subject‘s beliefs can be epistemically justified 
for him. This is a proposal that has been made by Alvin Goldman.
11
 In the first 
sense, which Goldman refers to as the ‗strong sense‘, a subject‘s beliefs are justified 
insofar as these beliefs are formed on the basis of reliable grounds or a reliable 
process. This is the sense in which a subject‘s perceptual beliefs are generally 
justified in friendly worlds or environments of the kind that we take ourselves to 
inhabit. In the second sense, which Goldman refers to as the‘ weak sense‘, a 
subject‘s beliefs are justified insofar as he is epistemically blameless in holding these 
beliefs. This is the sense in which a subject‘s perceptual beliefs are generally 
justified in unfriendly worlds or environments of the kind inhabited by victims of an 
evil demon.  According to Goldman, a subject S is merely justified in holding a 
belief that p in this second, weak sense when the following conditions are met: 
 
(1) The method M by which the belief is produced is unreliable.  
(2) S does not believe that M is unreliable 
(3) S neither possesses, nor has available to him/her, a reliable way of telling that 
M is unreliable.  
                                                 
11 (Goldman, Strong and Weak Justificaiton, 1988) 
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(4) There is no process or method S believes to be reliable which, if used, would 
lead S to believe that M is unreliable. (ibid, 56)  
 
The idea is thus roughly that a subject is justified in (merely) the weak sense insofar 
as his beliefs are unreliably formed but he cannot be reasonably blamed for doing so 
or for not respecting any countervailing evidence that there might be. However, in 
the remainder of this thesis, I will not be addressing in any detail the proposal that 
any form of epistemic justification can be accounted for in terms of doxastic 
blamelessness. The reason, briefly, is that the notion of doxastic blamelessness does 
not seem to be an epistemic notion at all since it does not seem to be conceptually 
connected in a relevant way with the notion of truth. Thus, suppose, for example, 
that I suffer from a particular brain lesion that causes me form the belief in the 
proposition that I am constantly being stalked and that prevents me from considering 
all the countervailing evidence that in fact exists against this proposition. I am 
certainly blameless in holding this belief but unless it is more likely than not to be 
true or unless I have some good reasons for thinking that I am constantly being 
stalked it is far from clear why this belief should be in any way epistemically 
justified for me.
12
 
The focus in the remainder of this chapter will therefore be with evaluating 
versions of the second option mentioned earlier. Roughly, this response to the new 
evil demon problem on the part of a proponent of an objectivist account of 
perceptual justification consists of saying that while reliability in the subject‘s own 
world or environment of the grounds or processes on the basis of which he forms his 
beliefs may not be a necessary condition for those beliefs to be epistemically 
                                                 
12  This is not to say, however, that we and the new evil demon victims cannot be justified in two 
different senses. I discuss a potential two sense account in Chapter 3 
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justified for the subject, it is a necessary condition for these beliefs to be justified 
that the grounds or processes on which they are based are reliable relative to some 
world or environment. As I will be showing, this kind of objectivist response to the 
new evil demon reasoning faces one particular fundamental problem. We can get an 
initial handle on this problem by considering the following example of an objectivist 
account. Suppose we were to say that a victim of an evil demon had justified 
perceptual beliefs because his perceptual experiences provided him with grounds 
that, while unreliable in his own world or environment,  are reliable in our, the actual 
world.
13
 This objectivist proposal would be immediately confronted with the 
following question: why should it be, objectively speaking, epistemically appropriate 
for the victim of an evil demon to form beliefs about his environment on the basis of 
grounds or processes that are reliable relative to some world or environment but 
highly unreliable relative the world or environment that he finds himself in? Call this 
the epistemic relevance question. I shall argue that the prominent objectivist 
accounts of perceptual justification that can be found in the literature which relativise 
reliability of perceptual grounds or perceptual belief forming processes face real 
difficulties in answering, and ultimately fail to provide satisfying answers to, this 
question.  
I will approach this issue as follows. In the next section, I discuss how the 
epistemic relevance question arises for standard forms of reliabilism independently 
of the new evil demon problem and how a standard reliabilist might satisfactorily 
address this question. I will then consider two objectivist accounts of perceptual 
justification that can be taken as attempting to solve the new evil demon problem by 
relativising reliability of perceptual grounds or perceptual belief forming processes 
                                                 
13  See (Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, 1986) for a proposal of this kind. Goldman does not 
actually endorse this proposal 
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to worlds or environments other than the world or environment inhabited by the 
victim of the new evil demon. In particular, I will be looking at the objectivist 
accounts of perceptual justification that are offered by, or can be derived from the 
work of, Michael Bergman and Tyler Burge. 
 
 
Global Reliabilism  
 
Reliabilism in its standard form faces questions concerning some (variations of 
certain) well-known thought experiments other than the new evil demon scenario. 
These questions are raised by a recent discussion about reliabilism by David 
Henderson and Terry Horgan. Henderson and Horgan appeal to a thought experiment 
that goes like this:  
 
Suppose that Athena and Fortuna are driving...through a county in which 
there happen to be numerous extremely realistic-looking fake barns within 
view of the highway – although neither of them has any inkling of this fact or 
any reason to suspect it. As it happens, in this local area all the real barns are 
yellows, and none of the fake barns or any other buildings are yellow. Again, 
they have no information to this effect. As they drive past a saliently 
presented yellow building, Athena, who has had reasonable experience with 
barns, gets a clear look at it, and on the basis of its barn-like visual 
experience, she judges it to be a barn.  
Fortuna only gets a very brief glimpse of the building. She saw her first 
barn just yesterday, elsewhere, and it happened to be yellow. She judges, on 
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the basis of the briefly glimpsed building‘s yellow color, that it is a barn – 
even though she did not get a good look at it, and was thus unable to discern 
any features that are generally distinctive of barns as opposed to other kinds 
of buildings. It‘s not that she has a general belief that all and only yellow 
buildings are barns, or that all barns are yellow...Also, it‘s not that she has a 
general tendency to inductively extrapolate from old cases to new ones in a 
hastily generalizing way, a tendency she might otherwise be exhibiting here. 
Rather, it just happens that in the present circumstances, a psychological 
process is present within her that takes as input both the brief glimpse of a 
yellow building and the yellow-barn memory, and generates as output the 
barn-belief about the briefly glimpsed object.  
So Athena and Fortuna each form the belief that the building is a barn. 
And indeed it is. (Henderson & Horgan, 2007, pp. 103-4)  
 
According to Henderson and Horgan, the intuitive verdict about Athena in this case 
is that while she fails to know that the building is a barn she nonetheless has a 
justified belief that it is despite the fact that the process on the basis of which she 
forms that belief – which takes a perceptual experiences of barn-like structures as an 
input and produces as an output the belief that the building is barn – are unreliable in 
the local environment through which she and Fortuna are currently driving. The 
intuitive verdict about Fortuna, on the other hand, is that she neither knows nor has a 
justified belief that the building is a barn despite the fact that the process on the basis 
of which she forms the belief – which takes a perceptual glimpse of a yellow 
building as an input and produces as an output the belief that the building is a barn – 
is a reliable in the given local environment. Still, Henderson and Horgan maintain 
39 
 
that neither of these two intuitive verdicts concerning the beliefs of Athena and 
Fortune entail that reliabilism about epistemic justification is essentially wrong. 
Rather what these verdicts may indicate to us is that what matters to one‘s having an 
epistemically justified belief is that this belief is formed on the basis of grounds or 
processes that are globally rather than merely locally reliable.  
A subject‘s global environment can be understood as a set consisting of various 
local environments that the subject may find himself in. Globally reliable belief-
forming processes are thus ones that have ―a tendency to produce (mostly) true 
beliefs...with respect to the wide reference class comprising the potential local 
environments to which an agent might be exposed (or which the agent might inhabit) 
within that agent‘s global environment.‖ (ibid, 105) On the emerging global 
reliabilist view, therefore, Athena‘s belief that the building is a barn is justified 
because it is based on a process that is globally reliable – after all, most barn-looking 
structures across the global environment are real barns – whereas Fortunes belief is 
unjustified because it is based on a process that is merely locally reliable. 
What should we make of this proposal? One question we might ask here is 
whether there is any motivation for thinking of epistemic justification as a matter of 
global reliability in Henderson and Horgan‘s sense independently of whether doing 
so renders correct the intuitive verdicts concerning the epistemic status of Athena‘s 
and Fortune‘s beliefs in the above case. Henderson and Horgan certainly think that 
such independent motivation can be provided. This is made clear in the following 
passage:  
 
One can begin to appreciate why epistemic safety – and the relative 
robustness of reliability – of belief-fixing processes would be 
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epistemologically significant when one reflects on a prominent and pervasive 
characteristic of epistemic life: one‘s epistemic endeavour must be 
undertaken in the face of uncertainty. One‘s epistemic chores must be 
managed while possessing only a fallible understanding regarding one‘s 
global and local environment. Such epistemic uncertainty (or fallibility) 
regarding one‘s environment is paralleled by, or mirrored in, an uncertainty 
(or fallibility) regarding what processes will work in one‘s environment. In 
view of the uncertainty characteristic of the epistemic situation, consider two 
alternatives...On the one hand, one could employ a process that is reliable 
with respect to the wide reference class comprising the potential local 
environments two which one might be exposed (or which one might inhabit) 
within one‘s global environment...[Such a process] is relatively safe insofar 
as its reliability does not depend heavily upon certain unusual or atypical 
features that highly specific to the particular circumstance or environment 
which the possessor of the disposition might happen to occupy; its reliability 
then does not obtain only relative to a narrow reference class of environments 
in which those particular features happen to be present. Alternatively, one 
might employ processes that would be reliable only given certain unusual or 
atypical environment features – only given features that are highly specific to 
particular circumstances or environments within the global environment that 
one happens to occupy. If, in employing such a process one employs a 
reliable process, it is a merely locally reliable process. In light of the 
uncertainty that is a pervasive fact of epistemic life, it is clear what one 
should make of this general abstract choice. The safety afforded by globally 
reliable processes would be rationally desirable in preference to the risk one 
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runs when using a merely locally reliable process. (Henderson & Horgan, 
2007, pp. 107-8)  
 
The argument that Henderson and Horgan present here seems to be this: we should 
think of an epistemically justified belief as one that is produced by a globally reliable 
process because choosing such a process would be rationally preferable to choosing 
a process that is merely locally reliable. 
But now the question is: ‗rationally preferable‘ in what sense? In Henderson and 
Horgan‘s sense, the rationally preferable choice here arises from a particular set of 
constraints. First a choice has to be made between two competing belief-forming 
processes, namely a globally reliable process and a merely locally reliable one. 
Second, the choice has to be made under conditions in which the chooser lacks 
knowledge of relevant features of the environment that he finds himself in and 
knowledge of what belief-forming processes will work in that environment. Third, 
though this is not explicitly stated in the above passage, we can take it that the choice 
has to be made with the aim of forming a true belief about what obtains in the given 
environment. Thus the sense in which a belief-forming process ‗works‘ or does not 
‗work‘ in the given environment is that of whether this process will or will not 
produce a belief that is more likely than not to be true.  
Now given these constraints, we can concede that it straightforwardly follows 
that the globally reliable process is by far the rationally preferable choice. For given 
one‘s antecedent knowledge about the choices one has and about how these might 
work in the given environment, in choosing the globally reliable process one 
minimizes the risk of forming a false belief. Hence it is the globally reliable process 
rather than the merely locally reliable one that can provide one with justification for 
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believing the relevant proposition in one‘s current local environment – even if this 
process turns out to be unreliable in that environment –  because this process ensures 
a level of epistemic safety that cannot be secured by the merely locally reliable one. 
Of course, it should be said here, that epistemic subjects under ordinary 
circumstances do not actually make the kind of choice that is envisaged in the above 
passage. But as Henderson and Horgan make clear, this kind of choice is merely an 
abstract one. Thus we can take the conditions under which this kind of choice is 
made as representing a certain rational perspective which fixes for us an objective 
conception of epistemic justification; that is, a conception of when beliefs are or are 
not, objectively speaking, appropriate from an epistemic point of view. From this 
perspective, a belief based on globally reliable processes is epistemically appropriate 
whereas a belief based on a merely locally reliable process is not.  
How good is the argument that Henderson and Horgan provide in support of the 
claim that we should think of epistemic justification as a matter of the global 
reliability of a given belief-forming process? One further question that we might 
have at this point is why we should think that it is the particular perspective of a 
rational subject that Henderson and Horgan rely on that should fix for us an objective 
conception of epistemic justification. Certainly, we can think of relevant rational 
choices being made under very different constraints. For example, we could suppose 
that a rational subject – faced with the two choices for belief-forming processes as 
Henderson and Horgan‘s rational subject – does in fact have prior knowledge of 
whether or not the two processes will work in the local environment in which the 
relevant belief is to be formed. Of course, from this perspective, it will be, 
objectively speaking, entirely appropriate to rely on the locally reliable process 
rather than the globally reliable one. After all, the locally reliable process will in fact 
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make it more likely than not, in the given case, that the belief to be formed is true. So 
why should this rational perspective rather than the one outlined by Henderson and 
Horgan not fix for us an objective conception of epistemic justification?  
At this point, I want to suggest that rather than pursuing this line of questioning, 
that the issue here is far more straightforward than Henderson and Horgan suggest. 
The question, to repeat, is why it should be epistemically appropriate, objectively 
speaking, for us to rely on globally reliable processes in forming our beliefs? The 
answer to this question seems be just this: we should do so because we do, as a 
matter of fact, conduct our epistemic affairs within a global environment and are not, 
therefore, merely confined to just a particular local environment. It follows from this 
that relying on globally reliable processes will ensure that most of the beliefs that we 
form in conducting our epistemic affairs will turn out to be mostly true. And given 
that it is surely a proper epistemic goal to have beliefs that are all, or mostly, true, 
this makes reliance on globally reliable processes epistemically appropriate from an 
objective point of view. It also follows from the fact that we do conduct our 
epistemic affairs within a global environment that relying on globally reliable 
processes is epistemically more appropriate than relying on a merely locally reliable 
process because the latter unlike the former cannot ensure that most of our beliefs 
turn out to be true in a global context.  
At this point, we might ask, however, if we do conduct our epistemic affairs 
within a global environment, why – objectively speaking – we should rely on a 
globally reliable process rather than relying on whatever process might be locally 
reliable in the environment that we happen to find ourselves in. For objectively 
speaking, reliance on whatever process is reliable in the local environment we 
happen to occupy at any given moment may satisfy the epistemic goal of having 
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mostly true beliefs in a global context even better than mere reliance on a globally 
reliable process.  
In response to this question, I think that the reliabilist can concede that relying 
on whatever process is reliable in the local environment we happen to occupy may 
be even more objectively appropriate than merely relying on a globally reliable 
process but still insist that doing the latter is nonetheless epistemically appropriate to 
a sufficiently high degree such that beliefs produced by such a globally reliable 
process count as epistemically justified.  In other words, relying on processes that are 
globally reliable does a sufficiently good job of fulfilling the aim of having true 
beliefs and avoiding false ones within a global context in way that reliance on such 
processes can result in genuinely justified beliefs.   
Suppose then that we ask the epistemic relevance question in relation to 
Henderson and Horgan‘s Athena: why should she rely on a process that is globally 
reliable but unreliable in the local environment she finds herself in? The answer to 
this question is that, even though the globally reliable process is more likely than not 
to produce a false belief in the local environment that Athena finds herself in, it 
nonetheless ensures that most of the beliefs that she forms on the basis of this 
process will come out to be true rather than false. So in the absence of her having 
reasons for thinking that she is in a local environment in which her processes are 
unreliable, it is epistemically appropriate for her, to a degree sufficient to yield 
epistemic justification, to rely on her barn-like visual experiences. 
The kind of thought experiment that Henderson and Horgan run therefore 
provides us with some motivation for adopting a form of global reliabilism. In the 
final analysis, however, this sort of reliabilism, of course, is still unacceptable 
because it fails to address the new evil demon problem. Thus we can imagine a 
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scenario in which a victim of an evil demon enjoys perceptual experiences that from 
the inside are just like our perceptual experiences but inhabits a global environment 
in which these perceptual experiences are highly unreliable. As we have seen, the 
intuitive judgment about such victims is that they can have justified perceptual 
beliefs which means that the reliability of their perceptual experiences relative their 
global environment cannot be a necessary condition for their having justified 
perceptual beliefs. 
So we are still seeking an objectivist account of the Basic Principle that can 
accommodate the new evil demon intuition. As I have indicated, the objectivist 
approaches that I will be considering in more detail will insist that being 
epistemically justified requires having beliefs that are based on grounds or processes 
that are reliable relative to some environment, even if they are not reliable relative to 
the environment that a subject, like the evil demon victim, might find himself in. 
However, just like the global reliabilist, the proponent of such an approach will have 
to provide some principled explanation for why it should be epistemically 
appropriate, from an objective point of view, for a subject to rely on processes or 
grounds that are not reliable in the environment he finds himself in.  
In next section, I will consider the accounts of the justification of perceptual 
beliefs that are suggested by, or can be derived from, the work of Bergman on the 
one hand and Burge on the other. I will first provide an outline of each view before 
evaluating their viability with respect to the epistemic relevance question.  
 
 
Bergman’s Proper Function Account  
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In a recent book, Bergman develops an objectivist conception of an epistemically 
justified belief as one that is produced by a properly functioning cognitive faculty. 
The most detailed development of epistemic notions in terms of proper function is 
provided by Alvin Plantinga.
14
 Plantinga is concerned with giving an account of 
what he calls warrant which is a property that a belief can have and which turns a 
true belief into knowledge. Instead of analysing Plantinga‘s account of warrant, 
however, I will focus on the recent account provided by Bergman. Like Plantinga, 
Bergman appeals to the notion of proper function in developing an epistemological 
theory. But unlike Plantinga, Bergman is concerned with the concept of epistemic 
justification. This concept, as we have been understanding it, is a concept of a 
property that makes a belief appropriate from an epistemic point of view but is not 
one which essentially turns a true belief into knowledge. Even more importantly for 
our current purposes, Bergman‘s account of epistemic justification in terms of proper 
function is intended in part to account for the problem presented to us by the new 
evil demon scenario. If viable, this account could provide us with an objectivist 
conception of epistemic justification as well as an explanation of the Basic Principle 
of Perceptual Justification consistent with the new evil demon intuition.  
As a general analysis of what an epistemically justified belief amounts to, 
Bergman offers the following: 
 
S‘s belief B is justified iff (i) S does not take B to be defeated and (ii) the 
cognitive faculties producing B are (a) functioning properly, (b) truth-aimed 
and (c) reliable in the environment for which they are ‗designed‘ (Bergman, 
2006, p. 133)  
                                                 
14 (Plantinga, 1993) 
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If we apply this general analysis of an epstemically justified belief to the Basic 
Principle of Perceptual Justification in its doxastic form, we thus say that the Basic 
Principle is true insofar as S‘s forming the belief that something is x on the basis of 
having an experience as of an x being F is the result of the proper functioning of a 
cognitive faculty that is truth-aimed and reliable in the environment for which this 
faculty is ‗designed‘. The key elements of this analysis are the conditions listed 
under (ii). These conditions appeal to the notion of a cognitive faculty that is 
functioning properly, aimed at producing true beliefs and thus ‗designed‘ to be 
reliable under certain conditions. How should we understand these notions? As 
Plantinga notes, the notions employed here are most naturally applied to artefacts 
and devices and the purposeful, conscious beings who design them. (Plantinga 1993, 
195) This immediately raises the question of how we can apply these notions to our 
cognitive faculties without having to assume that these are artefacts or devices 
designed by some purposeful and conscious being. For if we don‘t take our cognitive 
faculties to be the product of a purposeful, conscious designer, in what sense should 
we understand the notion that these faculties are functioning properly, aimed at truth 
and therefore ‗designed‘ for a specific purpose?  Ultimately, we might think that 
such notions are inapplicable to our cognitive faculties unless they can be given 
some naturalistic explanation. However, I will leave these issues aside here. 
Furthermore, to simplify our discussion, I will use these notions as we most naturally 
understand them, namely as applying to artefacts and devices and as presupposing a 
purposeful, conscious designer. 
Why then should we take a justified belief as a belief that meets the conditions 
under (ii)? Consider first condition (ii)(a). Bergman‘s explanation of why this 
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condition holds for justified beliefs runs allowing the following lines. Take the case 
of a perceptually justified belief. Generally, we might say that a belief that an x is F 
when formed on the basis of an experience as of an x being F is justified insofar as 
that belief is an ‗epistemically fitting doxastic response‘ to the perceptual experience. 
An account of what makes a doxastic response a fitting response to a perceptual 
experience experience may accept the following three conditions: 
 
Nonreliability: the fittingness of doxastic response B to evidence E is not 
contingent upon E‘s being a reliable indicator of B‘s truth [in the subject‘s 
environment] 
 
Objectivity: the fittingness of a doxastic response B to evidence E is objective 
fittingness (in the sense that fittingness from the subject‘s perspective isn‘t 
sufficient for it).  
 
Necessity: the fittingness of doxastic response B to evidence E is an essential 
property of that response to that evidence. (Bergman 2006, p. 112) 
 
For reasons I won‘t go into here, Bergman argues at length that an account of what 
constitutes a fitting doxastic response to a piece of evidence should drop Necessity. 
Applied to our perceptual case from before this means that while for a subject like us 
the belief that an x is F may, in the absence of any countervailing evidence, be a 
fitting doxastic response to his having a perceptual experience of an x being F, this 
need not be the case for subjects who are unlike us in some epistemically relevant 
respect. So what then makes a belief a fitting doxastic response to a perceptual 
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experience if what does so is not a necessary but contingent property of that 
response? According to Bergman, what makes a belief a fitting doxastic response to 
a perceptual experience, is that this belief is produced by a properly functioning 
cognitive faculty. Hence condition (ii)(a) is a necessary condition for having a 
justified belief. Bergman‘s suggestion may thus be taken to mean that our cognitive 
faculties are designed in such a way that when we have a perceptual experience of an 
x being F, under normal circumstances, we respond by forming the belief that an x is 
F. Other species, however, may have cognitive faculties that are designed to form 
different kinds of beliefs on the basis of the same kind of perceptual experience. This 
does not preclude that their beliefs are doxastically fitting responses to a perceptual 
experience of that kind as long as further conditions are met.  
These conditions are (ii) (b) and (ii) (c). (ii) (b) is required to make the response 
produced by a properly functioning cognitive faculty an epistemically fitting as 
opposed to say, a pragmatically fitting, response. The following example illustrates 
this point:  
 
...suppose...that the particular faculty producing the belief we are considering is 
intended by its creator not to produce true beliefs but, rather, to produce beliefs 
that will minimize psychological trauma (even if that involves regularly 
producing false beliefs). Then it seems that beliefs being produced by such a 
cognitive faculty won‘t be epistemically fitting responses to the input to the 
subject‘s belief-forming system though they may be appropriate in some other 
sense. This would be a case of a belief that isn‘t justified (since it isn‘t an 
epistemically fitting doxastic response) even though it is produced by a properly 
functioning cognitive faculty. (Bergman, p. 135; his emphasis)  
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A similar point applies to condition (ii)(c). That is, unless the cognitive faculty is 
reliable in the way it was designed to be, it will not produce epistemically fitting 
responses to inputs in a subject‘s belief-forming system and will therefore be 
incapable of producing epistemically justified beliefs. I take it that this condition is 
meant to satisfy the general objectivist requirement that a belief-forming process 
yields epistemically justified beliefs only if it is in some sense sufficiently truth-
conducive independently of it‘s being truth-conducive from the subject‘s 
perspective.  Here is Bergman‘s example in support of this claim:  
 
...consider a creature designed by one of Hume‘s infant deities. And suppose 
that, although this incompetent creator was trying to make a believer with 
reliable faculties, it instead created one whose faculties produce mostly false 
beliefs when placed in the environment in which it was intended by its creator to 
produce true beliefs. For example, suppose this infant deity intentionally created 
Ric in such a way that...his natural unlearned doxastic response to an 
[experience] ME2 is to form [belief] B1. But, contrary to what this bumbling 
creator had hoped, this belief (like most other belief Ric forms) is false when 
produced in the intended environment by faculties functioning as they were 
designed to function. Is Ric‘s belief B1 an epistemically fitting response to 
ME2? It seems not...Despite the failed design attempt, the belief in question may 
be, in some sense, the output of properly functioning cognitive faculties...But 
because the plan, when implemented as intended, didn‘t work, the belief doesn‘t 
seem to be an epistemically fitting response to the subject‘s evidence. (ibid, pp. 
135-6).  
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Of course, the stipulation that the cognitive faculty only has to be reliable in the 
environment in which it is intended to be reliable, rather than the environment in 
which the subject of the faculty may happen to find himself in, is such that it can 
accommodate the new evil demon intuition. Thus on Bergman‘s analysis, the victim 
of the evil demon can have justified perceptual beliefs, even if the cognitive faculties 
producing these beliefs are highly unreliable in his environment, provided these 
faculties are functioning properly, aimed at producing true beliefs and reliable in the 
environment they are intended to be reliable in.  
Is this a satisfactory accommodation of the new evil demon intuition? Before 
answering this question, I want to first look at an alternative objectivist account of 
perceptual justification.  
 
 
Burge’s Anti-Individualist Account  
 
The other account is the view about perceptual entitlement that has been developed 
by Tyler Burge. Before analyzing this view, it will be helpful to first clarify Burge‘s 
use of certain terms. The term ‗entitlement‘, as Burge uses it, refers to a sub-species 
of what he calls ‗epistemic warrant‘. The latter is used to refer to what I have been 
calling justification here rather than to what Plantinga refers to by his use of the term 
‗warrant‘ which is a property of belief that turns a true belief into knowledge. 
According to Burge, an ‗entitlement is epistemically externalist inasmuch as it is 
warrant that need not be fully conceptually accessible, even on reflection, to the 
warranted individual. The individual need not have the concepts necessary to think 
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the propositional content that formulates the warrant.‖ (Burge, 2003) The other 
subspecies of warrant is what Burge refers to as ‗justification‘, which is ―warrant by 
reason that is conceptually accessible on reflection to the warranted individual‖ (ibid, 
p. 505) In explicating a conception of perceptual entitlement, Burge seeks an 
understanding of how beliefs about one‘s environment can be warranted by one‘s 
perceptual experiences where this warrant is not derived from a subject‘s possession 
of reasons from which the relevant propositions about the environment can be 
inferred. Perceptual entitlements for beliefs about the environment are therefore 
essentially non-inferential. In what follows, I shall speak of Burge‘s view on 
perceptual justification rather than entitlement. In doing so, I will use the term 
‗justification‘ in the way that I have been doing so far. This use is to be distinguished 
from Burge‘s use of the same term.  
The key element of Burge‘s view on perceptual justification is that it derives in 
part from the truth of anti-individualism about representational states, namely ―...the 
principle that certain representational states are dependent on their natures, and for 
the individuation of what representational contents they have, on certain relations 
between the individual or relevant representational systems of the individual – and 
certain aspects of the environment that is represented.‖ (ibid, 505) To Burge, 
perceptual experiences are just one type of representational state whose nature is 
individuated in this way. Thus he states:  
 
A condition on particular perceptual representational states‘ having the content 
that they have is that there have been both causal-formative interactions (which 
are not in themselves representational) and representationally successful 
interactions between instances of types of relevant perceptual referents and 
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aspects of the individual‘s perceptual system (in either the individual‘s history, 
or in evolution of the system in his evolutionary ancestors, or in some other 
way). (ibid, p. 531)  
 
On this view, a perceptual experience‘s representing an x as being F can only be a 
result of actual causal interactions between instances of x and instances of the 
property F on the one hand and the perceptual system of the subject whose 
perceptual experience it is on the other. In connection with this form of anti-
individualism about perceptual experiences, Burge introduces the notion of a normal 
environment. This is the environment ―by reference to which the perceptual content 
of the perceptual state is explained and established.‖ (ibid, p. 532) In other words, it 
is the environment in which causal interactions occur between features of that 
environment and the subject‘s perceptual representational system, causal interactions 
which make the subject‘s perceptual experiences have the representational contents 
that they do.  
The crucial epistemic move that Burge makes then comes at this point. Suppose 
that the causal interactions between features of the subject‘s normal environment and 
his perceptual representational system are the result of lawlike connections in such 
way that the representational content of these states are reliably veridical in the 
normal environment. One upshot of this supposition is that the reliable causal 
connections between features of the subject‘s normal environment and his perceptual 
representational system are constitutively connected with the nature of these states; 
in other words the reliable causal connections make the perceptual states what they 
are, namely states with certain representational contents. Crucially for Burge, when 
perceptual experiences and their representational contents are constituted in this way 
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by reliable causal connections between the subject‘s perceptual representational 
system and the environmental features that his experiences represent, the perceptual 
experiences become epistemically efficacious. For essentially, according to Burge, a 
perceptual experience with a certain representational content of an x being F 
provides one with justification for believing the corresponding proposition that an x 
is F only if perceptual experiences of this type are reliably veridical in the subject‘s 
normal environment and only if the reliable veridicality of perceptual experiences of 
this type is constitutively connected to these experiences having the nature that they 
do.  
At this point, I want to briefly compare my analysis so far of Burge‘s view of 
perceptual justification so far with Anthony Brueckner‘s interpretation of the same 
view. Brueckner summarises Burge‘s view of perceptual justification as follows:   
 
I. Anti-individualism holds for perceptual content. (Assumption)  
II. An individual‘s perceptual state types are reliably veridical in his 
perceptual system‘s normal environment. (I) 
III. This reliable veridicality is explained by the nature of the perceptual states. 
(I) 
IV. If (i) an individual‘s perceptual state types are reliably veridical in his 
perceptual system‘s normal environment, and (ii) this reliable veridicality 
is explained by the nature of the perceptual states, then the individual is 
entitled to hold beliefs appropriately based upon those states (Assumption).  
V. Perceptual entitlements exists. ((II), (III), (IV))15 
 
                                                 
15 (Brueckner, 2007, p. 162) 
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Brueckner interprets Burge as saying that (I) entails (II). On this interpretation, we 
would take Burge to say that we can validly infer a priori from the assumption that 
perceptual experiences have contents that are anti-individualistically individuated the 
proposition that these experiences are reliably veridical in the subject‘s normal 
environment. However, as far as I can tell, Burge nowhere makes an assumption 
along these lines. In the first instance, in line with his acceptance of anti-
individualism about perceptual representational content, he simply assumes that 
perceptual experiences have the contents that they do as a result of actual causal 
interactions between features of the subject‘s home environment and his perceptual 
representational system. Burge does not seem to hold in addition to this that 
perceptual experiences have the representational contents that they do only if the 
relevant causal interactions that individuate these contents are also reliable. Rather 
his view seems to be that if perceptual experiences have representational contents 
that are anti-individualistically individuated and if, as a matter of contingent fact, 
these experiences have the contents that they do as a result of reliable causal 
connections between the relevant features of the subject‘s normal environment and 
his perceptual representational system, then these perceptual experiences can provide 
the subject with epistemic justification (or entitlement) for forming beliefs about his 
surroundings. 
In summary, my analysis of Burge‘s view on perceptual justification, unlike that 
of Brueckner‘s analysis, is therefore as follows  
 
I. Anti-individualism holds for perceptual content. (Assumption)  
II. An individual‘s perceptual state types are reliably veridical in his 
perceptual system‘s normal environment (Assumption).  
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III. The nature of the individual‘s perceptual states is explained and constituted 
by this reliable veridicality. (I, II) 
IV. If (i) an individual‘s perceptual state types are reliably veridical in his 
perceptual system‘s normal environment, and (ii) the nature of the 
perceptual states is explained and constituted by this reliable veridicality, 
then the individual is justified (or entitled) to rely up on his perceptual 
states, and he is justified (or entitled) to hold beliefs appropriately based 
upon these states. (Assumption)  
V. Perceptual justification (entitlement) exists. ((II), (III), (IV))  
 
As we have seen, it is the last premise in this argument that is the key thought in 
Burge‘s conception of perceptual justification. To him, it is absolutely crucial that 
mere reliable veridicality of perceptual experiences does not by itself render these 
experiences epistemically efficacious. Thus he claims: ―Reliable connections to the 
world that are accidental relative to the conditions that individuate the individual‘s 
perceptual states and competencies contribute nothing to empirical epistemic 
entitlement.‖ (Burge, 2003, p. 534) This means that accidental connections – that is, 
connections that do not contribute to the individuation of the nature of perceptual 
experiences –  between perceptual experiences and features of a subject‘s 
environment, even if these are reliable, cannot contribute to the subject‘s having 
justified beliefs formed on the basis of these experiences.  
The question, of course, is why this should be so? Unfortunately, at least as far 
as I can tell, Burge does not provide any further defence of this assumption. 
However, rather than questioning it, I want to proceed by granting Burge his key 
thought about when the reliability of perceptual experiences contributes to the 
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epistemic efficacy of these experiences and when it does not. For a further claim that 
Burge makes, which I will eventually question,  is not only that reliable connections 
between perceptual experiences and features of the world fail to contribute to the 
epistemic efficacy of these experiences if these connections are merely accidental 
relative to the nature of the experiences, but also that the unreliability of perceptual 
experiences in a given environment need not affect their epistemic efficacy if the 
environment is not the one relative to which the nature of these perceptual 
experiences is individuated.  Thus:  
 
Perceptual errors or unreliabilities that are perceptually indiscernible and derive 
from brute abnormalities in the environmental conditions that cause perceptual 
states do not undermine warrant. Both unreliability and reliability in conditions 
other than those that played a role in explaining the nature of the perceptual state 
and the exercise of the perceptual competence are accidental relative to those 
natures. So reliability and unreliability in such conditions are irrelevant to the 
connection between warrant and veridicality. The only reliability that is relevant 
to the contribution of perceptual states to perceptual warrant is one that attaches 
to the states‘ normal functioning in the conditions that explain their natures. 
That is the only reliability that is non-accidental relative to the natures of the 
perceptual states. (ibid, 536)  
 
So in looking at Burge‘s view, we are now confronted with two different claims. To 
repeat, the first claim is that if perceptual experiences provide one with epistemic 
justification for believing propositions about one‘s surroundings then the nature of 
these experiences has to be connected in a reliable way to features of the 
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environment relative to which the nature of these experiences is individuated. The 
second claim is that perceptual experiences can provide one with epistemic 
justification for believing propositions about one‘s environment even if these 
experiences are highly unreliable in that environment provided that the environment 
in which the experiences are unreliable is not the one relative to which the nature of 
the experiences is individuated.  
One question is how these two claims are related and, in particular, whether or 
not they are independent from one another. Burge thinks that they are not. This is 
made clear in the following passage:  
 
... the normal environment – the conditions in which content is explained and 
established – is privileged in explanation of entitlement. Its privilege derives 
from the fact that it plays a central role in making the individual‘s states what 
they are – a role that abnormal environments do not play. This privilege entails 
the irrelevance to entitlement of reliability and unreliability in other conditions. 
So it extends to indiscernible abnormal environments that the individual might 
contingently find himself in. (ibid, 536)  
 
The line of argument presented here can be summarised as follows. (A) The normal 
environment is privileged with respect to the explanation of perceptual justification 
(or entitlement); it is privileged in the sense that only reliable connections between 
features of the normal environment and a subject‘s perceptual experiences can 
contribute to epistemic efficacy of these perceptual experiences (this is essentially 
the first claim above). From (A) it follows that (B) reliable connections between 
features of the world and a subject‘s perceptual experiences outside of the subject‘s 
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normal environment contribute nothing to the epistemic efficacy of these 
experiences. It also follows from (A) that (C) the unreliability of perceptual 
experiences in a given environment other than the normal environment does not 
affect the epistemic efficacy of these experiences (provided of course that these 
experiences are reliable in the subject‘s normal environment)   
Now I take it that the entailment from (A) to (B) is unproblematic. But why 
should we accept that (A) entails (C)? Unfortunately again, Burge does not seem to 
offer a defence of this crucial move. At the very least, it is not immediately clear 
why (A) should entail (C). For we could accept the proposition that perceptual 
experiences provide justification only if they are reliable relative to the subject‘s 
normal environment and yet insist that they provide one with justification only if one 
is actually in environments in which the experiences are reliable. Call this 
conjunction proposition (D). One of the reasons one might hold (D) to be true is that 
it is only in environments in which perceptual experiences are actually reliable that 
they are, objectively speaking, a good route to truth. (D), in virtue of its second 
conjunct, is of course inconsistent with (C). So if, as Burge says, (A) entails (C), the 
second conjunct of (D) must be false since (A) entails the first conjunct of (D). But 
prima facie, there does not seem to be any inconsistency in (D). 
Leave this issue aside for the moment (I will return to it below). Of course, if we 
were to accept (C) (that is, the second of the two claims of Burge‘s listed earlier), 
then we can give (at least a partial) explanation of the new evil demon intuition. A 
victim of an evil demon can have justified perceptual beliefs insofar as he forms 
these beliefs on the basis of perceptual experiences with representational contents 
that are reliably veridical in his normal environment even if these contents are highly 
unreliable in the environment he inhabits. On Burge‘s account, evil demon victims 
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are entitled to rely on their perceptual experiences in forming beliefs about their 
surroundings insofar as these experiences are by their nature reliably connected to 
the truth of these beliefs, not in his current environment but in the environment in 
which his perceptual system has developed.  
  
   
Evaluating Bergman’s and Burge’s Views  
 
Bergman and Burge each have now presented us with two different objectivist views 
of how perceptual beliefs can be epistemically justified for us. In evaluating their 
views, I want to focus specifically on the question of whether or not they 
successfully accommodate the new evil demon intuition. 
I will begin with Bergman‘s proper function account. To recall, this view holds 
that the victim of an evil demon is epistemically justified in holding his perceptual 
beliefs, even if these are reliably false, because these beliefs are the result of a 
cognitive process that is functioning properly, designed to produce true beliefs, and 
reliable in the environment for which it is designed. But why should we think that 
the conclusion that the evil demon victim has justified perceptual beliefs should 
follow from these conditions?  
On brief reflection, this conclusion does not seem to follow naturally at all. 
Consider, for example, this analogy. Suppose that I have the intention of taking part 
in a bicycle race in a mountainous and rocky terrain. The bike that I choose for doing 
so, however, is a highly specialised and sophisticated racing bike that was used by 
eight-time Tour de France winner Lance Armstrong on the last Tour. This bike is in 
excellent working order and as such functioning as it is supposed to function, is 
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designed to maximise a rider‘s ability to ride at very high speeds on paved and 
reasonably smooth roads and does so reliably under the conditions for which it was 
designed. Of course, given the thinness of the wheels on this bike, I struggle to make 
my way through the race at a high speed without damaging the wheels in the rocky 
terrain that I am riding in. Given the environment that I am in, it is clear that it is 
entirely inappropriate for me to be using this bike. Instead, I should have opted for a 
specialised mountain-bike with the kind of wheels, construction and design 
appropriate for racing in a mountainous and rocky terrain. In evaluating the 
appropriateness of using the racing bike, it is simply entirely irrelevant whether or 
not the bike is functioning as it is supposed to function, whether or not it is designed 
to maximise the rider‘s ability to achieve high speeds on normal roads, and whether 
or not it reliably does so under the conditions for which it was designed. 
By analogy, we might thus say that it is epistemically entirely inappropriate, 
objectively speaking, for the victim of an evil demon to rely on belief-forming 
processes that are highly unreliable in the environment that he finds himself in. And 
the appeal to the fact that these belief-forming processes are functioning properly, 
are designed to produce true beliefs and are reliable in the sort of environment for 
which they were designed seems to be entirely irrelevant.  
Of course, in the case of evaluating the epistemic appropriateness of relying on a 
particular belief-forming process, we have to recall that such evaluations depend in a 
crucial way on what epistemic goal is meant to be satisfied. Thus there may well be 
good reasons for thinking that we shouldn‘t simply evaluate the epistemic 
appropriateness of a subject‘s relying on a belief-forming process in terms of 
whether it reliably leads to true beliefs in his particular environment but rather 
whether it reliably leads to true beliefs in a wider reference class of environments. 
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One good reason for evaluating a subject‘s reliance on a belief-forming process in 
this way is if we can suppose that this subject actually conducts (or perhaps, is 
physically capable of conducting) his epistemic affairs in a wider reference class of 
environments.   
However, this is not a strategy that Bergman can fruitfully pursue. For it is 
entirely possible for there to be a victim of an evil demon who conducts his 
epistemic affairs entirely in an environment or in a class of environments in which 
his perceptual belief-forming processes are highly unreliable but, still, are 
functioning properly, designed to produce true beliefs and reliable in the 
environment for which it was designed. Thus suppose that the evil demon creates a 
world much like our world. As inhabitants of this world, he creates organisms with 
the same cognitive processes that we have. In particular, he designs these organisms 
in such a way that they have perceptual belief-forming processes that are aimed at 
truth and are in fact (globally) reliable in this world. The organisms heavily rely on 
these processes in forming beliefs about their surroundings and we can assume, here, 
that it is entirely appropriate, epsitemically and objectively, for them to do so given 
that these processes produce mostly true beliefs. However, one day the demon 
cruelly destroys this world and replaces it with a world radically different from what 
it was but continues to feed the organisms he created with the same kind of 
perceptual experiences they were enjoying before. The perceptual belief-forming 
processes of these organisms are now (globally) highly unreliable. But should we say 
that the organisms‘ perceptual belief-forming processes continue to produce justified 
beliefs for these organisms?  
From an objective perspective, the answer to this question seems to be ‗no‘. 
After all, the reliance on their perceptual belief-forming processes does not leave 
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these organisms with beliefs that are mostly true, even in a global context. Thus 
relative to the goal of forming mostly true beliefs in conducting their epistemic 
affairs, reliance on their perceptual belief-forming process is, objectively speaking, 
entirely inappropriate. Again, the fact that these processes are functioning properly, 
designed to produce true beliefs and reliable in the environment for which they are 
designed seems entirely irrelevant. For there does not seem to be any relevant 
epistemic goal here relative to which the reliance on these processes can be, 
objectively speaking, epistemically appropriate.  
Burge‘s view ultimately faces problems that are similar to the ones faced by 
Bergman‘s view. Recall that, according to Burge, a subject is epistemically justified 
in relying on his perceptual experiences insofar as these experiences are by their very 
nature connected with reliable representation. This means that a subject is 
epistemically justified insofar as these perceptual experiences have the nature that 
they do as a result of developing in an environment in which these experiences are 
reliably veridical. Furthermore, Burge holds that it is only insofar as the reliability of 
perceptual experiences is constitutively connected with the nature of these 
experiences that it contributes to the justification of beliefs based on them. Crucially, 
this last thought is supposed to entail that reliance on perceptual experiences that are 
by their very nature connected to reliable representation can be justified for a subject 
even in environments in which these experiences are highly unreliable. 
As we have seen, Burge does not provide any further explanation for why this 
entailment is supposed to hold and earlier I raised the worry that the supposed 
entailment was far from obvious. We have now also seen, in relation to Bergman‘s 
account, that the notion that a process or ground is by its nature connected in some 
way to reliably true beliefs is not sufficient for such a process or ground to provide a 
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subject with epistemic justification. After all, Bergman‘s properly functioning 
perceptual processes are by their nature reliably connected to truth – that is they are 
aimed at truth and reliable in the environment for which they are designed – but this 
was not enough to explain how they could produce justified beliefs in relevant evil 
demon environments. 
Returning to Burge‘s view, suppose we have a victim of an evil demon who has 
perceptual experiences that are by their nature connected with reliable representation 
in their home environment but that are highly unreliable in the environment the 
victim is now inhabiting. It is clear that in one sense it is epistemically inappropriate, 
objectively speaking, for this subject to rely on his perceptual experiences given that 
they are largely unveridical in his environment and therefore tend to produce false 
beliefs. At this point, the epistemic relevance question applies once more: why 
should it be epistemically appropriate for a subject to rely on perceptual experiences 
that are reliable in the environment in which their nature has developed but highly 
unreliable in the environment he currently inhabits? The reliability of these 
experiences in their home environment seems to be of no relevance at all. 
Of course, once again, we have to note that evaluations of the epistemic 
appropriateness of relying on particular processes or grounds for belief are highly 
dependent on the goal relative to which we should make such evaluations. Thus we 
might say, as before, that the objective appropriateness of relying on specific 
grounds or belief-forming processes should be judged on the basis of the way a 
subject actually conducts his epistemic affairs. And if a subject conducts his 
epistemic affairs within wider class of different local environments rather than 
within a local environment, then the objective appropriateness of relying on specific 
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grounds or belief-forming processes would have to be judged in terms of whether 
these grounds or processes are reliable relative to the wider class.  
However, as with Bergman, this point is of no use to Burge‘s view. Thus suppose 
a demon ensures that a subject‘s perceptual system develops in a global environment 
in which the subject‘s perceptual experiences are reliably veridical. This subject‘s 
perceptual states will have the contents that they do in virtue of these globally 
reliable connections. Suppose, finally, that the subject does in fact conduct his 
epistemic affairs within the global environment in which his perceptual experiences 
have developed. Cruelly, the demon now destroys this global environment, replaces 
it with a very different global environment but continues to feed the subject with the 
same kind of perceptual experiences that he was enjoying before. These perceptual 
experiences are now highly unreliable within the subject‘s global environment. The 
question now is whether it is objectively appropriate for the subject to rely on his 
perceptual experiences, given the aim of generally having true beliefs and avoiding 
false ones. With respect to the given cognitive aim, it seems clear that reliance on 
perceptual experiences is objectively inappropriate – that is, such reliance does not 
objectively satisfy the given cognitive aim. This is so even if these perceptual 
experiences are by their nature connected to reliable representation in their home 
environment. 
The problem with both Bergman‘s and Burge‘s views is thus essentially the 
same. As we have seen, both these theorists attempt to preserve an objectivist 
account of perceptual justification while at the same time trying to accommodate the 
new evil demon intuition by insisting that perceptual grounds or processes need to be 
reliable only relative to a specific environment but not relative to the environment 
the subject happens to inhabit. But neither of them makes clear why it should be 
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deemed epistemically appropriate, from an objective point of view, to rely on 
perceptual grounds or processes that are reliable only relative to the specific 
environments they suggest. As we have seen, whether reliance on specific grounds or 
processes is, objectively speaking, epistemically appropriate is a matter of whether 
or not such reliance satisfies a specific epistemic goal. But we have also seen that 
there can be cases in which it is not at all clear what epistemic goal is supposed to be 
satisfied by relying on a belief-forming process that is functioning properly, aimed at 
truth, and reliable in the environment for which it was designed or by relying on 
perceptual experiences that are by their nature reliably connected to veridical 
representation. That is why the views that Bergman and Burge develop ultimately 
are highly problematic.  
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Chapter 2  
 
 
Introduction  
 
In the last chapter, we investigated different proposals for how the Basic Principle 
about Perceptual Justification could be explained in objectivist terms and found no 
objectivist account that could adequately accommodate the intuition that the victim 
of an evil demon, whose perceptual experiences do not reliably produce true beliefs 
about his environment but are otherwise subjectively indistinguishable from the 
experiences that we enjoy, could nonetheless have perceptual beliefs about his 
environment that are epistemically justified for him. If we cannot in fact adequately 
explain the Basic Principle in objectivist terms, the natural move to make is to try to 
determine instead whether we can have more success in seeking an explanation of 
the Basic Principle in terms of the subjective conception of epistemic justification. I 
will refer to accounts that seek to explain the Basic Principle in terms of the 
subjective conception of epistemic justification as subjectivist accounts.  
On one such a conception, a subject S has epistemic justification for believing p 
only if S has some appropriate belief to the effect that conditions obtain that make it 
more likely than not that p is true. Call this the subjective-doxastic conception of 
epistemic justification. Crucially, having an appropriate belief to the effect that 
conditions obtain that make it more likely than not that p is true need not entail that 
those conditions actually obtain, and this is a feature of the subjective conception of 
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epistemic justification that, given the new evil demon intuition, makes it a prima 
facie attractive option in terms of which the Basic Principle can be explained.  
Alternatively, we might also think of a perceptual experience itself as 
constituting a subjective perspective on how things are in the world. Call this the 
subjective-experiential conception of epistemic justification. Thus, it is because the 
subject, in having the perceptual experience, occupies a subjective perspective from 
which conditions obtain that make it more likely than not that a proposition p is true 
that he is justified in forming the belief that p on the basis of his having the 
experience. In fact this is roughly the explanation of the Basic Principle that I will be 
proposing in this chapter. Before doing so, however, I want to first turn to the 
question of whether we can explain the Basic Principle in terms of the subjective-
doxastic conception of epistemic justification.  
In order to answer this question, we need to turn briefly to the notion of an 
‗appropriate belief‘ that figures in our formulation of what the subjective-doxastic 
conception of epistemic justification amounts to. What makes a belief to the effect 
that conditions obtain that make it more likely than not that a proposition p is true an 
appropriate one such that this belief can constitute a subject‘s justification for 
believing that p is the case? Obviously, it is not sufficient for a subject to have a 
justified belief that p that he merely has a belief to the effect that the relevant 
conditions obtain. Suppose, for example, that S forms the latter belief on the basis of 
reading tea leaves. We can assume that unless S has some good reasons for thinking 
that reading tea leaves reliably leads to true beliefs, S need not have any justification 
for believing that p in this case. The question is therefore what further properties a 
belief needs to have in order for this belief to be appropriate in the relevant sense for 
constituting a subject‘s justification for another belief. 
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Call an appropriate belief of this kind a justifying belief. In specifying the 
required further properties that a justifying belief needs to have, we might insist that 
justifying beliefs themselves need to be epistemically justified for the subject in 
some way. However, it is doubtful that this would lead us to a viable subjectivist 
explanation of the Basic Principle. To see this we can assume that if the Basic 
Principle is explained on the basis of S‘s having some belief to the effect that a 
situation obtains which makes it more likely than not that p is true this justifying 
belief is a belief about the experience he is undergoing. Suppose then that we say 
that a subject S‘s belief that an x is F, in circumstances in which he has a perceptual 
experience of an x being F, is justified for S in virtue of his believing that he is 
having an experience of an x being F and that having such an experience makes it 
more likely than not that an x is F. In what way can S‘s justifying beliefs themselves 
be justified in this case? We can assume for our purposes here that S‘s first justifying 
belief – that he is having an experience of an x being F – can be justified for him in a 
relatively straightforward way. For example, we might say that this belief is 
objectively justified on the basis of his actually having an experience of the sort he 
believes to be having and thereby justified on the basis of a ground that entails the 
truth of his belief. The difficulty, however, lies in trying to give an account of how 
S‘s second justifying belief can be justified for S. The issues here are familiar. For 
one, the proposition that he is having an experience of an x being F does not entail 
that an x is actually F. Hence, we cannot explain S‘s justification for believing that 
having an experience of an x being F makes it likely (or rather, entails) that an x is F 
in terms of, say, S‘s grasp of the concept of an experience of an x being F. So how 
else can the second justifying belief be justified for S? A plausible assumption is 
that, if this belief is justified at all for S, it is justified by S‘s having further justifying 
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beliefs. Thus one option is to say that S‘s belief that his having an experience of an x 
being F makes it more likely than not that an x is F is justified on the basis of his 
justifiably believing that past instances of his having an experience of this kind were 
more often than not correlated with the fact that an x is F. But it is hard to see how 
S‘s belief about the relevant past instances could themselves be justified for S unless 
he already had justified beliefs to the effect that an x is F in circumstances in which 
S had perceptual experiences of an x being F. And, of course, these are the kind of 
beliefs whose justification we are trying to account for. Another option is to say that 
S‘s belief that his having an experience of an x being F makes it more likely than not 
that an x is F is justified on the basis of his justifiably believing that the appeal to an 
x actually being F is the best explanation for why S is currently having an experience 
of an x being F. However, it has proved notoriously difficult to explain how such 
inferences to the best explanation can be justified for us. Furthermore, it is far from 
clear, even if it is true that an x actually being F is the best explanation for why a 
subject is having an experience of an x being F, why this should entail that one‘s 
having this experience makes it more likely than not that an x is actually F.  
Given these difficulties, what other options are left? One further alternative is to 
say that a subject S‘s belief, in circumstances in which he is having a perceptual 
experience of an x being F, is justified for S in virtue of his believing that he can see 
that an x is F and that seeing that an x is F entails that an x is F. Thus in this case, S‘s 
belief that an x is F is epistemically supported by his having a belief that he is having 
a factive perceptual experience which entails that an x is F. Here we can assume that 
S‘s belief that seeing that an x is F entails that an x is F can be straightforwardly 
justified for S. For example, we might simply say that this belief is justified for S on 
the basis of S‘s grasp of the concept of the state of seeing that an x is F. The 
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difficulty with this alternative, however, lies in trying to give an account of how the 
S‘s first justifying belief – that he sees that an x is F – can be justified for S. Thus, on 
the one hand, we might try to explain S‘s justification for this belief in objectivist 
terms. For example, we might say that S‘s belief that he sees that an x is F is justified 
for S when he bases this belief on his having an experience of an x being F which is 
a reliably correlated with his seeing that an x is F. But objectivist accounts like this 
could not explain how victims of an evil demon might be justified in having such a 
belief. On the other hand, we might try to explain S‘s justification for believing that 
he sees that an x is F in subjectivist-doxastic terms. But then the question is what 
justifying beliefs S could for believing that he sees that an x is F. Again, it is difficult 
to see how S could have justifying beliefs for believing that he sees that an x is F 
without his already having some justified belief that an x is F.  
It is difficult to see, therefore, how the Basic Principle could be explained in 
subjectivist-doxastic terms on the assumption that justifying beliefs themselves need 
to be justified. Instead of investigating this issue any further, I want to explore in 
more detail a way developing a subjectivist-doxastic account of the Basic Principle 
that does not conceive of justifying beliefs as themselves needing to be justified. One 
such account can be derived from Richard Foley‘s conception of an epistemically 
rational belief and this is the account with which I will begin. However, as I will be 
showing, this conception faces some serious difficulties. I will then turn to the view 
on perceptual justification that is offered by John McDowell, which I will suggest 
can be understood as presupposing, in part, a subjective-experiential conception of 
epistemic justification. This view, too, suffers from significant defects but the 
discussion of McDowell‘s view helps to illuminate a conception of perceptual 
justification that can underpin a viable explanation of the Basic Principle. Crucially, 
72 
 
this explanation of the Basic Principle will appeal specifically to the phenomenal 
character of perceptual experiences.  
 
 
Foley’s Conception of an Epistemically Rational Belief 
 
In his book The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, Foley develops a theory of what 
constitutes an epistemically rational belief. In what follows, I will to try determine 
whether this notion of an epistemically rational belief can provide us with an 
understanding of how our perceptual beliefs can be justified in the way that the Basic 
Principle states that they can be.  
Foley‘s theory is a version of an Aristotelian view of rationality, which in 
general conceives of rationality in terms of a subject‘s goals and what this subject 
would consider to be an effective way to pursue these goals upon careful reflection. 
Epistemic rationality as a particular form of rationality in the Aristotelian sense is 
then defined in terms of a specifically epistemic goal, which as Foley conceives of it, 
is the goal of now having true beliefs and avoiding false ones. Given this specifically 
epistemic goal, Foley suggests the following account of what constitutes an 
epistemically rational belief:  
 
...it is epistemically rational for an individual to be persuaded of the truth of 
just those propositions that are the conclusions of arguments that he would 
regard as likely to be truth-preserving were he to be reflective and that in 
addition have premises that he would uncover no good reason to be 
73 
 
suspicious of were he to be reflective. (Foley, The Theory of Epistemic 
Rationality, 1987, p. 5)  
 
The notion of an epistemically rational belief is thus defined in terms of a certain 
counterfactual claim. On this view, a belief that p is epistemically rational for a 
subject S if there is an argument that S would regard as establishing p and whose 
premises he would accept if he were to be reflective.  
One question that this account immediately raises is what it is for a subject to be 
reflective in the relevant sense. In one relevant sense, for a subject to be reflective at 
a time t is for him to bring bear on the questions of whether or not an argument a is 
truth-preserving and of whether or not the premises in a are such that there are no 
good reasons to be suspicious of them, other relevant propositions that S believes at 
t. Thus S might consider whether there are further arguments which he believes to be 
truth-conducive and whose premises he would accept upon further reflection which 
either support or undermine the belief that a is truth-conducive and/or the belief that 
the premises in a are true. Ultimately to Foley, however, reflecting on the questions 
of whether or not an argument a is truth-preserving and on whether or not the 
premises in a are such that they are no good reasons not to accept them will bring to 
bear a subject‘s deepest epistemic standards. These, in turn, are a ‗function of what 
he now is disposed to think about [an argument] were he to be sufficiently 
reflective.‘ (ibid, p. 35) Thus at some point in one‘s reflection, one will simply be 
disposed to take an argument a as truth-conducive without there having to be yet a 
further argument which, on yet further reflection, one would take to support the 
assumption that a is truth-conducive. Here a subject comes to a point at which his 
own deepest epistemic standards are simply made manifest: ‗...if an individual on 
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reflection is disposed to think that the argument is sufficiently likely to be truth 
preserving and if in addition he is so disposed that further reflection would not 
change his mind about this, then the argument conforms to his own deepest 
epistemic standards.‘ (ibid, p. 35) Epistemic rationality, on the Foleyian view, is thus 
entirely a matter of a subject‘s reflective perspective. That is, it is matter entirely of 
whether or not a subject‘s epistemic goal of believing p only if p is true is met from 
the subject‘s own reflective point of view. Crucially, being epistemically rational in 
this sense does not entail that a subject systematically achieves his goal of now 
believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. In fact, it is entirely consistent with being 
epistemically rational in the Foleyian sense that a subject has epistemically rational 
beliefs that are mostly false.  
It is also consistent with the Foleyian view that a subject can be epistemically 
rational even if, on reflection, he would be persuaded of the truths of propositions on 
the basis of arguments in a way that would seem to most ordinary people to be 
utterly bizarre. This is because subjects may ultimately have radically different deep 
epistemic standards. Thus some subjects might on deep reflection be disposed to 
judge arguments as being truth-preserving and accept the premises of these 
arguments as true in a way that others might find to be radically misguided. (I will 
return to this issue below) Finally, I take it that being epistemically rational in the 
Foleyian sense does not entail that a subject‘s own reflective perspective from which 
it will seem to him as if his epistemic goals are sufficiently met is itself epistemically 
rational for him. Thus, a subject can, upon sufficient reflection, be persuaded of the 
truth of a proposition p by arguing to p from premise q without there being a further 
argument, which upon yet further reflection, the subject would take to support q and 
to support the inference from q to p. As we have seen, his acceptance of q and of the 
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validity of the inference from q to p can simply be a manifestation of his own deep 
epistemic standards. Furthermore, his acceptance of q and of the validity of the 
inference from q to p need not be epistemically justified for S in any other sense. For 
example, it need not be the case that S‘s reflecting on q and on the validity of the 
inference from q to p is such that it reliably produces true beliefs in regards to q and 
the inference from q to p.  
Given this last point, we might of course ask why we should think that the kind 
of subjective reflective perspective that Foley appeals to should generate any form of 
epistemically rational or justified beliefs. In other words, why should the epistemic 
rationality of believing a proposition p be a matter of certain kinds of further beliefs 
that a subject would adopt if he were to engage in a certain kind of reflection, if these 
beliefs themselves need not be epistemically rational for S or justified for him in any 
other way? This of course relates to the general question raised earlier of what 
properties make a belief a justifying belief. Foley‘s answer to this question is that the 
epistemic rationality of believing a proposition p is a matter of certain beliefs that 
one would adopt on the basis of reflection because such beliefs render the belief that 
p ‗invulnerable to intellectual self-criticism‘: 
 
Being rational in this sense involves making oneself invulnerable to 
intellectual self-criticism to the extent possible. It is a matter of having 
opinions and using faculties, methods, and practices capable of standing up to 
one‘s own, most severe scrutiny. For an opinion to pass this test, it must not 
be the case that one‘s other opinions could be used to mount what one on 
reflection would regard as a convincing critique of it. Nor can it be the case 
that one has, or would have on reflection, criticisms about the ways one has 
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acquired the opinion. (Foley, Epistemic Rationality as Invulnerability to Self-
Criticism, 2003, p. 3) . 
 
Thus, according to Foley, subjecting one‘s beliefs to the kind of reflection he 
outlines constitutes a most severe kind of intellectual self-scrutiny of those beliefs. 
Beliefs that are subject to, and survive, this kind of scrutiny count for him as being 
epistemically rational.  
Now, I think we can grant Foley the point that, at the very least, his conception 
does pick out a certain form of epistemic rationality that beliefs can have. The 
question of interest to us, however, is whether this conception provides us with a 
means of understanding how our perceptual beliefs can be epistemically justified for 
us. So how can this conception of epistemic rationality provide us with an 
explanation of the Basic Principle about Perceptual Justification? In the first 
instance, a Foleyian explanation of the Basic Principle will say that that a subject, 
when having a perceptual experience of something‘s being F, will be justified in 
Foley‘s sense of being epistemically rational in believing that something is F insofar 
as there is an argument that has the proposition that something is F as its conclusion, 
which S would take to be truth-preserving and whose premises S would accept were 
he to be sufficiently reflective. However, given Foley‘s conception of epistemic 
rationality, there are in principle many different ways in which subjects, when they 
are having a perceptual experience of something‘s being F, can be epistemically 
rational in believing that something is F. For example, one subject might be 
epistemically rational in believing that something is F in circumstances in which he 
is having the relevant sort of perceptual experience if, on reflection, he would be 
persuaded of the truth of the proposition that something is F, on the basis of arguing 
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from the premise that he is having an experience of something‘s being F to the 
conclusion that something is F. Another subject, however, might be epistemically 
rational if, on reflection, he would argue to the conclusion that something is F from 
the premise that he can see that something is F. And so on.  That is because, as we 
have seen, deep epistemic standards can vary among different subjects.   
What should we make of Foley‘s conception of epistemic rationality and its 
application to the Basic Principle? To answer this question, it will be helpful to 
consider some prominent objections to Foley‘s general view. One line of criticism is 
that Foley‘s conception of epistemic rationality does not really pick out an 
interesting or important epistemic property. Richard Feldman expresses this worry in 
the following passage:  
 
I don‘t see why one‘s own deepest epistemic standards identify any particular 
interesting or important concept of rationality. This point is best raised as a 
rhetorical question: Why think my deep standards are so important for 
evaluating my rationality? Why not use your standards, or my Uncle Al‘s, 
standards, or community standards,...? Foley seems to acknowledge that 
there is a sense of ‗rational‘ for each such standard. I‘m suspicious of the idea 
that there are so many senses of the term, but if there are so many senses, I‘m 
especially suspicious of the idea that the one he singles out is of any great 
importance or that it somehow identifies a central epistemic concept. There 
is, I admit, something virtuous about conforming to one‘s own standards. It‘s 
hypocritical, or dishonest, not to. But I‘m not sure that the relevant virtue is 
appropriately characterized as being rational. (Feldman, 1989, p. 157)  
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One question that Feldman‘s criticism here raises, however, is what exactly makes 
an epistemic concept an interesting or important one. Perhaps, we can view the 
matter in this way. Suppose we begin with the idea that we have some pre-theoretical 
understanding of the kinds of beliefs that are epistemically justified for us. Thus, pre-
theoretically we think that our perceptual beliefs are generally epistemically justified 
for us and the same applies to beliefs that are based on our memories or the 
testimony of others. Given this, we might say that an interesting or important 
epistemic notion is one that can be applied to these beliefs and thereby illuminate in 
what sense they are epistemically justified for us. If this is the sense in which an 
epistemic notion is interesting or important, I do think that the charge that Foley‘s 
notion of epistemic rationality is ultimately uninteresting or unimportant, at least 
insofar as our perceptual beliefs are concerned, is basically sound, but we need to 
take some care in spelling out the argument in support of this contention.   
Now one way of not arguing for this contention, however, is by presupposing, 
implicitly or explicitly, that an interesting or important epistemic notion can only be 
one that renders our beliefs justified in an objective sense. Thus take the following 
criticism of Foley‘s conception of epistemic rationality by William Alston:    
 
The key to the whole matter is the fact that, as Foley acknowledges and even 
insists, the basic epistemic goal is ‗now to have true beliefs and now not to 
have false beliefs‘. Hence our interest in the concept of the rationality of 
belief, or more generally in a mode of epistemically evaluating beliefs, will 
be in direct proportion to the relevance of this goal. Most directly relevant is 
the evaluation of beliefs as true or false. Next down the line comes the 
consideration of the likelihood of a belief‘s being true, relative to some 
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publicly accessible body of evidence, or relative to what the subject has or to 
what is available to him, or relative to the basis of the belief...At the bottom 
of the list comes a purely subjective conception, whether S believes that it is 
acceptable for him to believe that p. And just above that, but significantly 
below all the other alternatives listed, is F-rationality, whether S would take 
it, on reflection, that he has an uncontroversial argument for p. This is of little 
interest, relative to the epistemic goal, just because it has no determinate 
implication, in itself, for (the likelihood of) the truth or falsity of the belief. 
(Alston, 1989, pp. 146-7)  
 
According to Alston, relative to the epistemic goal of having true beliefs and 
avoiding false ones, the objective conceptions of epistemic justification or rationality 
are much more important and interesting than the subjective conception that Foley 
develops. The problem with the latter, so Alston argues, is precisely that it fails to 
ensure that our justified or rational beliefs are more likely than not to be true. The 
problem with this objection to Foley‘s view, however, especially when the issue 
turns to our perceptual beliefs, is that it may simply not be possible to account for 
some of our justified beliefs in objectivist terms. In the above passage, Alston 
suggests that there is a certain hierarchy of different ways of epistemically evaluating 
a belief which represents the relative importance of a particular conception of 
epistemic justification or rationality. At the top of this hierarchy we find various 
objectivist forms of epistemic evaluation, while the subjectivist ones are further 
down the list. However, Alston does not mention what forms of epistemic 
evaluations might fall between the objectivist ones he lists and Foley‘s subjectivist 
conception of epistemic rationality. So for all we have been given, and on the 
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assumption that we cannot explain how perceptual beliefs in particular are justified 
for us in objectivist terms, Foley‘s conception of epistemic rationality may well be 
the best form of epistemic evaluation we have to explain the Basic Principle.  
A more promising approach to showing that Foley‘s conception of epistemic 
rationality is uninteresting or unimportant in the relevant sense is taken by Marshall 
Swain in his criticisms of Foley‘s views. One point on which these criticisms focus 
is, as we have seen, that Foley allows for the possibility of cases when a belief is 
epistemically rational for a subject, even if, on reflection, he would argue for the 
belief on the basis of what we would consider to be very bizarre. Swain provides the 
following example  
 
When confronted with the premise p v (p & q)...an individual might correctly 
conclude p, but only because one his deepest standards directs him to derive 
p from any disjunction with p as a single disjunct. If confronted with p v q, 
he would also conclude p...This person is just not very good at logic, and 
thinks that lots of inferences are valid when they are not. In what sense are 
such a person‘s beliefs epistemically rational? (Swain, 1989, p. 164)  
 
In response to Swain‘s question at the end of this passage, and as I suggested earlier, 
I think that we can grant that there is a perfectly good sense in which the person‘s 
belief is epistemically rational, which is simply the sense of being epistemically 
rational under Foley‘s conception. However, even if we do grant this, we certainly 
still want to say that a subject who can logically reason in a competent way is 
epistemically rational in a very different and, we might say, more interesting and 
important sense. The intuition concerning the subject in Swain‘s example and the 
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subject who can logically reason in a competent way is thus that the latter subject is, 
epistemically speaking, much better off than the former. Swain himself seeks to 
distinguish these two subjects by insisting, like Alston, that genuine epistemic 
rationality – or in our terms, a more interesting or important sense of it – requires an 
objectivist connection to truth. That is, to Swain, if epistemic rationality is to be 
understood in terms of adopting only those beliefs that would survive deep reflection 
in Foley‘s sense, then it should follow that those beliefs are more likely than not to 
be true. But once again, we have to note that the insistence on an objective truth-
connection in this way is unlikely, given the new evil demon intuition, to yield a 
viable conception of how our perceptual beliefs can be epistemically justified for us. 
Nonetheless, I think that there is an important point that has emerged from Swain‘s 
example and this is that our perceptual beliefs can be epistemically justified or 
rational for us in a way that makes them much better, epistemically speaking, than 
some beliefs that are rendered perfectly rational by Foley‘s conception of epistemic 
rationality. Thus, like the subject who can logically reason in a competent way, I 
suggest that a subject who forms a belief about his surroundings on the basis of the 
relevant sort of perceptual experience can be justified in having this belief in a sense 
that is much more interesting or important than the sense in which the subject in 
Swain‘s example is epistemically rational. The challenge, therefore, is to develop a 
notion of epistemic justification or rationality that can make the right distinctions 
between the different subjects we have considered and it seems clear that Foley‘s 
subjectivist conception is incapable of making those distinctions.  
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McDowell’s Conception of Perceptual Justification  
 
As I suggested earlier, we may be able to provide an explanation of the Basic 
Principle by drawing on certain elements that can be found in McDowell‘s 
conception of perceptual justification. Before, turning to this explanation, however, 
we first need to consider McDowell‘s conception in its entirety.  
Some of the central elements of McDowell‘s conception of perceptual 
justification are outlined in the following passage from his Mind and World:  
 
In a particular experience in which one is not misled, what one takes in is that 
things are thus and so. That things are thus and so is the content of the 
experience, and it can also be the content of a judgment: it becomes the 
content of a judgment if the subject decides to take the experience at face 
value. So it is conceptual content. But that things are thus and so is also, if 
one is not misled, an aspect of the layout of the world: it is how things are. 
Thus the idea of conceptually structured operations of receptivity puts us in a 
position to speak of experience as openness to the layout of reality. 
Experience enables the layout of reality itself to exert a rational influence on 
what a subject thinks. (McDowell, Mind and World, 1994, p. 26)  
 
There are in fact several elements here that make up McDowell‘s conception of 
perceptual justification. However, the key element to McDowell‘s thought seems to 
be that perceptual experiences can in some cases be ‗an openness to the layout of 
reality‘, that is, to mind-independent, environmental facts. What follows from this, or 
so McDowell argues, is that in those cases in which perceptual experiences do 
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amount to an openness to facts, these facts themselves can ‗exert a rational 
influence‘ on our thoughts. The idea that McDowell seems to be expressing here is 
that, given the right kind of perceptual experience, an environmental fact that p can 
be one‘s reason for believing the proposition that p. The right kind of perceptual 
experiences can therefore provide us with justification for believing propositions 
about the external world by providing us with, or bringing into view, the facts that 
make these propositions true. In providing us with such facts, or in bringing them 
into view, these experiences provide us with reasons for beliefs about our 
environment.  
Stated thus far, McDowell‘s conception of perceptual justification suggests the 
following explanation of the Basic Principle: when having a perceptual experience of  
something‘s being F and forming the belief that something is F on the basis of 
having this experience, this belief is prima facie justified for a subject to the extent 
that the given perceptual experience amounts to an openness to the fact that 
something is F and, therefore, to the extent this experience brings into view a mind-
independent fact that acts as the subject‘s reason for forming the belief that 
something is F. Now the important first point to note about this explanation of the 
Basic Principle is that it is of an objectivist sort: that is, the Basic Principle is 
explained on the basis of the thought that a belief that p is perceptually justified for a 
subject insofar as he bases this belief on his having a perceptual experience that 
objectively entails, or is necessarily correlated with the truth of, the proposition that 
p. 
However, it is equally important to note that this objectivist element in 
McDowell‘s picture of perceptual justification, if it plays a role at all, forms only 
part of the picture as a whole. In its complete form, McDowell‘s view on perceptual 
84 
 
justification crucially also involves a subjectivist element. His insistence on this 
subjectivist element derives from his acceptance that an epistemically justified belief 
(and ultimately knowledge) essentially belongs to the space of reasons. Thus to him, 
one has an epistemically justified belief that p only if one has a reason for believing 
that p is true. What we need to determine here is how exactly McDowell understands 
the notion that when one has a perceptually justified belief that p one has a 
perceptual reason for believing that p is true.  
On one general understanding of the notion of an epistemic reason, one has a 
reason for believing a proposition p when one can cite a valid argument consisting of 
premises q, r, s, and so forth that has p as its conclusion. Of course, further 
conditions would have to be met for one to have genuine justification for believing p 
on the basis of one‘s ability to cite a valid argument in support of believing p in this 
way. For example, we might suppose that these conditions include that one has 
justification for believing each of the premises as well as justification for believing 
that the premises validly entail the conclusion. Having reasons in this sense can often 
play an important dialectical role. Thus one can appropriately cite reasons of this 
kind in justifying one‘s beliefs to others or in trying to convince them to adopt the 
same belief in the conclusion. Again, there will be further conditions on when citing 
an argument in support of a belief in this way can be dialectically effective. 
A reason for believing p on the foregoing understanding is thus essentially a 
proposition (or a fact) that one can cite in support of one‘s believing that p. It is what 
Hannah Ginsborg, in her recent discussion of McDowell‘s view of perceptual 
justification, calls a reason1 for believing a proposition p.  As Ginsborg puts it, this 
sense of ‗reason‘ ―is the one we most naturally invoke when we are concerned with 
the first-person perspective from which a subject assesses her beliefs or potential 
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beliefs and considers which ones she ought to retain or adopt.‖ (Ginsborg, 2006, p. 
290) It is important, however, to carefully distinguish between a reason qua 
proposition or fact in this sense on the one hand and the mental state in virtue of 
which a subject possesses such a reason on the other. Thus, as it was explained in the 
previous paragraph, for one to have a reason r qua proposition for believing that p, it 
is intuitive to suppose that one needs to have some justification for believing r as 
well as for believing that r entails p. This would mean in turn that one has a justified 
belief that p on the basis of one‘s having a reason r qua proposition for believing p 
only if one believes that r and has some justification for doing so.  
Now, crucially, we might consider the justified belief that r which, in this case, 
constitutes a subject‘s justification for believing p to be the subject‘s ‗reason‘ for 
doing so. However, the sense in which a mental state such as a belief can be a 
subject‘s reason for believing another proposition is different from the sense in 
which a proposition can be a reason for him. To mark the difference between these 
two senses, Ginsborg introduces the notion of a reason2 for believing something and 
defines this notion as follows:  
 
The second sense of reason...is the sense we invoke when, from a third-
person perspective, we assess the rationality of someone else‘s beliefs, or, 
relatedly, try to make her beliefs rationally intelligible. From this perspective, 
in contrast to the first-person perspective occupied by the subject, the actual 
facts are irrelevant to the determination of what reason the subject has and 
whether they are good reasons. As a subject assessing my own beliefs, what I 
need to determine is what the facts are independently of those beliefs: if the 
issue is whether I am justified in believing that it has rained, I need to 
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determine whether the streets are wet, not whether I believe that the streets 
are wet. But if I am assessing someone else‘s beliefs, then I need to 
determine how things how things present themselves as being from her point 
of view....[we] specify a psychological state, typically another belief, in the 
light of which her original belief can be recognised from a third-person 
perspective, as rational. (Ibid, p. 290)   
 
Thus a mental state M of a subject S can be a reason2 for having a belief B when, 
from the third-person perspective, we can make S‘s having B rationally intelligible 
in light of his having M. Crucially, Ginsborg thinks that the notions of a reason1 and 
a reason2 are conceptually related. This means, in particular, that a subject can have 
a reason2 for believing p only he takes himself to have a reason1 for believing p; that 
is, only if there is some proposition or fact that she is prepared to cite in defence of 
her believing p. Thus, according to Ginsborg, a subject‘s belief that p can rationalise, 
or make rationally intelligible, another belief that q only if we can assume that the 
subject takes p as a reason1 for believing q.  
One point to note here, however, is that a subject‘s having a reason2 for 
believing p need not entail that a subject thereby has justification for believing p. As 
I explained earlier, for a subject to be justified in believing p on the basis of his 
having a reason r (that is, a reason1) for believing p, it seems essential that the 
subject has a justified belief that r. It seems possible, however, for a subject to have a 
belief that p which makes rationally intelligible, in some sense, his having a further 
belief that q without the latter belief‘s being justified for him. This kind of situation 
can obtain, for example, when S‘s belief that p is itself unjustified for him. On the 
other hand, we can take it that, when a subject has a justified belief that p which 
87 
 
constitutes, in part, his having a further justified belief that q, the belief that p 
rationalises his belief that q and is, therefore, a reason2 for his having that belief.  
Now returning to McDowell‘s view of perceptual justification and the question 
of what the subjectivist element in it amounts to, it is clear that McDowell does think 
that having a reason for believing something consists at least in part of being able to 
cite a proposition in support of what one believes. Thus quoting Wilfrid Sellars, 
McDowell endorses the view that:  
 
In characterising an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving 
an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the 
logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. 
(quoted in McDowell 1994, xiv)  
 
As it becomes clear here, to McDowell, a subject‘s belief that p cannot belong to the 
space of reasons and, therefore, be properly justified for him unless he is able in an 
appropriate way to provide a justification or a reason for this belief. In the case of a 
perceptual belief that p, however, which is based, say, on one‘s having a visual 
experience in which it appears to one as if p, the Sellarsian condition, or so 
McDowell thinks, can be quite straightforwardly satisfied. Thus McDowell claims 
that ―a proper move in the game of giving reasons‖ can simply be to claim that one 
sees that p. This, he continues, is ―a move that, if one can make it truly, vindicates 
one‘s entitlement to a claim with the content of the embedded proposition‖ 
(McDowell, Knowledge and the Internal Revisited, 2002, p. 100).  
It would seem, therefore, that, according to McDowell, when one has perceptual 
justification for believing p and can, as such, properly justify that belief on the basis 
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of claiming that one sees that p, one possesses a reason qua proposition (or a 
reason1) in the sense outlined earlier. This would mean that one‘s perceptually 
justified belief that p involves one‘s having a justified belief that one sees that p or, 
at the very least, one‘s being in a position to have such a justified belief.  
Now I think this is true as far as it goes, but we need to be careful here about 
what exactly, on McDowell‘s picture, constitutes one‘s justification for believing p 
when this involves the ability to appropriately cite the fact that one sees that p as a 
reason for believing that p. In particular, a correct interpretation of McDowell‘s 
views here would need to take account of what he says in the following passage:  
 
Of course one does not inherit entitlement to, for instance, ‗There is a candle 
in front of me‘ from a commitment – to which one would have to be entitled 
– to ―I see that there‘s a candle in front of me.‖ One could not be entitled to 
―I see that there‘s a candle in front of me‖ while it was still in suspense 
whether one was entitled to ―There is a candle in front of me‖ – suspense that 
one would terminate, on this impossible picture, by inferring ―There‘s a 
candle in front of me‖ from ―I seen that there‘s a candle in front of me‖. But 
the impossibility of this picture does not disqualify ―I see that...‖ from its 
status as the form of a proper move in the game of giving reasons, a move 
that, if one can make it truly, vindicates one‘s entitlement to a claim with the 
content of the embedded proposition. The point just brings out the 
insufficiency of a conception of justification that limits itself to inferential 
inheritance of entitlement (perhaps with a special story about one‘s 
entitlement to the premises of the envisaged inferences). (ibid, p. 100)  
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Thus, although one‘s having perceptual (visual) justification for believing p involves 
the capacity to appropriately justify one‘s belief by citing the fact or proposition that 
one sees that p, one‘s justification for believing cannot be (solely) constituted by this 
capacity. The reason for this, so McDowell claims, is that one could not 
appropriately cite the fact that one sees that p in defence of one‘s believing p unless 
one already had some justification for believing p, which does not consist of one‘s 
being able to appropriately cite the fact that one sees that p.  
This essentially brings us back to the passage cited on p.82. There McDowell 
made clear that when one has justification for believing p on the basis of one‘s 
having a perceptual experience which amounts to an openness to the fact that p (or 
the fact that makes the proposition p true), it is this fact – the fact that p – rather than 
the fact that one sees that p that functions as one‘s reason for believing p. In fact, on 
McDowell‘s picture, it is having a visual experience of this kind which provides one 
with justification for believing both the proposition p and the proposition that one 
sees that p. Thus he states:  
 
What does entitle one to claim that one is perceiving that things are thus and 
so, when one is so entitled? The fact that one is perceiving that things are 
thus and so. That is a kind of fact whose obtaining our self-consciously 
possessed perceptual capacities enable us to recognize on suitable occasions, 
just as they enable us to recognize such facts as that there are red cubes in 
front of us, and all the more complex types of environmental facts that our 
powers to perceive things put at our disposal. (McDowell, The Disjunctivist 
Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument, 2008, 
p. 387)  
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In reconstructing McDowell‘s view, we therefore need to distinguish two senses in 
which a subject can have a perceptual reason for believing a proposition p about his 
environment. Thus, on the one hand, his having a perceptual (visual) reason for 
believing p consists in his ability to appropriately justify this belief by citing the fact 
that he sees that p. On the other hand, however, his having a perceptual (visual) 
reason for believing p will consist of his having a visual experience which is open to 
the fact that p (or the fact that makes p true), a fact which, insofar as it is being 
experienced by him, can function as his reason for believing p. 
Now we can assume that the notion of a reason that figures in the first of these 
two senses of having a reason is that of Ginsborg‘s notion of a reason1. The 
question, however, is how we should understand the notion of a reason that figures 
in the second of the two senses of having a reason for believing p. If the latter notion 
of a reason is not that of a reason1, then we cannot take this notion to pick out a 
proposition or fact that one would cite in an appropriate defence of what one 
believes. But then what other relevant sense of a reason could be involved here?  
Before answering this question, we should note that the issue of how to 
understand the notion of a reason involved in the second sense in which, on 
McDowell‘s view, a subject can have a perceptual reason for believing a proposition 
p about his environment bears on the question of whether or not perceptual 
experiences can amount to a reason2 for believing p. Thus recall that a reason2, on 
Ginsborg‘s understanding of this notion, is a mental state M of a subject S on basis 
of which, from a third-person perspective, we can determine whether a given belief 
B of S is rationally held by S. In particular, if, from a third-person perspective, M 
makes B rationally intelligible, then we might take it, as a third-person observer, that 
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a fact presents itself to S in virtue of his having M which functions as his reason1 for 
having B. The question now is whether a fact can present itself to a subject in virtue 
of having a particular kind of perceptual experience in such way that we can take 
that experience to constitute a reason2 for believing a proposition p about his 
environment.   
The answer to this question may help to settle a dispute between McDowell on 
the one hand and Donald Davidson on the other. Thus Davidson famously claims 
―...nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief.‖ 
(Davidson, 2000, p. 416)  Ginsborg understands this to amount to the claim that only 
beliefs can function as reason2 for further beliefs; that is, it is only by appeal to a 
subject‘s beliefs that, form a third-person perspective, we can render rationally 
intelligible a subject‘s belief that p. In contrast to Davidson, McDowell does seem to 
hold that the scope of reasons2 should include not just beliefs but also perceptual 
experiences. This is a claim, however, that Ginsborg seeks to undermine.  
 
If I see that p, but without believing that p, do I nonetheless take p to be a 
reason1 for believing that p? It is important to be clear that the question is not 
just whether I take p to imply p. I take the proposition that the moon is made 
of cheese to imply the proposition that the moon is edible. But it does not 
follow that I take moon‘s being made of cheese to be a reason1 for believing 
that the moon is edible, or in other words that I take myself to have, in the 
fact that the moon is made of cheese, a reason1 for believing that it is edible. 
So for any propositions p and q, there is more involved in taking p as a 
reason for believing that q than simply taking one to imply the other. Now 
intuitively it appears that the reason that I do not take the moon‘s being made 
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of cheese as a reason1 for believing that the moon is edible is that I do not 
believe that the moon is made of cheese. Taking something as a reason1 for a 
belief is a matter of being prepared to cite it in defence of the belief, as a 
consideration which counts in its favour; and I cannot cite the moon‘s being 
made of cheese in defence of anything unless I believe that the moon is made 
of cheese. But if I am right about the relation between reasons1 and reasons2, 
this intuition is just what McDowell has to deny in extending the scope of 
reasons2 to include experiences as well as beliefs. He has to be able to say 
that even if I do not believe that an object presented to me is square, its 
veridically appearing to me as square can nonetheless make it the case that I 
regard its squareness as a consideration counting in favour of a belief, in 
particular the belief that it is square.  (Ginsborg, 2006, p. 304)  
 
Here Ginsborg reiterates the claim that if one has a reason1 r for believing a 
proposition p then one has to take r as a reason1 for believing p, that is, as a fact or 
consideration that one would cite in defence of believing p. One cannot, however, 
take a fact or proposition r as a reason1 for believing p if one does not believe that r 
obtains. What follows from this, so Ginsborg seems to argue, is, just like Davidson 
claims, that only a belief can function as a reason2 for another belief.  
The line of argument that Ginsborg offers in this passage, however, crucially 
depends on the assumption that a mental state M can be a reason2 for believing a 
proposition p only if the subject takes himself to have a reason1 for believing a 
proposition p. The problem with this, however, is that Ginsborg does not consider an 
alternative conception of a (subjective) reason which would make intelligible the 
idea that in a perceptual experience one can be presented with a fact which can then 
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function as one‘s reason – whatever this sense might be – for believing the 
proposition that this fact makes true.  Thus what McDowell needs in order to resist 
Ginsborg‘s objection is some understanding of how a perceptual experience can 
rationalise a belief – act as a reason2 for that belief – by presenting the subject with a 
fact as a reason for believing a proposition p without assuming the subject takes that 
fact as a consideration that he can cite in defence of believing p.  
  Now I think that an alternative conception of a subjective reason that can 
present itself to a subject when having the relevant kind of perceptual experience can 
be developed. However, I would suggest that we need to make some specific 
assumptions about what this kind of experience would need to involve. Thus, for 
one, it does not seem possible to explain how a perceptual experience can provide 
one with a reason r for believing a proposition p – and how this perceptual 
experience can be a reason2 for believing p – if all we assume about this perceptual 
experience is that it is of a certain phenomenological sort. That is, it is not sufficient 
to think of a reason-providing perceptual experience as one which is best described 
from the subjective point of view as one in which an object x presents itself to one as 
having a property F. Nor is it enough, or so it seems to me, in explaining how a 
perceptual experience can be reason-providing, to conceive of it as having a 
phenomenal character – as the naive realist and disjunctivist might say – that is 
constituted by a the subject‘s relation to a mind-independent fact.  
However, a further key element in McDowell‘s picture of perceptual 
justification, which is alluded to in the quoted passage from Mind and World, is that 
perceptual experiences can provide one with reasons qua facts for believing 
propositions about one‘s environment only insofar as these experiences are 
conceptual. In the first instance, this means that for one to have a genuinely reason-
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giving perceptual experience is for one to be in possession of certain concepts. In 
particular, for one to have an experience which amounts to an openness to the fact 
that p requires that one possesses the concepts needed in order to think the thought 
that p. Adopting a term from Alva Noe, we can call this the dependency thesis.
16
  
However, I also take McDowell to endorse a somewhat stronger thesis than 
the dependency thesis. Thus, it is not only that having a genuine reason-giving 
perceptual experience requires the possession of certain concepts; it is rather that the 
experience itself is constituted by the ‗actualisation of conceptual capacities‘, namely 
those very same capacities that are involved in thinking or forming perceptual beliefs 
and judgements. Call this the actualisation thesis.  
How exactly is the actualisation thesis to be understood? One way of 
understanding this thesis is as making the claim that one could not have a perceptual 
experience of a certain phenomenological sort unless one possesses certain relevant 
concepts and unless these concepts are ‗actualised‘ in one‘s having the experience. 
This, at any rate, seems to be the thesis that is suggested by Noe: 
 
Visual experience is experience of objects and features of the environment. 
There just is no more basic, more neutral way of describing how things 
perceptually seem to us than that available to us when we describe our 
experiences as of the kinds of things and properties and events we take to 
inhabit the world around us...We pick out or individuate experiences by 
reference to judgments we would make were we to take the experience at 
face value. We have visual experiences as of geese flying overhead, deer 
grazing in the meadow, lions hunting down gazelles, and armadillos crossing 
                                                 
16 (Noe) 
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the road. To have visual experiences is not to judge that things are some way 
or other, but it is to represent things as being some way or other. It is to 
represent things as being a way we can appreciate them as being. That‘s why 
experience requires the mastery of concepts. (Noe, p. 7)   
 
Thus, when one has a perceptual experience, for example, as of geese flying 
overhead or as of deer grazing in the meadow, one essentially has a perceptual 
experience of a certain phenomenological kind and one could not have an experience 
of this kind if one were not capable of judging that geese are flying overhead or that 
deer are grazing in the meadow.  The ability to grasp the judgment or thought that, 
for example, there are deer grazing in the meadow, is a precondition of one‘s 
capacity to have the corresponding perceptual experience. 
In response to Noe‘s contention here, we might find it problematic to think that 
one‘s having a perceptual experience of  a certain phenomenological sort has to be a 
matter of one‘s having, and actualising, certain conceptual capacities. For example, 
we might hold that children and animals can have perceptual experiences of the same 
phenomenological sort as conceptually sophisticated mature human beings while 
lacking the requisite conceptual capacities to make relevant judgments about what 
they are experiencing.  
However, without getting drawn too deeply into the question of whether or not 
conceptual capacities are required in order for one to enjoy a perceptual experience 
of a certain phenomenological sort, I want to suggest at this point that the importance 
of McDowell‘s suggestion that perceptual experiences involve the actualisation of 
conceptual capacities in fact lie elsewhere. Thus the issue here is not so much – or 
not only – that of whether or not one could have a perceptual experience of certain 
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phenomenological sort only if certain conceptual capacities are actualised in one‘s 
having the perceptual experience but rather that of whether a perceptual experience 
can have certain epistemic properties unless we can assume that one‘s having such 
an experience involves one‘s having certain requisite conceptual capacities.  
So what we are seeking is a kind of conceptual-experiential state which makes 
intelligible how a mind-independent fact that p can present itself to one as a reason 
for believing p. To see what this kind of state might amount to, consider by way of 
analogy the kind of a priori justification one can have for believing conceptual truths 
such as, for example, that all bachelors are male. One way of accounting for the kind 
of justification one can have for believing the proposition that all bachelors are male 
is to say that one‘s grasp or understanding of this proposition is sufficient for one‘s 
having justification for believing, and, in fact, for knowing, that it is true. Note, that 
one‘s justification here, or so I would suggest, is not merely objectivist but also 
subjectivist. That is, it is not just that in grasping the conceptual truth that all 
bachelors are male, one is objectively connected to the truth of this proposition, it is 
also that in grasping the proposition, its truth becomes subjectively transparent to 
one. In this sense, the proposition that all bachelors are male can be one‘s reason for 
believing this proposition to be true. It becomes one‘s reason for believing it to be 
true when it is the content of the state one is in when one grasps that proposition to 
be true. Crucially, however, it seems that this is not the kind of reason that, when one 
possesses it, one would cite as a consideration in favour of believing that all 
bachelors are male. At the very least, it is not the kind of reason for believing a 
proposition p that one possesses when, for example, one would cite the fact that the 
streets are wet as a reason for believing that it has recently rained. Hence it is not a 
reason1 in Ginsborg‘s sense. Furthermore, the kind of justification one has for 
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believing that all bachelors are male requires one to be in a state, namely the state of 
grasping or understanding this proposition, which involves the actualisation of 
specific conceptual capacities. These, of course, are those conceptual capacities that 
are required to judge and come to believe that all males are bachelors.  
Now, by way of analogy, we might suggest then that there is a perceptual or 
experiential state, say, the state of seeing that p, that one can be in, in which the 
obtaining of the fact that p (or of the fact that makes p true) becomes subjectively 
transparent to one. Like in the case of one‘s having a priori justification for 
believing propositions such that all bachelors are male, the justification that one has 
for believing an external world proposition p when the fact that p (or the fact that 
makes p true) becomes transparent to one in seeing that p, is not merely objectivist 
but also subjectivist. When one sees the fact that p, that fact is one‘s reason for 
believing the proposition that p. Once again, the kind of reason one has when one 
sees that p is not the kind of reason, when one possesses it, that one would typically 
cite as a consideration in favour of believing p. Hence it is not a reason1 in 
Ginsborg‘s sense.  
But what kind of state exactly is the state of seeing that p? It is important to 
emphasise that this state should not be assimilated to the state of grasping conceptual 
truths such that all bachelors are male. Nor should we think that the sense of reason 
involved in the notion that the proposition that all bachelors are male can be one‘s 
reason for believing that proposition to be true when one grasps it to be true is the 
kind of reason involved in the notion that the fact that, say, there is a table in front of 
one, can be one‘s reason for believing that fact to obtain when one sees that there is a 
table in front of one. In the end, I think that the state of seeing that p or the state of 
having a perceptual experience ‗open‘ to the fact that p, which figures in 
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McDowell‘s view of perceptual justification, is simply a sui generis mental state. In 
presenting his view, it seems to me, that McDowell relies on the expectation that 
most of us will find the notion that in seeing that p the obtaining of the fact that p 
becomes transparent to one as being intuitively compelling. To determine whether 
there is such a state, the suggestion might be that all that one needs to do is to briefly 
reflect on one‘s current situation. In looking around multiple facts just seem to 
present themselves to one. These facts seem to be made manifest in one‘s visual 
experience of them.  
At this point, it should become clear that the possibility of being in an 
experiential state in which the obtaining of a mind-independent fact becomes 
transparent to one crucially depends on perceptual experiences having the 
phenomenal character that they do. Thus, it seems clear that we could not conceive 
of how the obtaining of a mind-independent fact that an x is F can become 
subjectively transparent to one when one sees that an x is F, unless one is in a visual 
state that from the subject‘s own introspective point of view is one that is best 
described as a conscious awareness of an x being there in front of one and as having 
the property F. It is, therefore, at least in part, in virtue of a perceptual experience 
having the phenomenal character that it does that one can be in a state, when having 
this experience, that provides one with justification for believing propositions about 
one‘s environment  
It is equally clear that the state that one is in when one sees that p is a conceptual 
state and involves the actualisation of certain conceptual capacities. I leave open the 
question of whether the actualisation of conceptual capacities is required for the state 
of seeing an environmental fact that p to have the phenomenal character that it does. 
What is clear, however, is that a mental state could not be a state in which the 
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obtaining of a fact that p becomes subjectively transparent to one unless one has the 
conceptual capacity to form the judgment that p.  
With this, we can sum up McDowell‘s view of perceptual justification and its 
application to the Basic Principle as follows. As we have seen, the view contains 
both an objectivist and a subjectivist element. The objectivist element is that when 
one has a perceptual experience in which it appears to one as if an x is F and forms 
the belief that an x is F on the basis of one‘s having this perceptual experience, one‘s 
belief that an x is F is prima facie justified for one to the extent that the perceptual 
experience constitutes an openness to the fact that an x is F and thereby allows one to 
form the belief that an x is F on the basis of something that entails (or is necessarily 
correlated with) the truth of the proposition that an x is F. The subjectivist element, 
in turn, breaks down into two separate elements. Thus, on the one hand, when one 
has a perceptual experience in which it appears to one as if an x is F and forms the 
belief that an x is F on the basis of this perceptual experience, one‘s belief is justified 
insofar as one has the capacity to properly justify that belief by claiming that one 
sees that an x is F. On the other hand, however, the subjectivist element in 
McDowell‘s view consists of the notion that in having a perceptual experience in 
which it appears to one as if an x is F, one can be in a conceptual-experiential state in 
which the obtaining of the fact that an x is F can become transparent to one.  
How then should we evaluate this view? One serious problem, of course, is that 
this view cannot give us a complete explanation of the Basic Principle because it 
fails to accommodate in any way the new evil demon intuition. For our evil demon 
victim can neither satisfy the objectivist condition nor the subjectivist condition in 
McDowell‘s view of perceptual justification. He cannot satisfy the objectivist 
condition because his perceptual experiences do not entail the truth of propositions 
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he believes on the basis of these experiences, and he cannot satisfy the subjectivist 
condition because he cannot be in a conceptual-experiential state in which the 
obtaining of the facts is transparent to him, since this is a factive state. Moreover, 
McDowell‘s view not only fails to accommodate the new evil demon intuition, but it 
also fails to explain how a ‗normal‘ subject, who is not a demon victim, but who 
inhabits the kind of world that we take ourselves to be in, could have justification for 
believing a proposition p about his environment on the basis of a perceptual 
experience when, unbeknownst to him, this experience is merely a very deceptive 
kind of hallucination.   
 
 
E-Representing the Obtaining of a Mind-Independent Fact 
 
So McDowell‘s view, as stated, cannot be fully accepted. At this point, he might, of 
course, offer a two-sense conception of perceptual justification and two-sense 
explanation of the Basic Principle. Thus, he might say that while in the veridical case 
one can be justified in believing an external world proposition p on the basis of one‘s 
being in a state in which the obtaining of the fact that p becomes transparent to one, 
one essentially has a different kind of justification for one‘s perceptual beliefs when 
one unwittingly suffers, say, from a highly deceptive hallucination. But this would 
require some understanding of how one can be justified in one‘s perceptual belief 
that p when one is not, or is not in a position to be, in a mental state in which the 
obtaining of the fact that p is transparent to one. In the next chapter, I will address 
the question of whether there is any good reason for adopting a two-sense conception 
of perceptual justification in the way that a McDowellian might propose. For the 
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remainder of this chapter, I want to develop a conception of perceptual justification 
that can explain how one can have a justified perceptual belief independently of 
whether one is a ‗normal‘ subject or a victim of an evil demon.  
As I have suggested earlier, the discussion so far of McDowell‘s view of 
perceptual justification can help illuminate an alternative conception of perceptual 
justification and an alternative explanation of the Basic Principle, both of which can 
fully accommodate the new evil demon intuition. The problem with McDowell‘s 
view, of course, is that, even though it conceives of one‘s having perceptual 
justification for believing a proposition p about one‘s environment in terms of one‘s 
occupying a certain subjective perspective from which a situation obtains which 
entails or makes true the proposition p, the mental state in virtue of which one 
occupies this perspective is essentially a factive one. Thus, the experiential-
conceptual state that one is in when the fact that p becomes perceptually transparent 
to one is one that entails, or is necessarily correlated with, the fact that p. The key to 
providing an account of perceptual justification and an explanation of the Basic 
Principle, which is consistent with the new evil demon intuition and with the thought 
that one can have justification for one‘s perceptual beliefs even if one suffers from 
certain kinds of hallucination, is thus to try to conceive of an epistemically 
significant experiential state, which can constitute a subjective perspective from 
which a situation obtains that entails or makes true certain external world 
propositions but which is, crucially, non-factive. One suggestion is that instead of 
conceiving of perceptual justification as a matter of one‘s being in a state in which 
the obtaining of a mind-independent fact becomes perceptually transparent to one, 
we should conceive of perceptual justification as a matter of one‘s being in a state 
which perceptually represents in some way the obtaining of a mind-independent fact. 
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What is important here is that the notion of representation in general is not (or not 
essentially) factive, since one can falsely represent the obtaining of the fact that p.  
 The question, of course, is how exactly we should conceive of this kind of 
representational state. As with the state in which the obtaining of the fact that p 
becomes transparent to one, I suggest that we should think of the relevant kind of 
perceptual-representational state, if it exists, as in some sense being sui generis. 
What follows is a list of some of the key properties of this kind of state.  
First of all, the state is such that, if one is in it, it is liable to fix one‘s beliefs 
about the external world. Thus, if one is in a state in which one perceptually 
represents, in the relevant way, the obtaining of the fact that p, then, in the absence 
of reasons for believing otherwise, one will typically form the belief that p. 
However, it is absolutely crucial to emphasize that there is in the subject not merely 
a disposition to form the belief that p when he perceptually represents, in the relevant 
way, the obtaining of the fact that p. For what is required here is not simply a 
conception of a representational state which is liable to cause certain beliefs about 
the environment but rather a representational state which constitutes an epistemically 
significant subjective perspective from which a situation obtains that entails or 
makes true the contents of these beliefs. So I suggest that another feature of this kind 
of perceptual-representational state is that it is not just liable to fix certain beliefs 
about one‘s environment but also that it is such that if one were to reflect on the 
question of why one should think that these beliefs are true, one would be disposed 
to think – as a result of one‘s having a perceptual experience of a certain 
phenomenological sort – that these beliefs are true because one can see their contents 
as being true or because the facts that make these beliefs true (visibly, say) obtain 
before one. Thus the state we are concerned with is a perceptual-representational 
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state of a certain phenomenological sort such that if the subject were to reflect on his 
current situation when being in this state is he would, in the absence of reason for 
thinking otherwise, be disposed to think that it is a situation in which certain facts 
are simply made perceptually manifest to him.
17
  
It is in these ways that this is a kind of experiential or perceptual state in which 
one represents the obtaining of the fact that p in an epistemically significant way. I 
will refer to this kind of state as a perceptual e-representation of the mind-
independent fact that p. Thus, on the resulting account of perceptual justification, 
one has justification for believing that p on the basis of one‘s having a perceptual 
experience of the relevant phenomenological sort if one perceptually e-represents the 
obtaining of the fact that p (or the fact that makes true the proposition p).   
 It should be clear from the forgoing that the phenomenal character of 
perceptual experience plays an absolutely vital role in the conception of a perceptual 
e-representation. Thus one could not perceptually e-represent the obtaining of the 
fact that P unless one enjoys a perceptual experience in which it phenomenally 
appears to one as if p. We should also emphasize, however, that the state of 
perceptually e-representing the obtaining of the fact that p is essentially conceptual 
and as such requires the actualisation of the relevant conceptual capacities. Thus one 
could not be in this kind of epistemically significant state unless one could form the 
judgment that proposition p is true.  
To further clarify the conception of a perceptual e-representation, it is 
important to note that the kind of representational state that one is in when one 
                                                 
17
 Compare with this with Martin‘s notion of the non-neutrality of perceptual experience. See 
(Martin, The Transparency of Experience, 2002, pp. 389-91) However, it is not clear if Martin 
thinks that perceptual experiences are non-neutral in virtue simply of their having the phenomenal 
character that they do. That thought, I think, would be mistaken. For it seems to me that perceptual 
experiences are non-neutral only to the extent that they involve the actualisation of conceptual 
capacities.  
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perceptually e-represents the obtaining of a mind-independent fact is not necessarily 
the kind of representational state that the intentionalist about perceptual experiences 
claims is the kind of state one is in when one has a perceptual experience of a certain 
phenomenological sort. Thus, an intentionalist makes a commitment about what kind 
of state can constitute one‘s being in a state that has a specific phenomenal character. 
Thus, he will say, for example, that when one has a perceptual experience in which it 
appears to one as if an x is F, then one is essentially in a state with a certain 
representational content which represents an x as being F. However, as I understand 
it, the conception of a perceptual e-representation of a mind-independent fact that p 
is entirely metaphysically neutral. Thus, while having a perceptual e-representation 
requires that the subject is in a perceptual state of a certain phenomenological sort, 
the conception of a perceptual e-representation is in itself consistent with the various 
theories about what constitutes the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences. 
Of course, if intentionalism about perceptual experiences turns out to be the correct 
account of the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences, we would want to 
say that if one perceptually e-represents the obtaining of the fact that p that one‘s 
being in this state is a matter of, or is constituted by, one‘s being in a representational 
state with a certain representational content. Alternatively, however, we might hold 
on a sense-datum theory that one perceptually e-represents p the obtaining of the fact 
that p, in part, when having a perceptual experience whose phenomenal character is 
constituted by one‘s standing in some relation of awareness to a mind-dependent 
sense-datum and its properties. Finally, on a disjunctivist conception of perceptual 
experience, we might hold that one perceptually e-represents the obtaining of the fact 
that p either when having a perceptual experience whose phenomenal character is 
constituted by a relation to a mind-independent fact or when having a perceptual 
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experience whose phenomenal character is a matter of this experience being 
subjectively indistinguishable from a certain kind of veridical experience.  
Finally we should note that contrary to the McDowellian conception of a state in 
which the obtaining of a fact that p is transparent to one, the conception of a 
perceptual e-representation is not a conception of a state that amounts to one‘s 
possession of a reason for believing p. Thus there is on the latter conception no 
actual fact that one perceives that can function as one‘s subjective reason for 
believing a proposition about one‘s environment. I do think, however, that, with 
some care, we can conceive of a perceptual e-representation as a reason2 for a belief. 
For recall that, according to Ginsborg, a reason2 for a belief b is a mental state M on 
the basis of which, from a third-person perspective, we can make rationally 
intelligible a person‘s having B. In particular, Ginsborg‘s suggestion is that a 
reason2 is a mental state M in which things present themselves to a subject in such a 
way that his having B makes rational sense in light of his having M. Perceptual e-
representations do meet this definition of a reason2.
18
 At the same time we should 
note that although we can conceive of a perceptual e-representation as a reason2, that 
the notion of a perceptual e-representation is ultimately a technical notion. Thus, in 
ordinary circumstances, a third-person observer unfamiliar with the theory of 
perceptual justification being developed here (that is, nearly everyone in the world) 
would not explicitly attempt to make rational sense of a person‘s belief by appeal to 
that person‘s having a perceptual e-representation. However, we can think of a 
subject, in ordinary circumstances, making rational sense of someone else‘s belief 
that p by assuming correctly, for example, that this person can see that p or that this 
person has a perceptual experience in which it appears to him as if p is the case. My 
                                                 
18 Of course, they fail to be reasons2 if we also accept Ginsborg‘s stipulation that a subject‘s having a 
reason2 for believing p involves his taking it that he has a reason1 for believing p.  
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suggestion would be that in this case the subject‘s assumption is correct precisely 
because the person he is trying to make rational sense of enjoys a state in which he 
perceptually e-represents the obtaining of the fact that p.   
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Chapter 3 
 
Introduction 
 
In the last chapter we developed an explanation of the Basic Principle of Perceptual 
Justification that could fully accommodate the new evil demon intuition and thereby 
account for the fact that the victims of an evil demon, whose perceptual experiences 
are generally unreliable but otherwise phenomenologically like our experience (or if 
one prefers: subjectively indistinguishable from our experiences), could nonetheless 
be epistemically justified in holding their perceptual beliefs. As we have seen, this 
explanation of the Basic Principle relies in part on facts about the phenomenal 
character of perceptual experiences. Thus, if the explanation is correct, then it is in 
virtue of their phenomenal character that perceptual experiences contribute to the 
epistemic justification of our perceptual beliefs. Crucially, however, the resulting 
picture of perceptual justification, while appealing to facts about the phenomenal 
character of perceptual experience, is consistent with the various theories of the 
metaphysics of perceptual experience that are on offer.  
In this chapter, I want to address the question of whether there is more to say 
about the relation between the metaphysics and epistemology of perceptual 
experience. In particular, I will be concerned with whether a disjunctivist conception 
of perceptual experience can have any further implications on how our perceptual 
beliefs can be justified for us.  
Thus suppose we accept a disjunctivist conception as well as the explanation of 
the Basic Principle that was developed in the last chapter. According to the latter, 
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one has justification for believing a proposition p about one‘s environment on the 
basis of a perceptual experience if, partly in virtue of the given experience and its 
phenomenal character, one perceptually e-represents the obtaining of the fact that p 
(or the fact that makes p true). If this view of perceptual justification is combined 
with the disjunctivist conception of perceptual experience, we would say that one 
can perceptually e-represent the obtaining of the fact that p either when one has a 
perceptual experience whose phenomenal character is constituted by one‘s standing 
is some relation of awareness to the fact that p or when one has a perceptual 
(hallucinatory) experience whose phenomenal character is simply a matter of this 
experience‘s being subjectively indistinguishable from a veridical experience of the 
fact that p. In both the veridical and the hallucinatory case, the kind of justification 
one has for believing p, however, is essentially the same. For in both cases, the 
justification one has for believing p is constituted by one‘s perceptually e-
representing the obtaining of the fact that p.  
Still, in accepting a disjunctivist conception of perceptual experience, the fact 
remains that, in the veridical case, one has a perceptual experience whose 
phenomenal character objectively connects one with the truth of certain propositions 
about one‘s environment. So, on this conception, there is potential room to hold that, 
in the veridical case, one could have a kind of justification for believing a 
proposition about one‘s environment that one could not have if one suffered from a 
hallucination. In particular, we might hold, adopting the McDowellian picture of 
perceptual justification we considered in the previous chapter, that when one has a 
veridical experience, given the way the phenomenal character of this experience is 
constituted, one would not merely perceptually e-represent the obtaining of the fact 
that p, but rather enjoy a state in which the obtaining of the fact that p becomes 
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transparent to one.
19
 This in turn could lead us to accept a two-sense conception of 
perceptual justification (and a two-sense explanation of the Basic Principle) on 
which one will have different kinds of perceptual justification for believing 
propositions about one‘s environment depending on whether or not one has a 
veridical perceptual experience.  
The crucial question, of course, is whether there are any good arguments for 
insisting that in the veridical case one has a kind of perceptual justification for 
believing propositions about one‘s environment which is not available in the 
hallucinatory case and which is a matter of one‘s having a perceptual experience that 
is constituted by one‘s standing in a relation to a mind-independent fact. To answer 
this question we need to turn, once again, to some of McDowell‘s writings. Thus, 
apart from the claim that perceptual experiences provide one with reasons for 
believing propositions about one‘s environment, another key claim in his 
epistemology is that perceptual experiences can in some cases provide one with a 
kind of justification which amounts to one‘s having conclusive warrants for external 
world beliefs. Crucially, McDowell holds that it is only insofar as perceptual 
experiences can provide one with justification for believing propositions about one‘s 
environment which amounts to one‘s having conclusive warrants that these 
experiences can provide one with knowledge of those propositions. Furthermore, he 
seems to hold that perceptual experiences can provide one with conclusive warrants 
for believing external world propositions only if these experiences, in the veridical 
cases, are constituted by one‘s standing in some relation to objective facts. This 
                                                 
19  One would need to explain, of course, how a disjunctivist could secure this McDowellian 
conception of a reason-giving experience. The question is also whether only disjunctivism could 
make sense of how such an experience is possible. Finally, we might ask whether disjunctivism 
could yield a different conception of perceptual justification other than McDowell‘s conception. I 
am not aware of any alternative subjectivist conception. Disjunctivism of course could yield a 
straightforward objectivist conception.  
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means in turn that in the veridical case, perceptual experiences provide one with a 
kind of justification that is sufficient, qua justification, for one‘s coming to know a 
proposition about one‘s environment that cannot be had if one were in a 
hallucinatory case.  
Now in evaluating this line of reasoning, we need to have an understanding of 
the notion of a conclusive warrant and of why having such a warrant is essential to 
one‘s having perceptual knowledge of one‘s environment. We should also ask 
whether a conclusive warrant cannot be something that one has in both the veridical 
and the hallucinatory cases and, in particular, whether it is something that one can 
have even if one‘s perceptual justification for believing a proposition about one‘s 
environment consists of one‘s perceptually e-representing the obtaining of an 
environmental fact. But suppose for the moment that the notion of one‘s perceptually 
e-representing the obtaining of an environment fact is not in fact a notion of 
perceptual justification that involves one‘s having a conclusive warrant for believing 
an external world proposition, however the notion of a conclusive warrant is to be 
understood. As such, one‘s having this kind of perceptual justification, according to 
McDowell, would essentially fail to support one‘s having any perceptual knowledge 
of one‘s environment. And that, of course, would be an unfortunate consequence if 
we were to insist that one‘s having any perceptual justification for believing a 
proposition p about one‘s environment could consist in nothing else but one‘s 
perceptually e-representing the obtaining of the fact that p. Thus while we might 
happily accept that, in the hallucinatory case, one can merely have a kind of 
perceptual justification for believing p which essentially fails to deliver perceptual 
knowledge of the fact that p, it is surely unacceptable, in the veridical case, that one 
essentially lacks a kind of perceptual justification for believing p which, qua 
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justification, is sufficient for one‘s having perceptual knowledge that p. Thus, even 
if, in the hallucinatory case, one may well be justified in having a perceptual belief 
as a result of one‘s perceptually e-representing the obtaining of the fact that p, we 
would be compelled to hold that one can have a different kind of perceptual 
justification for believing an external world proposition p in the veridical case, which 
is sufficient, qua justification, to yield knowledge of the fact that p. We would 
therefore have strong motivation for a two-sense conception of perceptual 
justification (and a two-sense explanation of the Basic Principle) and, perhaps in 
turn, some motivation for endorsing a disjunctivist conception of perceptual 
experience, should this conception turn out to make possible one‘s having a kind of 
perceptual justification for believing a proposition p about one‘s environment that is 
sufficient, qua justification, to yield perceptual knowledge that p.  
Now later in the chapter, I will consider in more detail McDowell‘s argument for 
the claim that perceptual knowledge requires the possession on the part of the subject 
of conclusive warrants for believing propositions about the external world, the extent 
to which the notion of having conclusive perceptual warrants entails that one cannot 
have such warrants in both the veridical and hallucinatory cases, and the question of 
whether the notion of having conclusive perceptual warrants presupposes any 
particular metaphysical conception of perceptual experiences. Before doing so, 
however, I first want to turn to a related but different epistemological argument for 
the disjunctivist conception of experience that McDowell has offered in a recent 
paper. His claim in this paper is that this conception helps to solve the familiar 
problem of scepticism about the external world.  
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McDowell’s Response to Scepticism about the External World 
 
It will help to begin with McDowell‘s own understanding of the disjunctivist 
conception of perceptual experience. Thus, as he understands it, disjunctivism is a 
conception of perceptual experience that preserves the idea that in non-deceptive 
veridical perceptions there can be ‗direct perceptual access to objective facts about 
the environment.‘ (McDowell, 2008, p. 4) It does so by invalidating the inference 
from the possibility of certain kinds of deceptive perceptual experience, i.e. certain 
kinds of hallucination (or illusion), to the conclusion that non-deceptive veridical 
perceptions, i.e. experiences involving no hallucinatory (or illusory) elements, 
cannot be constituted by direct perceptual access to objective facts. The relevant 
deceptive experiences that supposedly support this inference are those that are 
subjectively indistinguishable from non-deceptive veridical perceptions. The idea is 
thus that when one considers a non-deceptive veridical perception, say, a visual 
perception of a red cube, one‘s ‗experience could be just as it is, in all respects, even 
if there were no red cube in front of [one]‘ (ibid, p. 378). From this it follows that a 
non-deceptive visual perception of a red cube cannot be constituted by a mind-
independent fact – that there is a red cube –  being made perceptually accessible to 
one. Against this, disjunctivism, as McDowell conceives of it, holds that perceptual 
experiences that are subjectively indistinguishable from non-deceptive veridical 
perceptions are either, in the non-deceptive veridical cases, perceptual experiences in 
which an objective fact is perceptually accessible or, in the deceptive cases, 
perceptual experiences in which it merely appears as if an objective fact is 
perceptually accessible when actually it is not. Thus the disjunctivist idea that the 
class of experiences subjectively indistinguishable from non-deceptive veridical 
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perceptions comprises perceptual experiences that both do and do not involve 
genuine perceptual relations to objective facts can block the inference from the 
possibility of deceptive experiences subjectively indistinguishable from non-
deceptive veridical perceptions to the conclusion that non-deceptive veridical 
perceptions cannot involve genuine perceptual relations to objective facts.
20
 
What bearing does the disjunctivist conception of experience have on 
scepticism about the external world? According to McDowell, it is the following:  
 
... scepticism expresses an inability to make sense of the idea of direct 
perceptual access to objective facts about the environment. What generates 
this scepticism is the thought that even in the best possible case, the most that 
perceptual experience can yield falls short of a subject‘s having an 
environmental state of affairs directly available to her. Consider situations in 
which a subject seems to see that, say, there is a red cube in front of her. The 
idea is that even if we focus on the best possible case, her experience could 
be just as it is, in all respects, even if there were no red cube in front of her. 
This seems to reveal that perceptual experience provides at best inconclusive 
warrants for claims about the environment. And that seems incompatible with 
supposing we ever, strictly speaking, know anything about our objective 
surroundings. The familiar sceptical scenarios — Descartes‘s demon, the 
scientist with our brains in his vat, the suggestion that all our apparent 
experience might be a dream — are only ways to make this supposed 
predicament vivid. (ibid, pp. 378-8)  
 
                                                 
20  Note that disjunctivism as formulated in this paragraph makes no explicit commitment about what 
constitutes the phenomenal character of experiences. However, this fact won‘t matter for the 
purposes of this chapter.  
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Now it is not clear why McDowell claims that scepticism ‗expresses an inability to 
make sense of the idea of direct perceptual access to objective facts‘ for that idea 
seems clear enough. What I will take McDowell to mean here is simply that the 
sceptic cannot accept that perceptual experiences could be constituted by a direct 
perceptual access to objective facts about the environment. Presumably, this is 
because of the kind of inference from the possibility of certain kinds of deceptive 
experience to the nature of perceptual experiences in general that was outlined 
earlier. So to the sceptic, as McDowell sees it, a non-deceptive veridical experience 
of an x can be just what it is, in all respects qua experience, even if there is no x in 
one‘s perceptual field. From this the sceptic then apparently concludes that a 
perceptual experience, even if non-deceptive and veridical, can at best provide one 
with inconclusive warrant for beliefs or claims concerning one‘s environment. And 
such a warrant is insufficient, qua justification, to constitute the possibility of 
perceptual knowledge.
21
 Hence perceptual knowledge is impossible and scepticism 
about the external world, at least insofar as one thinks that perceptual experiences are 
the source of knowledge about the external world, immediately follows. Finally, the 
familiar Cartesian scenarios, like the evil demon thought experiment, are only 
supposed to make vivid the idea that perceptual experiences cannot be constituted by 
a relation to mind-independent facts.  
Having outlined the sceptical argument in this way, McDowell offers the 
following response:  
 
...it constitutes a response [to this kind of scepticism] if we can find a way to 
insist that we can make sense of the idea of direct perceptual access to 
                                                 
21  I will assume here that for one to know that p is for one to have a true justified belief that p plus 
whatever conditions are required to rule out one‘s being in a Gettier situation.  
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objective facts about the environment. That contradicts the claim that what 
perceptual experience yields even in the best possible case must fall short of 
having an environmental fact directly available to one. And without that 
thought, this scepticism loses its supposed basis and falls to the ground. (ibid, 
p. 379) 
 
Thus if, despite the subjective indistinguishability between veridical perceptions and 
certain kinds of hallucinations, we can insist that perceptual experiences can consist 
of direct perceptual relations to objective facts about the environment, we no longer 
have to conceive of the kind of justification that perceptual experiences can provide 
as insufficient, qua justification, for constituting the possibility of perceptual 
knowledge. Hence if disjunctivism is true, and if one can thereby accommodate the 
fact that certain deceptive experiences can be subjectively indistinguishable from 
non-deceptive veridical perceptions without having to deny the possibility that some 
perceptual experiences can consist of direct perceptual access to objective facts, 
scepticism ‗falls to the ground‘. 
Both McDowell‘s account of the reasoning leading to scepticism and his 
response to it raise some pressing questions. First why should we think that 
perceptual experiences, when they are not conceived of as involving direct 
perceptual relations to objective facts, at best provide inconclusive warrants for 
beliefs or claims about one‘s environment? Second, even if such perceptual 
experiences at best provide inconclusive warrants for perceptual beliefs, why is 
having such a warrant insufficient, qua having justification, for constituting the 
possibility of knowledge about one‘s environment?22 However, we can, for the 
                                                 
22 Of course, we need to understand what conclusive warrants are. I will turn to this in the next 
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moment, leave these questions aside. For now, the more pressing issue is whether 
McDowell is right to contend that the sceptic makes any assumptions at all about the 
nature of perceptual experience and about whether perceptual experience can ever be 
constituted by a relation to mind-independent facts. If it can be shown that the 
sceptic does not make any assumptions at all about the nature of perceptual 
experience, then McDowell‘s anti-sceptical response fails and cannot, therefore, be 
used in defence of the disjunctivist conception of perceptual experience.  
 
 
Wright’s Response to McDowell’s Anti-Scepticism  
 
As we have seen, the effectiveness of McDowell‘s response to scepticism about the 
external world clearly depends on the claim that the sceptic cannot make sense of 
how perceptual experiences can provide one with justification for believing 
propositions about the external world that is sufficient, qua justification, for the 
possibility of knowledge about one‘s environment only because he cannot accept that 
perceptual experience can consist of a perceptual relation to an objective fact about 
one‘s environment. According to McDowell, the phenomenological fact concerning 
the subjective indistinguishability between non-deceptive veridical perceptions and 
certain kinds of hallucination and the sceptical Cartesian scenarios that make this 
fact so vivid thus blind the sceptic from a conception of perceptual justification that, 
if one were not misled by the phenomenological fact, would seem to be sheer 
common sense. In response to McDowell, Crispin Wright has recently argued that 
                                                                                                                                          
section. For the moment, I will understand the notion of one‘s having conclusive warrant as a 
particular form of one‘s having epistemic justification. 
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this reconstruction of the line of reasoning leading to Cartesian scepticism about the 
external world misconstrues the true import of the Cartesian sceptical scenarios and 
the subjective indistinguishability between veridical perceptions and certain kinds of 
hallucinations. For properly understood, the sceptical line of reasoning does not 
depend at all on any particular conception of what constitutes the experiential nature 
of perceptual experiences. In illustrating this point, Wright appeals to the following 
case:  
 
Suppose I knowingly participate in double-blind trials of a new 
hallucinogenic drug. Half the participants receive the drug, the other half an 
identical looking and tasting vitamin pill. The consciousness of those who 
ingest the drug will move — so it is predicted — seamlessly into a 
completely plausible, sustained, multi-sense hallucination, in which all the 
experiences ―make sense‖ in the context of the subjects‘ recollection of their 
previous waking experiences of the day prior to ingestion of the pill, and 
indeed of the general fabric of their lives. This will happen — if the drug 
performs as expected — within a few minutes of ingestion, and the 
hallucination will then be sustained for several hours. (Wright, Comments on 
John McDowell's 'The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for 
a Transcendental Argument', 2008, pp. 398-9) 
 
This case unfolds as follows. Not knowing which of the two pills it is, I ingest the 
vitamin pill and continue to have non-deceptive, fully veridical perceptual 
experiences. Thus, according to the disjunctivist conception, I continue to have 
perceptual experiences which consist of direct perceptual relations to objective facts. 
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But that clearly does not entail that I continue to have perceptual justification for any 
beliefs about those facts.  As Wright argues:  
 
…it would, in the circumstances, be unwarranted for me to believe any of the 
mundane propositions of whose truth-conditions I am perceiving the worldly 
satisfaction. I do not know that these propositions are true. I am not, in the 
circumstances, even justified in claiming that they are true (the trialists, 
remember, are knowingly divided 50-50 but blind between those who take 
the drug and those who take the vitamins.)…the perceptual apprehension of a 
state of affairs that makes it the case that P is one thing, and possession of 
warrant for taking it to be the case that P is another. The former, even when a 
subject's belief that P is based on that very apprehension, is insufficient for 
warrant if aspects of the subject's collateral information conspire to make the 
belief that P somehow irrational or irresponsible. (ibid, p. 399) 
 
The crucial point this case raises is thus that my knowing participation in the trial 
puts me in an informational state such that I can no longer rationally avail myself of 
any justification my perceptual experiences supposedly provide. And this is so 
however the nature of a perceptual experience is constituted 
I take it that there is no question that whatever form of justification for empirical 
beliefs perceptual experiences can provide, this justification can be undermined in 
this way. Thus Wright raises a straightforward point about the potential defeasibility 
of perceptual justification. The question, however, is what bearing this has on the 
sceptical argument. Here Wright seems to think that while the collateral information 
that one obtains when participating in the above trial undermines whatever warrant 
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one‘s perceptual experiences yield at the time around the trial, the raising of the 
metaphysical possibility of Cartesian sceptical scenarios represents collateral 
information that undermines the epistemic credentials of perceptual experiences as 
such. Again, quoting from Wright: 
 
…it is undeniable that if the alternatives are to suppose that my current 
experiences are elements of veridical perceptual activity and to suppose that 
they are a marvellously convincing counterfeit, then the subjective quality of 
the experiences itself — what it is like to undergo them — can indeed 
provide no rational motive for either view. (ibid, p. 400) 
 
It becomes clear therefore how, according to Wright, McDowell misconstrues the 
sceptical line of reasoning. McDowell is right in claiming that the sceptic cannot 
make sense of how perceptual experiences can provide warrants that are sufficient, 
qua justification, for the possibility of knowledge about one‘s environment. But this 
is not because the sceptic cannot accept that perceptual experience can consist of a 
perceptual relation to an objective fact about one‘s environment, as McDowell would 
have it. Rather it is because the sceptic cannot accept that one can rationally avail 
oneself of whatever form of justification perceptual experiences might provide in 
light of the metaphysical possibility of sceptical scenarios – for example, that one is 
brain-in-a-vat – and the phenomenological fact that if one were a brain-in-a-vat, 
one‘s experiences would be subjectively indistinguishable from non-deceptive, fully 
veridical perceptions. So Wright claims that McDowell‘s response to Cartesian 
scepticism about the external world is ‗dialectically quite ineffectual‘ (Wright, (Anti-
) Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G.E. Moore and John McDowell, 2002, p. 331). It will 
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not do to simply insist on the disjunctivist conception of perceptual experience and 
the conception of perceptual justification that it supposedly makes available.  
Now to see if Wright is correct in claiming that McDowell‘s response to 
scepticism is ineffectual, we need to take a closer look at Wright‘s alternative 
reconstruction of the sceptical reasoning. As became clear, the epistemic 
predicament the sceptic describes is the result of the possession of collateral 
information concerning the metaphysical possibility of being in sceptical scenarios 
that threatens to undermine the epistemic credentials of one‘s perceptual 
experiences. In driving home this point, Wright relies on the analogy between raising 
the possibility of one‘s entrapment in a sceptical scenario and knowingly taking part 
in the trial of the hallucinogenic drug. But how well does the analogy hold? 
As the drug trial case is described, what it represents is a situation in which one 
is rationally compelled to consider the question of whether one‘s perceptual faculties 
are properly functioning and to regard this question as entirely open.
23
 The reason for 
this is that one has evenly balanced evidence for and against the claim that one‘s 
perceptual faculties are properly functioning. It is clear, however, that the raising of 
the metaphysical possibility of being in a sceptical scenario does not create the exact 
same kind of evidential situation. That is, it is not the case, in the context in which, 
for example, the brain-in-the-vat hypothesis is raised, that one has evenly balanced 
evidence for and against the claim that one is not a brain-in-a-vat as a result of 
having evidence for the claim that there is an exactly even chance that one is a brain-
in-a-vat and that one is not. Nevertheless, Wright believes that the effect of raising 
the brain-in-the-vat hypothesis is to create an epistemic situation that is no better 
than – or analogous to – one‘s epistemic situation in the drug trial. Wright claims: 
                                                 
23 See Wright (2008), p. 400.  
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‗…a special case of balanced evidence is the situation of no evidence either way.‘ 
(Wright, 2008, p. 400) And, quoting again a statement mentioned earlier: ‗…it is 
undeniable that if the alternatives are to suppose that my current experiences are 
elements of veridical perceptual activity and to suppose that they are a marvellously 
convincing counterfeit, then the subjective quality of the experiences itself — what it 
is like to undergo them — can indeed provide no rational motive for either view.‘ 
(ibid, p. 400) But even if one agrees with Wright that a situation of no evidence 
either way is just a special case of having balanced evidence, it remains questionable 
whether there are sufficient similarities between the epistemic situation one is in the 
drug trial case and the epistemic situation one is in when a sceptical hypothesis is 
being raised. For there is a crucial difference between the two cases in what supports 
the assumption that one has balanced evidence for and against the claim that one‘s 
perceptual faculties are properly functioning and, therefore, in what generates the 
(purported) rational compulsion (a) to consider the question of whether one‘s 
perceptual faculties are functioning property and (b) to regard this question as 
entirely open. In the drug trial case, what supports this assumption is one‘s 
knowledge of how the trial is set up; namely that half the participants are given the 
hallucinogenic drug, while the rest are given the vitamin pill. This knowledge is set 
against whatever form of justification one‘s perceptual experiences might otherwise 
provide, and it is clear that it is sufficient to undermine the epistemic credentials of 
one‘s experiences. And, the point bears repeating: one‘s knowledge about how the 
trial is set up genuinely undermines the epistemic credentials of one‘s perceptual 
experiences precisely because it legitimately throws up the question of whether one‘s 
perceptual faculties are functioning properly and rationally compels one to regard 
that question as entirely open. There is, however, no analogous support for the 
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assumption that one has balanced evidence for and against the claim that one‘s 
perceptual faculties are functioning properly in the context in which a sceptical 
scenario is raised. As Wright‘s reasoning in the quoted passages makes clear, what 
supports the assumption that one has balanced evidence either way in this context is 
what he calls ‗the subjective quality‘ of one‘s experiences, which is the fact that our 
perceptual experiences are subjectively indistinguishable from certain kinds of 
hallucination.  
But why should this phenomenological fact about our perceptual experiences 
entail that we can have no (perceptual) evidence either way for believing that our 
perceptual experiences are genuinely veridical or certain kinds of hallucination? 
Now to say that one‘s perceptual experience is subjectively indistinguishable from a 
certain kind of hallucination is to say that one cannot know on the basis of 
introspecting one‘s experience alone that the experience is indeed a veridical 
perception and not a very deceptive kind of hallucination. But this fact entails that 
we can have no evidence either way for believing that our perceptual experiences are 
genuinely veridical or certain kinds of hallucination only if we make the further 
assumption that evidence for believing that our perceptual experiences are veridical 
can only be acquired on the basis of introspection of our perceptual experiences. 
Thus we can summarise the sceptic‘s argument, as it is reconstructed by Wright, as 
follows: 
  
(1) If I have some justification/evidence/rational motive for believing that I am 
not a brain-in-vat when having a perceptual experience e, I need to be able to 
tell on the basis of introspecting e alone that I am not a brain-in-vat suffering 
from systematic hallucinations.  
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(2) I am not able to tell on the basis of introspecting e alone that I am having a 
veridical perception and not a very deceptive kind of hallucination.  
Therefore,  
(3) I have no justification/evidence/rational motive for believing that I am not a 
brain-in-a-vat when having a perceptual experience e.  
Furthermore,  
(4) If I have no warrant/evidence/rational motive for believing that I am not a 
brain-in-vat when having a perceptual experience e, then I have no 
justification/evidence/rational motive for believing that ordinary propositions 
such that I have two hands.  
Therefore,  
(5) I have no justification/rational motive for believing that I have two hands 
when having a perceptual experience e.  
 
Premise (2) simply expresses the fact, which we presumably we accept, that our 
perceptual experiences are subjectively indistinguishable from certain kinds of 
hallucination. Proposition (3) in this argument unproblematically follows from 
premises (1) and (2). Premise (4) in turn is derived from the so-called closure 
principle which we can also take to be unproblematic and which states that:  
 
If S knows that p, and knows that p entails q, then S knows q.   
 
 Finally proposition (5) in this argument unproblematically follows from (3) and (4).  
At issue, therefore, is the status of premise (1) and the question is why we 
should follow the sceptic in accepting it. For the obvious alternative is suppose that 
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one can have some justification for believing that one is not a brain-in-vat and that 
this justification can be acquired on the basis of sources other than what one can 
come to know on the basis of introspecting one‘s perceptual experiences.  In this 
case, the fact that veridical perceptual experiences can be subjectively 
indistinguishable from very deceptive forms of hallucinations would have no bearing 
on the question of whether or not one can come to know that one is not in a sceptical 
scenario. If one accepts that the sceptical reasoning can be undermined in this way, 
then there seem to be two options available to the anti-sceptic. Thus, on the one 
hand, we can attempt to show that one can have some form of a priori justification 
for believing that one is not a brain-in-vat, where this is a kind of justification that 
derives neither from one‘s having specific kinds of perceptual experience nor from 
one‘s introspection of those experiences. On the other hand, we can attempt to show 
that one can have justification for believing that one is not a brain-in-vat on the basis 
of one‘s having some perceptual justification for believing ordinary propositions 
about one‘s environment such that one has two hands – propositions that entail that 
one is not a brain-in-vat. In this case, one‘s justification for believing that one is not 
a brain-in-vat thus derives from one‘s having a perceptual experience which provides 
one with justification for believing that one has two hands and from one‘s grasping 
that the proposition that one has two hands entails the proposition that one is not a 
brain-in-vat.  
In his own approach to answering the sceptic, Wright himself explores the option 
of whether we can indeed have some relevant form of a priori justification for 
accepting that one is not a brain-in-vat.
24
  But suppose that this strategy essentially 
fails. What then rules out the claim that one can have justification for believing that 
                                                 
24 (Wright, Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?, 2004) 
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one is not a brain-in-vat on the basis of one‘s having perceptual justification for 
believing ordinary propositions about one‘s environment? This question, of course, 
is crucial, for suppose McDowell were to insist at this point that it is only because 
the sceptic is simply not open to the idea that if one has a perceptual experience 
which is constituted by a relation to mind-independent facts one can have conclusive 
warrant for believing that one has two hands, that the sceptic fails to understand that 
one can have justification for believing that one is not a brain-in-vat. Thus, according 
to this rejoinder on the part of McDowell, the sceptic, contra Wright‘s suggestion, 
would in fact have to implicitly assume the impossibility of perceptual experiences 
that are constituted by a relation to mind-independent facts. 
However, even though I think that this is how McDowell should respond to 
Wright‘s objections, problems remain with this rejoinder. One of these is that 
McDowell‘s anti-sceptical rejoinder, even if ultimately correct, may still leave us 
unsatisfied. For ultimately, what we may have here is simply a combination two 
conflicting intuitions. Thus the sceptic – and those sympathetic to his reasoning – 
may simply insist that given the subjective indistinguishability between the kind of 
veridical perceptual experiences that we take ourselves to enjoy and the kinds of 
hallucinatory experiences that the brain-in-vat has to suffer, we cannot in fact have 
justification for believing that we are not brains-in-vats on the basis of our having 
perceptual justification for believing ordinary propositions about our environment. 
The McDowellian in turn might simply insist on the intuition that when we have a 
perceptual experience which is constituted by a relation to a mind-independent fact 
we can have a kind of perceptual justification that puts in a position to know 
ordinary propositions about our environment and therefore puts us in a position to 
know that we are not brains-in-vats. Of course, insofar as we assume that one cannot 
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have a priori justification for believing that one is not a brain-in-vat and insofar as 
we assume that we do have justified perceptual beliefs, then we might left in a 
situation in which we simply have to resist the sceptic‘s intuition and endorse the 
McDowellian intuition instead.  
But this leads us to a second problem with McDowell‘s potential rejoinder to 
Wright‘s objections. For it is far from clear that McDowell‘s conception of how 
perceptual experiences can provide us with justification for believing proposition 
about the external world, which relies on the assumption that some perceptual 
experiences can consist of a relation to mind-independent facts, is the only way to 
resist the sceptic‘s intuition. Thus, there may well be other ways of providing an 
intuitively plausible account of how perceptual experiences can contribute to the 
justification of beliefs about the external world that do not depend on the 
disjunctivist assumption that in some cases perceptual experiences can consist of a 
relation to mind-independent facts. Ultimately, therefore, whether or not we should 
accept a disjunctivist conception of perceptual experience will depend – from an 
epistemological point of view at least – on whether or not we should accept 
McDowell‘s claim that only one‘s having conclusive perceptual warrants can ensure 
that perceptual experiences can provide one with knowledge of the external world. 
McDowell, it seems to me, needs to defend this claim independently of whether or 
not it can constitute a response to scepticism about the external world. In fact he does 
provide independent arguments in defence of this claim and it is to these that I will 
turn in the next section.  
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Perceptual Knowledge and Conclusive Warrants 
 
In reconstructing McDowell‘s response to scepticism, I earlier quoted him as saying 
that  
 
[what] generates...scepticism is the thought that even in the best possible 
case, the most that perceptual experience can yield falls short of a subject‘s 
having an environmental state of affairs directly available to her...This seems 
to reveal that perceptual experience provides at best inconclusive warrants for 
claims about the environment. And that seems incompatible with supposing 
that we ever, strictly speaking, know anything about our objective 
surroundings.  
 
Continuing, McDowell claims:  
 
...it constitutes a response [to this kind of scepticism] if we can find a way to 
insist that we can make sense of the idea of direct perceptual access to 
objective facts about the environment. That contradicts the claim that what 
perceptual experience yields even in the best possible case must fall short of 
having an environmental fact directly available to one.  
 
Now whether or not these remarks constitute a reasonable response to scepticism 
about the external world, they can be taken as making clear McDowell‘s 
commitment to the claim that perceptual experiences can provide one with 
knowledge about the external world only if they can provide one with justification 
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for believing propositions about the external world that amounts to one‘s having 
conclusive warrants for believing those propositions and for the claim that only if 
perceptual experiences are constituted by a relation to a mind-independent fact can 
they provide one with these kinds of conclusive warrant.  In this section, we need to 
determine first whether perceptual knowledge really does require one‘s possessing 
conclusive perceptual warrants and, second, if knowledge really does require one‘s 
possessing conclusive perceptual warrants, whether one‘s having such warrants 
requires one‘s having perceptual experiences which are constituted by a relation to 
mind-independent facts. Of course, if perceptual knowledge of an external world 
proposition p is possible even on the assumption that one does not have justification 
for believing p that amounts to one‘s having conclusive warrants for believing p, or 
if one‘s having perceptual conclusive warrants for believing p does not require one‘s 
having a perceptual experience which is constituted by a relation to a mind-
independent fact, then we may lose any motivation for adopting the disjuncitivist 
conception of experience and for thinking that there is a kind of perceptual 
justification that one can have only if one has a veridical perceptual experience.  
 How then is the claim that perceptual knowledge requires the possession of 
conclusive warrants to be understood? As we have seen in the previous chapter, to 
McDowell, knowledge is essentially a standing in the space of reasons, which means 
that one can know a proposition p only if one has some reason for believing p. We 
have also seen that McDowell‘s epistemological outlook consists of two ways in 
which we can understand the notion of one‘s having a perceptual reason for 
believing p. Thus, on the first understanding of this notion, one has a perceptual 
reason for believing p if one can appropriately cite the proposition, say, that one sees 
that p as a reason for believing p. Here a perceptual reason consists of a proposition 
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that one can cite in defence of one‘s belief. On the second understanding of this 
notion, however, one has a perceptual reason for believing p if, seeing the fact that p, 
the obtaining of the fact that p becomes visually transparent to one. On this second 
way of understanding the notion of having a perceptual reason, one‘s reason for 
believing p is the mind-independent fact that makes this proposition true. In what 
follows, we can take it that both these kinds of perceptual reason can amount to the 
kinds of conclusive warrant that McDowell alludes to in the passages quoted. Having 
a perceptual reason for believing p, in either of the two senses, amounts to having a 
conclusive warrant in the sense that one has a reason for believing p which entails, or 
necessarily makes true, this proposition. We therefore need to examine first the claim 
that perceptual knowledge of the proposition p requires one‘s being able to justify 
one‘s believing p by citing a conclusive perceptual reason and address the question 
of whether one‘s ability to justify one‘s believing that p requires that one be in a 
perceptual state which is constituted by a relation to a mind-independent fact. 
Second, we need to examine the claim that perceptual knowledge of the external 
world proposition p requires one‘s being in a state in which the obtaining of the fact 
that becomes perceptually transparent to one. 
Before we begin our examination of these two claims, however, I want to 
briefly introduce a term – borrowed from McDowell – for the kind of perceptual 
experience that we would have on a non-disjucntivist conception of experience. The 
assumption of an alternative conception of perceptual experience would have to be 
that a non-deceptive, veridical experience of an x could be just as it is, in all respects 
qua experience, even if there is no x in one‘s environment. Borrowing a term 
McDowell uses, I will call experiences conceived of in this way highest common 
factor experiences or HCF-experiences. McDowell‘s claim, therefore, is that HCF-
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experiences could at best provide inconclusive warrants for beliefs about one‘s 
environment.  
 Consider then the claim that perceptual knowledge that p requires one‘s 
ability to appropriately justify one‘s believing that p by citing, as a conclusive 
reason, the proposition that one sees that p. This claim entails that one could not 
have perceptual knowledge that p if one is merely able to justify one‘s believing that 
p by citing a proposition that does not entail the proposition that p. For example, one 
could not have perceptual knowledge that p if all one could say, or if all one were 
justified in saying, in defence of one‘s believing that p that it perceptually appears to 
one as if p is the case. This kind of proposition about the experiential state that one is 
in is entirely consistent with the falsity of p and, in that sense, an inconclusive 
warrant for believing p.  
But why should we think that one‘s merely being able to cite a nonconclusive 
reason or warrant for believing p is incompatible with knowing that p? Adapting a 
line of thought that McDowell employs in a different context, I will assume here that 
McDowell would reject the idea that one can know that p if one is merely able to cite 
a non-conclusive reason for believing that p because this idea would entail that 
knowing that p ―could be constituted by being in a position, which for all one knows, 
[is compatible with the falsity of p]. And that seems straightforwardly incoherent‖ 
(McDowell, Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge, 1982, p. 457). Thus, if one‘s 
reason for believing that p is, for all one knows, incapable of ruling out the 
possibility that p is false, then it would be incoherent to ascribe to one knowledge 
that p.   
Now, from an initial, pre-theoretical viewpoint, this does seems to be 
straightforwardly true. Thus, if someone were to provide as a reason for thinking p, 
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say, that it (perceptually) seems to him as if p, one might rightly hesitate in 
attributing to him knowledge that p. But, of course, in the normal run of things when 
one has no doubts about the accuracy of one‘s visual experiences, one would not 
hold back from simply claiming that one sees that p and offer instead the 
comparatively weaker claim that it visually seems to one as if p. McDowell‘s point, 
however, seems to be this: that an HCF-experience could never provide one with 
justification for believing p by making it appropriate for one to claim in defence of 
one‘s believing p that one sees that p.  
This latter contention can be questioned, and I will question it below. But 
suppose one accepts it. In doing so, one need not hold that the weaker kind of 
perceptual claim would actually be made in the ordinary run of things and thereby, 
by itself, constitute a proper reason for an empirical belief; rather one would take 
such a perceptual claim as a starting point in a theoretical account of how making 
such a perceptual claim could figure in constituting one‘s justification for beliefs 
about one‘s environment. It is precisely theoretical accounts of this kind that are the 
target of McDowell‘s arguments: 
 
So we are to try to reconstruct the epistemic satisfactoriness implicit in the 
idea of seeing that things are thus and so, using the following materials; first, 
the fact that it looks to a subject as if things are that way; second, whatever 
further circumstances are relevant (this depends on the third item); third, the 
fact that the policy or habit of accepting appearances in such circumstances is 
endorsed by reason, in its critical function, as reliable. (McDowell, 
Knowledge and the Internal, 1995, p. 880)  
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The specific theoretical account that McDowell addresses here says that one‘s 
environmental knowledge that p can be constituted by the fact (or rather by one‘s 
justifiably believing) that it perceptually seems to one as if p and the fact (or one‘s 
justifiably believing) that such seemings are a reliable indicator for the truth of p. 
Concerning perceptual justification, this account would say that one‘s justification 
for believing p would be constituted by one‘s having justification for believing (a) 
that it perceptually seems to one as if p and (b) that such seemings are a reliable 
indicator for the truth of p. A crucial question with this is, of course, whether one can 
really have an adequate justification for thinking (b). But as far as I can see, 
McDowell does not dispute the possibility of having such justification. To him, the 
fault with this view, as he makes clear in the following passage, lies elsewhere: 
 
…the trouble is this: unless reason can come up with policies or habits that 
will never lead us astray, there is not enough here to add up to what we were 
trying to reconstruct. Seeing that things are thus and so is a position one 
cannot be in if things are not thus and so. Given that one is in that position, it 
follows that things are thus and so. And if reason cannot find policies or 
habits that are utterly risk-free, the reconstructing materials cannot duplicate 
that. However careful one is in basing belief on appearances, if one‘s method 
falls short of total freedom from risk of error, the appearance plus the 
appropriate circumstances for achieving the method cannot ensure that things 
are as one takes them to be. (ibid, p. 880) 
 
Thus the apparent problem with the view under consideration is that it cannot 
duplicate the epistemic situation that one would be in if one could legitimately claim 
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to perceive that things are thus and so. Perceptual claims of this kind are factive and 
therefore offer conclusive reasons for the propositions they embed. In contrast, what 
one has on the alternative conception of perceptual justification are reasons – (a) and 
(b) – that, although perhaps one has justification for believing them, do not strictly 
speaking entail that p. But why does this amount to a problem? Recall that 
McDowell‘s contention was not the trivial claim that inconclusive warrants are 
weaker than conclusive warrants but rather that the inconclusive warrants HCF-
experiences can yield are not sufficient, qua having justification, for constituting the 
possibility of knowledge about one‘s environment. But what reasons has he offered 
so far for thinking that this should be so? If one could really have justification for 
taking it that (a) and (b) are true, why would having these reasons, qua having 
justification, not be sufficient for constituting one‘s knowing p?  
In the above passage, McDowell alludes to the requirement, when forming a 
belief about one‘s environment on the basis of inconclusive reasons such as (a) and 
(b), for a total freedom from risk of error. Again, the suggestion seems to be that this 
requirement is needed in order to ensure that when one forms an empirical belief on 
the basis of (a) and (b), one can be in an epistemic situation that is like the epistemic 
situation one is in when one has factive reasons. However, this is just a restatement 
of the claim that knowledge requires one‘s possessing conclusive reasons. What we 
need it is some independent argument in support of this claim.  
So far, this is thus utterly unconvincing. But McDowell raises a separate, perhaps 
more serious problem for the view he is considering:  
 
I want to urge another problem about the hybrid conception of knowledge. In 
the hybrid conception, a satisfactory standing in the space of reasons is only 
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part of what knowledge is; truth is an extra requirement. So two subjects can 
be alike in respect of the satisfactoriness of their standing in the space of 
reasons, although only one of them is a knower, because only in her case is 
what she takes to be so actually so. But if its being so is external to her 
operations in the space of reasons, how can it not be outside the reach of her 
rational powers? And if it is outside the reach of her rational powers, how can 
its being so be the crucial element in an intelligible conception of her knowing 
that it is so – what makes the relevant difference between her and the other 
subject? Its being so is conceived as external to the only thing that is supposed 
to be epistemologically significant about the knower itself, her satisfactory 
standing in the space of reasons. That standing is not itself a cognitive 
purchase on its being so…But then how can the unconnected obtaining of the 
fact have any intelligible bearing on an epistemic position that the person‘s 
standing in the space of reasons is supposed to help constitute? How can it 
coalesce with that standing to yield a composite story that somehow adds up to 
the person‘s being a knower? (ibid, p. 883) 
 
The concern here is still with the view that one‘s perceptual justification for a belief 
about one‘s environment consists in one‘s having justification for believing 
propositions (a) and (b), which in turn can be one‘s reasons for believing an 
environmental proposition p. McDowell calls such a view a hybrid view because it 
conceives of knowledge as the combination of one‘s standing in the space of reasons 
and the fulfilment of the truth requirement. That is, on this account, one counts as 
knowing p if one‘s believing p is based on one‘s believing with justification 
propositions (a) and (b) and if p is indeed true. That one‘s believing that p is a matter 
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of standing in the space of reasons derives from the fact that it is a rational cognitive 
achievement; a cognitive state one is in because one is led by reasons. That p is true, 
however, is a mind-independent circumstance, independent of any of one‘s cognitive 
achievements and therefore outside the space of reasons. McDowell‘s preferred view 
of perceptual knowledge is, presumably, very different. On this view, one counts as 
knowing p if one is able to justify one‘s believing p by appeal to a perceptual claim 
such that one sees that p and such a perceptual claim is justified for one in virtue of 
the direct visual accessibility to one of the objective fact that p.
25
 There is, on this 
view, no appeal to a mind-independent circumstance that, by definition, would be 
outside one‘s standing in the space of reasons.26  
According to McDowell, the hybrid view, if this view includes the claim that 
knowledge can be a standing in the space of reasons, is incoherent. Thus, his point 
seems to be that on the hybrid view, one could never achieve a standing in the space 
of reason in believing p. This conclusion is reached by considering two subjects. 
Both subjects are alike in their (purported) standing in the space of reasons in 
thinking p. That is, both their believing p is (purportedly) justified in virtue of their 
having the same justification for taking it that (a) and (b). p is true in one case but 
not the other. Thus, as per the hybrid view, only one subject knows while the other 
does not. But, so McDowell‘s reasoning goes, since both subjects are alike in their 
(purported) standing of the space of reasons in thinking p, and yet only one subject 
                                                 
25  Or as I have suggested in the last chapter in virtue of one‘s being in a conceptual-experiential in 
which the obtaining of the fact that p is transparent to one 
26  Although conditions would have to be built into the notion of visual accessibility to the fact that p 
other than that one has a visual experience that is constituted by a relation to the fact that p. For as 
thought experiments like Goldman‘s fake-barn scenario show, forming a belief that p on the basis 
of a veridical visual experience, even if this experience is constituted by relation to the fact that p, 
need not be enough to know that p. Thus in this case one‘ s having a visual experience which is 
constituted by a relation to the fact that p does not amount to one‘s having visual access to the fact 
that p. One may wonder, contrary to McDowell, if these further conditions – whatever they are – 
have to be built into the notion of such visual accessibility to the factthat p whether having a belief 
based on such accessibility is really purely a standing in the space of reasons.  
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knows in virtue of p being true in her case but not in her counterpart‘s, p has to be 
outside the rational powers of both subjects. This means, I take it, that neither subject 
can in fact have a reason for thinking p is the case. Since p is outside the rational 
powers of the knowing subject, having a reason for believing p cannot be part of her 
standing in the space of reasons. It cannot therefore be part of what constitutes her 
knowing p. So her knowing p cannot be a matter of standing in the space of reasons.  
However, the line of reasoning here seems to me to be invalid. Thus, McDowell 
is certainly right in claiming that they hybrid view entails that knowledge cannot be 
merely a matter of one‘s standing in the space of reason; that is, it cannot, like on 
McDowell‘s alternative view, be constituted simply by one‘s believing that p on the 
basis of one‘s having a reason for believing that p. But he seems to me to be wrong – 
or unjustified – in saying that the hybrid view entails that knowledge that p cannot be 
a matter at all of one‘s standing in the space of reason, that is, a matter of one‘s 
believing that p on the basis of one‘s possession of reasons for doing so. Thus, take 
the following simple example. Suppose, at three o‘clock in the morning, I see that 
the lights in my neighbour‘s house are on. My neighbour is a freelance journalist and 
I know that he usually goes to bed by eleven o‘clock at night and that if the lights are 
on at his hour, it is most likely because he‘s working towards meeting a deadline for 
submitting a piece. I form the belief that he‘s working on a piece. Clearly, the 
evidential situation I am in is such that I can be in the exact same kind of evidential 
situation and yet not know that neighbour is working on a piece because he is, 
uncharacteristically, watching the whole final season of The Sopranos. But that does 
not entail that my rational powers cannot reach the fact that my neighbour is working 
on a piece; that is, it does not entail that I cannot have a reason for thinking that he 
is. Thus, it seems clear that I can, in this case, have a belief that my neighbour is 
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working on a piece that is based on my having a reason for believing this proposition 
to be true. Thus, if as the hybrid view entails I can know that my neighbour is 
working on a piece as a matter of believing that he is and believing this on the basis 
of my knowing that the lights in his house are on and that the lights are on usually 
only when he works towards a deadline, then the hybrid view entails that knowledge 
can be a matter of a standing in the space of reasons.  
McDowell cannot accept the idea that two subjects can be alike in their standing 
in the space of reasons in thinking p and yet only one subject knows, or has the 
opportunity to know, p. It seems to me, however, that we cannot reasonably accept 
that idea only if we already accept the thesis that only having conclusive reasons 
amounts to having any reasons at all. But there is, as far as I can see, nothing in 
McDowell‘s arguments that amounts to an independent defence of that thesis.  
Of course the hybrid conception is deficient for other, more straightforward 
reasons. Thus, it depends on the assumption that one can have some justification for 
believing an external world proposition p on the basis of one‘s having some prior 
justification for believing that it perceptually seems to one as if p and for believing 
that such seemings are a reliable indication that p is the case. It is doubtful, to say the 
least, that one can really have any prior justification for the second of these beliefs.  
 At this point, however, we might ask why we should accept the assumption 
that an HCF-conception of perceptual experience cannot support the idea that one‘s 
justification for believing an external world proposition p can be matter of one‘s 
being able to legitimately justify this belief on the basis of citing a conclusive reason 
of the form that one sees that p. Thus, it seems that even if one is suffering from a 
hallucinatory experience as of p, one can appropriately justify one‘s believing p on 
the basis of claiming that one sees that p. We can then say that this kind of claim 
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would be legitimate under the circumstances because one has a perceptual 
experience of a certain phenomenological sort and because one possesses the right 
sort of conceptual capacities. In this way, one‘s justifying one‘s belief that p by 
saying that one sees that p is legitimate because one is in a perceptual state which 
constitutes a subjective perspective in which fact that p appears to be visibly 
manifest to one. It is far from clear, therefore, why the insistence that that perceptual 
knowledge requires the possession on the part of the subject of conclusive reasons or 
warrants, in the sense we have looked at, requires the disjunctivist conception of 
experience.   
With this, we can turn to the second sense in which we can understand the notion 
that perceptual knowledge requires conclusive warrants or reasons. Here the claim is 
that perceptual knowledge that p requires conclusive warrants in the sense that it 
requires one‘s being in a conceptual-experiential in which the obtaining of the fact 
that p (or the fact that makes p true) is perceptually transparent to one. In this case, 
one‘s reason for believing p is the fact that p which entails or makes true the 
proposition p and is therefore conclusive with respect to that proposition. The first 
question we might ask then is whether one‘s having this sort of reason for believing 
an external world proposition p requires that one is in a perceptual state which is 
constituted by a relation to the mind-independent fact that p. Suppose, for the 
moment, that this requirement indeed holds. We can then say that one‘s being in the 
state in which the obtaining of the fact that p is perceptually transparent to one is a 
matter of one‘s being in a perceptual state which is constituted by one‘s standing in a 
relation to a mind-independent fact and by one‘s actualising certain conceptual 
capacities. However, it is not clear why we could not hold instead, on an alternative 
conception, that one‘s being in a state in which the obtaining of the fact that p is 
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perceptually transparent to one is constituted by one‘s having a relevant HCF-
experience which caused in the right sort of way by the fact that p and by one‘s 
actualising certain conceptual capacities. If the latter is indeed coherent, then even if 
we correctly assume that perceptual knowledge that p requires one‘s being in a state 
in which the obtaining of the fact that p is perceptual transparent to one, we no 
longer have a clear epistemic motivation for endorsing the disjunctivist conception 
of perceptual experience.  
Suppose, however, that we do accept that an HCF-conception of perceptual 
experience cannot make intelligible how one could be in a conceptual-experiential 
state in which the obtaining of the fact that p is perceptually transparent to one. In 
this case, an HCF-conception could not make sense of how one can have the relevant 
kind of conclusive warrant for believing an environmental proposition p. But should 
we in this case also accept that perceptual knowledge that p can only be secured if 
one‘s justification consists of one‘s having a fact made manifest to one in this way? 
 Now McDowell does not offer any further arguments for the claim that one‘s 
having conclusive perceptual warrants for believing p is a necessary condition for 
one‘s having perceptual knowledge that p. So we have to return to the arguments that 
we have already considered in connection to the first sense of one‘s having 
conclusive warrants. The question is thus whether these arguments fare any better in 
connection with the second sense of one‘s having conclusive warrants.   
To that end, consider again the claim by McDowell I quoted earlier which was 
supposed to make intelligible why it seems incoherent to ascribe to a subject 
knowledge of the fact that p if all we could assume about this subject is that he 
possesses inconclusive warrants in support of believing p. Thus McDowell claimed 
that the notion of knowledge based on one‘s having inconclusive warrants would 
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entail that this knowledge ―could be constituted by being in a position, which for all 
one knows, [is compatible with the falsity of p]. And that seems straightforwardly 
incoherent‖. In our discussion of the first sense of one‘s having conclusive 
perceptual warrants, I conceded that that claim is at least prima facie quite plausible. 
However, it also seems to me that this claim is plausible at all only on the 
assumption that one‘s knowing that p is based in some way of one‘s having 
knowledge of an independent fact.  
 The problem now is that the conception of knowledge based on the kind of 
conclusive warrants – where this notion is understood in the second of two senses – 
that McDowell thinks perceptual experiences can provide is not a kind of knowledge 
that is based on knowledge of an independent fact. For it should be clear here that 
when one forms the belief that p on the basis of one‘s being in a state in which the 
obtaining of the fact that p becomes transparent to one, one does not form that belief 
on the basis of one‘s prior knowledge of the fact that p; this, of course, would not 
give us a satisfying picture of how knowledge comes about since it already 
presupposes one‘s having the relevant piece of knowledge. Hence, the assumption 
has to be that when one forms the belief that p on the basis of one‘s being in a 
conceptual-experiential state in which the obtaining of the fact that p becomes 
transparent to one that this knowledge is based directly on the conceptual-
experiential state. But this also means that the question of whether one‘s knowledge 
is a matter of one‘s being in a position that for all one knows is incompatible with 
the fact the fact that p simply does not arise.  
The same point essentially applies to what we might consider to be an alternative 
to McDowell‘s. Thus suppose that what supports one‘s perceptual knowledge of an 
external world proposition p is not that one has conclusive warrant in the form of 
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one‘s being in a state in which the obtaining of the fact that p is transparent to one 
but rather that one has some justification for believing p in the form of one‘s being in 
a state that perceptually e-represents the obtaining of the fact that p. The idea is that, 
in the right sort of circumstances, one‘s forming the belief that p in this way can 
constitute one‘s perceptually knowing that p. Crucially, this is not a situation in 
which one forms the belief that p on the basis of one‘s having knowledge of some 
independent fact. Thus, there does not seem to be any relevant sense in which one is 
in a position that for all one knows is incompatible with the falsity of p. As such, we 
can avoid McDowell‘s charge that ascribing knowledge in this case is incoherent.  
Conisider now the other argument which McDowell earlier directed at the hybrid 
view. Recall that on this view, one‘s knowledge of a environmental proposition p 
was supposed to be constituted by one‘s having justification for believing (a) that it 
perceptually seems to one as if p and (b) that such seemings are a reliable indication 
that p is the case. McDowell‘s objection to this view was that it could not coherently 
conceive of knowledge as a matter of a standing in the space of reasons at all. For 
one implication of this view, as McDowell pointed out, was that two subjects could 
be alike in their (purported) standing in the space of reason and yet only of them 
know the fact that p. This, in turn, was supposed to entail that one‘s believing that p 
on the basis of one‘s having justification for believing (a) and (b) could not be a 
matter of a standing in the space of reasons at all.  
Suppose then that we apply a similar reasoning to the view that one‘s knowledge 
of an environmental fact that p can be a matter, qua  having justification for 
believing p, of one‘s being in a state of perceptually e-representing the obtaining of 
the fact that p. Again, it would be possible on this view for two subjects to be alike 
in terms of the justification they possess for believing p and yet for only one of them 
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to have knowledge of p. And so, McDowell might conclude once more that one‘s 
knowledge of p cannot be a matter of a standing in the space of reason at all. Since, 
however, knowledge is essentially a standing in the space of reasons, that simply 
entails that on the view under consideration knowledge is not possible at all.  
In responding to this argument, we should note first of all that, in a sense, 
McDowell‘s conclusion obtains quite independently anyway. Thus, as I explained in 
the previous chapter,  the state of perceptually e-representing the obtaining of the 
fact that p in not a state in which one has a reason for believing p, if the notion of a 
reason is one of an actual fact that one can perceive. Hence it follows that on the 
current view of perceptual knowledge such knowledge cannot indeed be a standing 
of a space of reasons if such a standing requires the possession of a reason qua 
perceived fact. 
What does not follow, however, is that on this view perceptual knowledge cannot 
reasonably be considered a standing in a space of reasons in any sense at all. For first 
of all, as I suggested in the previous chapter, although the state of perceptually e-
representing that p is not a state in which one possesses a reason qua experienced 
fact, it is a state that can nonetheless function as a reason2 in Ginsborg‘s sense. 
Second, I would also suggest that the state of perceptually e-representing that p, in 
the absence of reasons for thinking that one is say, hallucinating, essentially puts one 
in a position to be able to properly justify one‘s believing p on the basis of claiming 
that one sees that p. In other words, such a state can put one in a position to have a 
reason1 in Ginsborg‘s sense. From the fact that perceptual e-representations can 
amount to reasons2 for beliefs and the fact that they can put one in a position to have 
a reason1 for believing p, it follows that one‘s believing that p on the basis of one‘s 
143 
 
having a relevant perceptual e-representation can be a matter of a standing in the 
space of reasons in some sense or another.   
McDowell could, of course, attempt to undermine this contention by appealing 
once again to the thought experiment involving two subjects who are alike in their 
(purported) standings in the space of reasons but of whom only one has knowledge.  
But as before, this thought experiment would show that perceptual knowledge cannot 
be a standing in the space of reasons when it is based on one‘s having a perceptual e-
representation only if one already accepted that perceptual knowledge requires 
conclusive reasons in McDowell‘s sense. McDowell, however, simply does not offer 
an independent argument for this conclusion.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Introduction 
 
We have been looking at various possible explanations for what I have called the 
Basic Principle about Perceptual Justification. To recall, this principle, in its doxastic 
form, states that:  
 
If a subject S has a perceptual experience as of a mind-independent object an 
x being F (or in which it appears to him as if an x is F), and forms the belief 
that an x is F on the basis of having an experience of this phenomenological 
sort, then (perhaps provided certain further conditions obtain) S‘s belief that 
an x is F is prima facie justified for S.  
 
The concern so far has been with whether this principle could be explained by saying 
that it is the perceptual experience itself that contributes to the epistemic justification 
of the subject‘s belief and whether it does in virtue of the phenomenal character that 
it has. The suggestion, developed in chapter 2, was that we should think of the 
subject‘s belief as being justified on the basis of his perceptually e-representing the 
obtaining of the fact that an x is F (or the fact that makes true the proposition that an 
x is F), where this latter state is constituted by the subject‘s having a perceptual 
experience of the relevant phenomenological sort.   
However, for all that we have said, the claim that the Basic Principle is true 
as a matter of the subject‘s perceptually e-representing the obtaining of the fact that 
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an x is F leaves open the possibility that further conditions have to be met in order 
for the subject to have epistemic justification for his belief that an x is F. In 
particular, the question remains whether the subject can be justified in his perceptual 
belief on the basis of having the perceptual experience that he does without having 
independent justification for further beliefs. In brief, the question remains whether 
the Basic Principle can be true as a matter of the subject‘s possessing immediate 
perceptual justification for his belief.  
But why should we think at all that when a subject has justification for his 
belief that an x is F on the basis of perceptually e-representing the obtaining of the 
fact that an x is F, that his having this justification presupposes that he has 
independent justification for further beliefs? As we saw in the previous chapter, we 
might be persuaded by elements in the sceptic‘s line of reasoning into thinking that 
one can have a justified perceptual belief only to the extent that one has some a priori 
justification for believing that one is not a brain-in-a-vat. However, there is another 
line of argument that has been the concern of recent discussions in epistemology 
which might lead us into thinking that one cannot have a justified perceptual belief 
unless one also has some independent justification for believing that one‘s perceptual 
experiences are generally reliable. It is this line of argument that I will be addressing 
in this chapter.  
The issues here have been brought into focus in a paper by Stewart Cohen.
27
 
Cohen presents these issues in terms of knowledge rather than justification, and I 
will follow him in this. We can begin with the plausible thought that we can come to 
know many things on the basis of perceptual experiences without first knowing that 
our perceptual experiences are generally reliable. A young child, for example, may 
                                                 
27 (Cohen, Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge, 2002) 
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know on the basis of looking at a table that the table is red without having prior 
knowledge, for which he may lack the requisite conceptual resources, that his visual 
experiences are a reliable source of information. Following Cohen, I will call all 
knowledge that is based on perception without prior knowledge that perceptual 
experiences are reliable basic (perceptual) knowledge. Any theory of perceptual 
knowledge that accepts the possibility of basic knowledge thus rejects the following 
principle:  
 
PR If perceptual experiences provide S with knowledge that p, 
then S knows  (antecedently) that perceptual experiences are 
reliable. 
 
Thus according to what we might call a foundationalism (about perceptual 
knowledge), a subject can come to know that p on the basis of some grounds g, 
which provides him with justification for believing p, without prior knowledge that g 
is a reliable indication that p is the case.
28
 For example, on this view, a subject can 
come to know that the table is red on the basis of a perceptual experience in which it 
appears to him as if a table is red – which provides him with justification for 
believing that a table is red – without having prior, independent knowledge that a 
perceptual experience in which it appears to him as if a table is red is a reliable 
indication that it is red. Note that the idea that the perceptual experience is the 
justificatory basis for his knowledge that a table is red need not mean that S forms 
the belief that a table is red through an inference from the belief that he is having a 
perceptual experience in which it appears to him as if a table is red. Rather, the 
                                                 
28 Ibid, 310.  
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perceptual experience can provide S with immediate, non-inferential knowledge that 
the table is red.  As I understand the view, the perceptual foundationalist holds that 
the perceptual experience can provide the subject with immediate justification for 
believing that a table is red which, in the right circumstances, is sufficient, qua 
justification, for him to know that a table is red without his having prior knowledge 
that having a perceptual experience in which it appears to him as if a table is red is a 
reliable indication that a table is red. The perceptual foundationalist therefore rejects 
the following version of the PR principle:  
 
PR1 If S knows that an x is F on the (justificatory) basis of having a 
perceptual experience in which it appears to him as if an x is F, then S 
has prior knowledge that his having a perceptual experience in which 
it appears to him as if an x is F is a reliable indication that an x is F.  
 
The problem with any view that allows for basic knowledge, so Cohen argues, is that 
it also allows for the possibility of 'easy knowledge'. Again following Cohen, I will 
refer to this problem as the 'Problem of Easy Knowledge'. Cohen identifies two such 
problems. The first of these supposedly derives from the acceptance of both the 
possibility of basic knowledge and the following closure principle.  
 
Closure If S knows that p, competently deduces q from p, and thereby 
comes  to believe q while retaining knowledge of p, then S 
knows q.
29
  
 
                                                 
29 This is how the Closure Principle is defined by John Hawthorne. See (Hawthorne, 2004, p. 34). 
This definition is different from the definition Cohen employs in his paper.  
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Suppose then that S has basic visual knowledge that the table is red. In particular, S 
knows that the table is red simply on the basis of having the relevant visual 
experience. Given closure, S should then be able to deduce and thereby come to 
know, for example, that the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look red. Thus, 
having as justificatory grounds merely a perceptual experience in which it appears to 
him as if a table is red, S can come to know that the table is red and subsequently 
that the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look red. This form of ‗easy 
knowledge‘, however, seems to be entirely unacceptable. On the assumption that the 
closure principle is undeniable, and that basic knowledge entails the possibility of 
easy knowledge, it would seem to follow that S does not have basic visual 
knowledge of the fact that the table is red after all. Furthermore, since the 
proposition that a subject can have immediate perceptual justification for believing a 
proposition p entails that he can have basic knowledge that p and therefore easy 
knowledge of a relevant proposition q, if easy knowledge is not possible then neither 
is immediate perceptual justification. 
 The second problem is that basic knowledge seems to allow for a process 
called 'bootstrapping'.
30
 Thus suppose again that at a certain time t, S knows that the 
table is red on the basis merely of a perceptual experience in which it appears to him 
as if a table is red. Certainly, S can also come to know based on a bit of introspection 
that he is having this kind of perceptual experience. So at t, S can know that the table 
is red and that he is having a perceptual experience in which it appears to him as if a 
table is red and conclude on this occasion that the perceptual experience accurately 
indicates that the table is red. Continuing this process on subsequent occasions, S 
would seem to be able to gather more and more evidence which would ultimately 
                                                 
30 See also (Fumerton, 1995) and (Vogel, Reliabilism Levelled, 2000) 
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provide him with sufficient justification for coming to know that his having a 
perceptual experience in which it appears to him as if a table is red is a reliable 
indication that the table is red. Again, this seems an unacceptable result. On the 
assumption that inductive knowledge is generally possible and that there is nothing 
problematic with S's coming to know on suitable occasions that he is having a 
perceptual experience in which it appears to him as if a table is red, it would seem to 
follow that S cannot have basic visual knowledge of the fact that the table is red to 
begin with. And once again, since the proposition that a subject can have immediate 
perceptual justification for believing a proposition p entails that he can have basic 
knowledge that p and therefore acquire knowledge, by bootstrapping, of the 
proposition that his perceptual experience is reliable, if knowledge by bootstrapping 
is not possible then neither is immediate perceptual justification.   
 At this point, we still need to determine how exactly basic knowledge leads 
to the easy knowledge problem in the two ways described and, relatedly, how 
acceptance of the PR principle can avoid the problem in the case of perceptual 
knowledge. For now we should note that there seem to be good arguments for 
thinking that the PR principle is untenable. First, as we have seen, acceptance of the 
PR principle would seem to make it impossible for us to explain how young children 
can have perceptual knowledge. But, perhaps more importantly, it would also seem 
to lead to skepticism about perceptual knowledge. Thus suppose that the principle is 
correct. The question then is how a subject could know that his perceptual 
experiences are generally reliable. It would seem that the only plausible way for him 
to have this knowledge is through some inference from propositions that he knows, 
and has justification for believing, on the basis of perceptual experiences. If that is 
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the case, however, then a subject would never attain any perceptual knowledge since 
he would already require some perceptual knowledge before first acquiring it.
31
  
 This line of reasoning may ultimately lead one to accept that easy knowledge, 
though seemingly problematic, is possible after all. That is, if, on the one hand, 
accepting the PR principle leads to skepticism whereas, on the other hand, denying 
the PR principle and allowing for basic knowledge leads to the possibility of easy 
knowledge, then denying the PR principle and allowing for easy knowledge may 
seem to be the lesser of two evils.
32
 Still, occupying the latter position may seem far 
from satisfying. It is worthwhile to consider, therefore, whether the rejection of the 
PR principle and the acceptance of basic knowledge really lead to the possibility of 
easy knowledge. 
 
 
The Closure Problem  
 
I first turn to the easy knowledge problem for perceptual foundationalism that 
derives from the closure principle. As we have seen, according to Cohen, it is the 
theory's rejection of the PR1 principle combined with acceptance of the closure 
principle that leads to the possibility of acquiring easy knowledge. Thus, if a subject 
S1 can come to know that the table is red on the basis merely having the relevant sort 
of perceptual experience, then given closure it seems that S1 can come to know that 
the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look red on the basis of a simple 
deduction without needing any further evidence in support of the deduced 
                                                 
31 See (Cohen, Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge, 2002, p. 309). 
32 See (Van Cleve, 2003) 
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proposition. First, let's ask whether accepting the PR1 principle can avoid the 
possibility of acquiring easy knowledge in this way. Of course, if accepting PR1 
entails skepticism, then a subject would not know that the table is red to begin with 
and therefore would be unable to acquire easy knowledge of the proposition that the 
table is not white cleverly  illuminated to look red. But suppose for the moment that 
PR1 does not entail skepticism. Then, on a given occasion, a subject S2 can know 
that the table is red on the basis having a perceptual experience in which it appears to 
him as if a table is red and his knowledge that this perceptual experience is a reliable 
indication that the table is red. Given the closure principle, he can then deduce and 
thereby come to know that the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look red. 
 Now is S2's way of acquiring knowledge of this fact any more acceptable 
than S1's way of acquiring knowledge of the same fact? One reason why we might 
think that S2's way of acquiring knowledge is legitimate whereas S1's way is not is 
that S2, unlike S1, is in possession of additional evidence from which he can infer 
that the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look red.  
Thus S2, unlike S1, can reason as follows:  
 
(1) I have an experience in which it appears to me as if the table is red. 
(2) My having this kind of perceptual experience is reliable indication that the 
table is red.  
(3) If my having this kind of perceptual experience is a reliable indication that it 
is red, then the table's looking red to me is a reliable indication that it is not 
white cleverly illuminated to look red.  
(4) My having this perceptual experience is a reliable indication that the table is 
not white cleverly illuminated to look red.  
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(5) Therefore: the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look red. 
  
Given our assumptions each of the premises can be known by S2. (1) simply 
expresses a piece of introspective knowledge. (2) is a piece of knowledge we assume 
S2 to have given our acceptance of the PR1 principle. (3) is a straightforward 
conceptual truth and (4) follows from (2) and (3). So S2 can know that the table is 
not white cleverly illuminated to look red without having to make an inference from 
the proposition that the table is red. This does not rule out of course that S can come 
to know that the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look red on the basis of a 
deduction from the proposition that the table is red, which he knows to be true. But 
this deduction will be supported by S's possession of evidence that provides 
justification for both the belief that the table is red as well as the belief that the table 
is not white cleverly illuminated to look red. And this fact may be enough to render 
the deduction a legitimate way of coming to know the conclusion. It would seem 
therefore that acceptance of PR1, even if it does not lead to skepticism, can solve the 
problem of easy knowledge. 
 The next question we need to address is whether the rejection of PR1 entails 
the possibility of easy knowledge. As we have seen, the foundationalist rejects PR1 
by claiming that a subject can know that the table is red on the basis of having a 
perceptual experience in which it appears to him as if the table is red without having 
prior knowledge that having this sort of perceptual experience is a reliable indication 
that it is red. But, as we have also seen,  if a subject can know that the table is red 
merely on the basis of the perceptual experience, then it seems that the subject can 
come to know that the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look red in an all too 
easy way. However, it is important to note that a rejection of PR1 does not entail that 
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a subject can come to know that the table is red merely on the basis of the perceptual 
experience. One may hold, for example, that in order for a subject to know that the 
table is red on the basis of a perceptual experience, he also needs to be in possession 
of additional evidence where this further evidence does not consist in his knowing 
that his having the perceptual experience is a reliable indication that the table is red. 
If so, a theory that insists on the subject's possessing this further evidence may 
potentially avoid the problem of easy knowledge as it arises from the closure 
principle without at the same time endorsing the PR1 principle.  
 Suppose then that we accept the following condition on S's knowing that the 
table is red: 
 
IND If S knows that a table he is looking at is red merely on the 
basis of having a perceptual experience in which it appears to 
him as if a table is red, S needs to know independently of his 
knowing that the table is red on the basis of having the 
perceptual experience that the table is not white but cleverly 
illuminated to look red.  
 
[I take it that IND is an instance of the more general principle that: If S 
knows that an x is F merely on the basis of having a perceptual experience in 
which it appears to him as if an x is F, then S needs to know independently of 
his knowing that an x is F on the basis of that perceptual experience that he 
the situation he is experiencing is not a situation in which no x is F but which 
is subjectively indistinguishable for him from the situation in which it 
perceptually appears to him as if an x is F and an x is F.] 
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Now since a subject's knowledge that the table is red presupposes his having 
independent knowledge that the table is not white but cleverly illuminated to look 
red, he is then obviously no longer in a position to acquire knowledge of the fact that 
the table is not white but cleverly illuminated to look red. So in this case, easy 
knowledge will not be available to him. Crucially, however, the IND principle is 
neutral with respect to the PR1 principle. As stated the IND principle does not entail 
that S's independent knowledge that the table is not white but cleverly illuminated to 
look red, which he needs in order to know that the table is red on the basis of having 
the relevant perceptual experience, has to be supported by knowledge that having 
that perceptual experience is a reliable indication that the table is red or by his 
knowledge that having that perceptual experience is a reliable indication that it is not 
white cleverly illuminated to look red. And since the IND principle is consistent with 
the rejection of the PR1 principle, it is also consistent with the possibility of basic 
knowledge. Therefore, it can potentially explain how the possibility of basic 
knowledge need not entail the possibility of easy knowledge.  
 However, the IND principle is too strong to be plausible. Once again, young 
children prove a case in point. Still, we may find similar principles that are more 
restrictive and specifically relevant to the cases at hand. In this regard, it is important 
to recall that, in accordance with the closure principle, for a subject to come to know 
that the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look red by deducing this 
proposition from the proposition that the table is red, which he knows to be true, he 
needs to retain his knowledge that the table is red throughout the process. Now there 
are of course many different ways in which a subject, once having acquired 
knowledge that the table is red merely on the basis of it's looking red to him, can lose 
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this piece of knowledge. For example, he may hear testimony from a reliable source 
that there are numerous tables in his current environment that are white but cleverly 
illuminated to look red. Under such a circumstance, his perceptual experience can no 
longer function as adequate justification for sustaining S's knowledge that the table is 
red. I take it that this is because S is now in possession of evidence for the claim that 
having the perceptual experience, in his current environment, is not a reliable 
indication that the table is red or that the table he is looking at may indeed be white 
cleverly illuminated to look red, evidence which undermines or defeats whatever 
epistemic support the perceptual experience might otherwise provide. In this case, if 
S is to retain his knowledge that the table is red, he needs some independent grounds 
for dismissing the hypothesis that the table is white cleverly illuminated to look red. 
But given that his retaining the knowledge that the table is red now depends on his 
having independent grounds for dismissing the hypothesis that the table is white 
cleverly illuminated to look red, it is no longer possible for him to acquire easy 
knowledge of the fact that the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look red. 
Thus it seems plausible to accept the following principle:  
 
IND1 If S knows that the table is red merely on the basis of having a 
perceptual experience in which it appears to him as if a table is 
red and subsequently acquires evidence in support of the claim 
that the table is white cleverly illuminated to look red, then S 
can retain his knowledge that the table is red only if S has 
some independent grounds for knowing that the table is not 
white but cleverly illuminated to look red.  
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[Generally: If S knows that an x is F merely on the basis having a perceptual 
experience in which it appears to him as if an x is F and subsequently 
acquires evidence in support of the claim that the situation he is experiencing 
is a situation Sn in which no x is F but which is phenomenologically 
indistinguishable for him from the situation in which he is having this 
perceptual experience and an x is F, then S can retain his knowledge that an x 
is F only if S has some independent grounds for knowing that the situation he 
is experiencing is not a situation Sn] 
 
Now, crucially, it also may seem plausible to some to think that S's knowledge can 
be defeated in a similar fashion even if S is not provided with positive evidence for 
thinking that his visual experiences are not relevantly reliable. To illustrate, consider 
Cohen's example:  
 
Suppose my son wants to buy a red table for his room. We go in the store and 
I say, 'That table is red. I'll buy it for you.' Having inherited his father's 
obsessive personality, he worries, 'Daddy, what if it's white with red lights 
shining on it?' I reply, 'Don't worry  – you see, it looks red, so it is red, so 
it's not white but illuminated by red lights.
33
 
 
In this case, the son does not provide Cohen with any positive evidence for believing 
that the perceptual experience they are having may not be a reliable indication that it 
is red. Nor does he provide Cohen with positive evidence for believing that the table 
they are looking at is indeed white but cleverly illuminated to look red. The son is 
                                                 
33 (Cohen, Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge, 2002, p. 314).  
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simply asking whether the table may not be red but white cleverly illuminated to 
look red. Still, as Cohen suggests, it seems unacceptable to think that under the given 
circumstances, he could come to know that the table is red by reasoning the way he 
does. We might explain this by saying that although the son does not present Cohen 
with evidence for believing that the table they are looking at is actually white 
cleverly illuminated to look red, the son does make Cohen aware of a certain kind of 
error-possibility. That is, he raises the possibility that the table merely looks red to 
them when in fact it is not. Just like in the previous case, we might then think that in 
order for Cohen to retain his knowledge that the table is red, he needs to have some 
independent grounds for dismissing the hypothesis that the table is white cleverly 
illuminated to look red. Consequently, as in the previous case, given that in order for 
Cohen to retain his knowledge that the table is red, he needs to have independent 
grounds for dismissing the hypothesis that the table is white cleverly illuminated to 
look red, he is no longer in a position to come to know that this hypothesis does not 
obtain by deducing its falsity from the proposition that the table is red. Cohen's 
example therefore seems to make plausible the following principle:  
 
IND 2 If S knows that the table is red merely on the basis of his 
having a perceptual experience in which it appears to him as if 
the table is red and subsequently entertains the possibility that 
the table is white but cleverly illuminated to look red, then S 
can retain his knowledge that the table is red only if S has 
some independent grounds for knowing that the table is not 
white cleverly illuminated to look red.  
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[Generally: If S knows that an x is F merely on the basis of his having a 
perceptual experience in which it appears to him as if an x is F and 
subsequently entertains the possibility that the situation he is experiencing is 
not a situation Sn in which no x is F but which is phenomenologically 
indistinguishable for him from the situation in which an x looks F to him and 
is F, then S can retain his knowledge that an x is F only if S has some 
independent grounds for knowing that the situation he is experiencing is not a 
situation Sn] 
 
So we have two kinds of cases in which a subject starts off with having knowledge 
that the table is red merely on the basis of having a perceptual experience in which it 
appears to him as if the table is red but subsequently ends up being in no position to 
rely on this knowledge to come to know that the table is not white cleverly 
illuminated to look red. The question is whether the principles we have formulated 
provide us with a sufficient framework to solve the first of the two easy knowledge 
problems. If yes, the suggestion would have to be that a subject's acquisition of easy 
knowledge of the proposition that the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look 
red based on his knowledge that the table is red is not possible for this reason: while 
a subject can know that the table is red merely on the basis of having the relevant 
sort of perceptual experience, he cannot retain this knowledge in such a way that it 
could form the basis for him to come to know that the table is not white cleverly 
illuminated to look red. The reason for that in turn is that a subject who knows that 
the table is red on the basis of it's looking red to him cannot become aware that the 
proposition that the table is red entails the proposition that the table is not white 
cleverly illuminated to look red without thereby (a) acquiring evidence that 
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undermines the epistemic justification the perceptual experience may otherwise give 
him for believing that the table is red or (b) entertaining the possibility that the table 
merely looks red when actually it is not. 
 Now it seems to me that the two principles at least capture those cases that 
we could imagine to somewhat plausibly occur in real people's lives. That is, it 
would seem to be extremely odd for people who believe that a table they are looking 
at is red when the table looks red to them to even entertain the proposition that the 
table is not white cleverly illuminated to look red unless they were already somehow 
concerned with whether or not the table might merely appear to be red when in fact it 
wasn't. The only problematic case would seem to be one in which a subject who 
knows that a table he is looking at is red merely on the basis of having a perceptual 
in which it appears to him as if the table is red for no particular reason at all deduces 
and thereby comes to believe that the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look 
red. Still, there is a sense in which it seems to be epistemically illegitimate for him to 
come to believe that the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look red in this way 
if the only relevant justification he possesses is the relevant perceptual experience. 
After all, if he is in possession of no other relevant evidence, the perceptual 
experience cannot indicate to him whether the table either is red and therefore not 
white cleverly illuminated to look red or white but cleverly illuminated to look red. 
This would mean that his evidential situation cannot epistemically support his belief 
that the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look red, which means in turn that 
he lacks knowledge of this proposition. Given the closure principle, however, his 
lack of knowledge that the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look red entails 
his lack of knowledge that the table is red. Thus, in order for him to retain his 
knowledge that the table is red, the subject needs to have some independent grounds 
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for knowing that the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look red. We can then 
propose the following principle:   
 
IND3 If S knows that the table is red merely on the basis of the 
table's looking red to him and subsequently comes to believe 
that the table is not white cleverly illuminated to look red, 
then S can retain his knowledge that the table is red only if S 
has some independent grounds for knowing that the table is 
not red cleverly illuminated to look red.  
 
[Generally: If S knows that an x is F merely on the basis of having a 
perceptual experience in which it appears to him as if an x is F and 
subsequently comes to believe that the situation he is experiencing is not a 
situation Sn in which no x is F but which is phenomenologically 
indistinguishable for him from the situation in which an x looks F to him and 
is F, then S can retain his knowledge that an x is F only if S has some 
independent grounds for knowing that the situation he is experiencing is not a 
situation Sn] 
 
The appeal to the various IND principles, therefore, provides us with the means to 
rule out the possibility of easy knowledge that seemed to derive from the possibility 
of basic knowledge and the closure principle. The key point is that, in the relevant 
cases, a subject cannot retain his knowledge that the table is red without having 
independent grounds for knowing that the table is not white cleverly illuminated to 
look red. Depending on the particulars of the case, such independent grounds can 
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consist of background knowledge to the effect that it is very unlikely that the table 
one is looking at, though it looks red to one, is not red but cleverly illuminated to 
look red. For example, Cohen in the earlier example might point out to his son that it 
is very unlikely that furniture stores would cleverly disguise the real colors of their 
pieces. Crucially, however, such background knowledge need not amount to having 
knowledge that having a perceptual experience in which it appears to one as if the 
table is red in general is a reliable indication that the table is red. Thus, at least far as 
the first of the two easy knowledge problems is concerned, we can provide a solution 
to this problem without having to appeal to the problematic PR1 principle.  
 
The Bootstrapping Problem   
 
I now turn to the second easy knowledge problem, which is that basic knowledge 
seems to allow for bootstrapping. As before, I will address this problem with respect 
to perceptual foundationalism. To remind ourselves how this problem arises consider 
the following example. Suppose that, on a given occasion, a subject S knows that the 
table in front of him is red on the basis of having a perceptual experience in which it 
appears to him as if the table is red. Again, we assume that S has no prior knowledge 
that his having this perceptual experience is a reliable indication that it is red. Thus 
S's knowledge that the table is red is a piece of basic knowledge. It now seems that S 
is in a position to reason as follows:  
 
(1) The table is red. 
(2) I have a perceptual experience in which it appears to me as if the table is red.  
(3) I have this perceptual experience and the table is red.  
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(4) My having this perceptual experience accurately indicates that the table is 
red. 
 
Apart from having basic knowledge of (1), S should know or easily be capable of 
knowing each of the other premises. Certainly, S can straightforwardly know (2) on 
the basis of introspection. (3) logically follows from (1) and (2) while (4) logically 
follows from (3). Hence S should be able to come to know (3) and (4) on the basis of 
a straightforward deduction from previously known premises. 
 Suppose then that S repeats this kind of reasoning on many other occasions in 
which he has basic knowledge that the table in front of him is red on the basis of 
having a perceptual experience in which it appears to him as if the table is red. In 
doing so, he ultimately seems to acquire evidence which is sufficient, qua evidence, 
for him to come to know that having this sort of perceptual experience is a reliable 
indication that the table is red. Thus, from this knowledge of (4) and his knowledge 
of many other propositions relevantly like (4)
34
, which he can arrive at on the basis 
of the same kind of reasoning just outlined, he can inductively infer and come to 
know that  
 
(5) My having a perceptual experience in which it appears to me as if a table is 
red is a reliable indication that the table is red.  
 
On the face of it, this kind of bootstrapping process seems to be an illegitimate way 
of coming to know (5). The inference from (4),… to (5), however, is inductively 
valid.  Thus, if S does not know (5), then it would seem that this must be because he 
                                                 
34 I shall symbolise this sentence in this way from now on: ‗(4),...‘ 
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does not know (4),… after all. As we have seen, however, (4) logically follows from 
(3), so that if S does not know (4), he does not know (3) either. We have also seen 
that (3) logically follows from (1) and (2) and since, presumably, there is nothing 
problematic about S's introspective knowledge of (2), it follows from S's lack of 
knowledge of (3) that he lacks knowledge, or at least basic knowledge, of (1). 
Reflection on bootstrapping, therefore, seems to initiate what Jonathan Vogel calls a 
'rollback' of S's presumed original basic knowledge of (1).    
 We can initially approach this second easy knowledge problem for perceptual 
foundationalism in the same way that we approached the first easy knowledge 
problem. Thus, we should ask, first, whether acceptance of PR1 – that is, acceptance 
of the principle that if S knows that the table is red on the basis of a perceptual 
experience in which it appears to him as if the table is red, he has to have prior, 
independent knowledge that his having this sort of perceptual experience is a reliable 
indication that the table is red – can avoid the bootstrapping problem and, second, 
whether a rejection of PR1 entails the possibility of bootstrapping. The answer to the 
first question is a straightforward yes. If S knows that the table is red on the basis of 
the right sort of experience only if he has prior, independent knowledge that his 
having this sort of perceptual experience is a reliable indication that it is red, then 
obviously he will no longer be able to acquire this piece of reliability knowledge by 
reasoning the way he does.  
 What then about the second question? Earlier we noted with respect to the 
first easy knowledge problem that the rejection of PR1, and therefore the acceptance 
of the possibility of basic knowledge, do not entail that S can know that the table is 
red merely on the basis of his having the relevant perceptual experience. Thus, it 
may be in some cases that although a subject S can have basic knowledge that the 
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table is red on the basis a perceptual experience, S also needs to be in possession of 
additional evidence distinct from the justification he has as a matter of having the 
perceptual experience but not consisting of some prior, independent knowledge that 
his having this sort of perceptual experience is a reliable indication that the table is 
red. In particular we saw that in the relevant cases, a subject can retain his basic 
perceptual knowledge that the table is red only if he also has independent evidence 
or grounds for knowing that it is not, for example, cleverly illuminated to look red. 
In this way, the requirement, in the relevant cases, that for S to retain his knowledge 
that the table is red he be in possession of such independent evidence or grounds for 
knowing the table is not red but cleverly illuminated to look red, provided some 
means for avoiding the first easy knowledge problem without having to appeal to the 
problematic PR1 principle.  
 Unfortunately, however, this kind of approach does not seem to be available 
when it comes to the second problem of easy knowledge. Thus suppose, for 
argument's sake, that the relevant cases can be restricted to those in which S actually 
engages in the kind of bootstrapping outlined earlier. What we want to say then, in 
line with our approach to the first easy knowledge problem, is that for S to have or 
retain knowledge of the premises, S has to be in possession of evidence or grounds 
in addition to the justification he has as a result of his having a perceptual experience 
in which it appears to him as if the table is red which would help explain either why 
S cannot come to know, by bootstrapping, that his having this perceptual experience 
is a reliable indication that the table is red or why the reasoning he performs is not an 
illegitimate way of coming to know the conclusion after all. The problem, however, 
is that it is difficult to see what such relevant additional evidence, if it does not 
consist of some prior, independent knowledge that his having a perceptual 
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experience in which it appears to him as if the table is red is a reliable indication that 
the table is red, could amount to. For if the relevant additional evidence does not 
consist of prior, independent knowledge of the conclusion of the bootstrapping 
reasoning, it obviously has to consist of evidence in support of one or several of the 
premises. Here the relevant premises are really (1) and (3) (or (4)). Of course, it 
follows that if S did have evidence in support of (1) or (3) independently of the 
justification he gains from looking at the table, then the reasoning from (1) – (4) to 
the conclusion (5) may be entirely appropriate. In that case, S would be 
accumulating evidence in support of the conclusion that his having a perceptual in 
which it appears to him as if the table is red a reliable indication that the table is red 
independently of the justification provided to him his perceptual experience. But it 
seems clear that such independent evidence cannot be had. For surely, such evidence 
would have to be a piece of empirical evidence. However, whatever empirical 
evidence S could gather in support of the belief that the table is red without relying 
on how things appear to him– for example, someone's testimony – that distinct piece 
of evidence in turn will ultimately have to be supported by evidence gained on the 
basis of someone or other looking at the table. So the requirement that S be in 
possession of additional evidence distinct from the justification afforded to him by 
his perceptual experience but not consisting of prior, independent knowledge that his 
having the perceptual experience is a reliable indication that it is red seems to gets us 
nowhere.  
 From this we might conclude that, really, the only way of avoiding the 
second easy knowledge problem is to accept principle PR1. Hence upon reflection 
on the issue of bootstrapping, we do seem to be faced with the rather uncomfortable 
choice of having to accept either the possibility of easy knowledge or a problematic 
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epistemic principle that seems to lead to skepticism. I do think that this dilemma is 
real but before turning to how we should proceed from here, I want to address a 
somewhat different approach to the bootstrapping problem.  
In a recent paper, Jonathan Vogel
35
 has argued that the available options in 
the face of the second easy knowledge problem are not in fact exhausted by 
accepting the possibility of bootstrapping on the one hand and a problematic 
principle like PR1 on the other. Instead he contends that a subject can have basic 
knowledge of (1) and thereby be in a position to know the remaining premises 
without also thereby being in a position to come to know (5) by reasoning from 
(4),… to (5). Now it should be clear that what is problematic about the reasoning we 
are concerned with is that it involves a certain kind of epistemic circularity.  Thus in 
forming the belief that his having a perceptual experience in which it appears to him 
as if the table is red is a reliable indication that the table is red, our subject S is in 
fact relying on his perceptual experience in support of the premises in his reasoning. 
However, Vogel suggests that a sound principle governing justification (and, by 
implication, knowledge) is something like the following:  
 
NEC
36
 We cannot acquire knowledge that our perceptual experience 
E is reliable by relying in part on E itself.
37
 
 
This principle certainly seems wholly plausible, and it is what seems to underlie the 
intuition that bootstrapping is an epistemically illegitimate procedure. But even if a 
                                                 
35 (Vogel, Epistemic Bootstrapping, 2008) 
36   NEC = No Epistemic Circularity  
37  The principles that Vogel himself formulates and appeals to are these. (NRC) A belief that an 
epistemic rule R is reliable cannot be justified by the application of R. That is, neither the 
conclusion itself nor any belief which supports the conclusion may be justified in virtue of the 
application of R and (NSS) One cannot obtain...a justified or warranted believe that a belief source 
S is trustworthy by relying even in part on source S. (Ibid, p. 531) 
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principle like NEC is accepted, the question of course is how it can offer a viable 
option for addressing the second easy knowledge problem which avoids having to 
accept either the possibility of bootstrapping or a problematic principle like PR1. As 
Vogel sees it, the issue turns on whether the appeal to NEC can provide us with the 
resources to resist the rollback problem. Thus, as we have seen earlier, it seems 
entirely plausible to say that if S does not know (5), then this must be because he 
does not know (4). We have also seen, however, that if (4) is not known, then neither 
is (1), at least not in a basic way. Vogel's proposed solution to this problem is to say, 
first of all, that other things being equal, S's knowledge of (4), supported as it is by 
his basic knowledge of (1), does provide S with a warrant for believing, and thereby 
knowing, conclusion (5). A principle like NEC, however, can operate as a potential 
defeater to the justification S's knowledge of (4),…may otherwise provide for 
believing (5). For example, upon realizing that the reasoning he employs violates 
NEC, S would then no longer be in a position to come to know (5) by inferring (5) 
from (4),…. Crucially, however, this does not mean, that S thereby loses his 
knowledge of (4). The rollback problem, therefore, is resisted.  
To illustrate his point, Vogel provides this analogy. Suppose that S knows 
that Tweety is a bird. This knowledge may well give him warrant for believing that 
Tweety flies. However, it fails to do so if S also knows that Tweety is a penguin. 
Thus his knowledge that Tweety is a penguin defeats the warrant that S, in knowing 
that Tweety is a bird, would otherwise have for believing that Tweety flies. Having 
his warrant for believing that Tweety flies defeated in this way, however, does not 
entail that S loses his knowledge that Tweety is a bird. 
38
 
                                                 
38 Ibid, p. 535, n. 42 
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Now is this a good solution to the second easy knowledge problem? The most 
obvious problem with this solution is that it does not completely avoid the dilemma 
we were faced with earlier. This of course contradicts Vogel‘s advertised goal since 
his contention was that the options in the face of the second easy knowledge problem 
were not exhausted by accepting the possibility of bootstrapping on the one hand and 
a problematic principle like PR1 on the other. As it is now clear, however, given his 
own solution to the problem, Vogel has to accept that bootstrapping is possible in 
some cases, namely in those in which a principle like NEC does not operate as a 
defeater. 
Still, despite this, Vogel also thinks that there are some cases in which a 
subject does have basic knowledge of (1) as well as knowledge of (2) – (4) but is not 
in a position to acquire the relevant piece of reliability knowledge by employing the 
bootstrapping reasoning. This means that at least in those cases, we can explain the 
impossibility of bootstrapping without appealing to a principle like PR1 but by 
appealing instead to a principle like NEC. 
The first point to note here is that Vogel does not provide a full account of 
the circumstances in which a principle like NEC does operate as a defeater to the 
warrant S‘s knowledge of (4) may otherwise provide for believing (5). One type of 
case I mentioned earlier was a case in which S comes to realize that his reasoning 
violates NEC, and this seems to be the type of case that Vogel has in mind. So, 
focusing on this type of case, does it really make sense to say, as Vogel suggests, 
that S retains his justification for, and knowledge of, (4),… upon realizing that it 
cannot epistemically support belief in (5)?  In other words, is this case sufficiently 
analogous to is the Tweety case? 
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There are two relevant comments Vogel makes in regard to this question. 
First, he says that: ―...the specific flaw in the justification for [5] does not attach to 
[4]‖. (Vogel, Epistemic Bootstrapping, 2008, p. 536) In other words, while the 
(supposed) justification for (5) that the reasoning from (4),…to (5) provides is 
epistemically circular in that it violates NEC, the justification or warrant for 
believing (4) is not. This point is entirely straightforward: NEC is a principle 
concerning knowledge of reliability and thus, since (4) does not express a reliability 
claim, S‘s knowledge of or warrant for (4) cannot be subject to NEC. The 
implication of this point, however, or so Vogel suggests, is that while S may fail to 
have justification for believing (5) as a result of a violation of NEC, he need not 
thereby fail to have justification for believing (4). Hence, rollback is averted. 
Second, Vogel says: ―would your discovery of bootstrapping...indicate that your 
original beliefs...were false or unsupported? It seems not. Why should a subsequent, 
untoward inference proceeding from those original beliefs affect their epistemic 
standing? More broadly, if [epistemic circularity] or anything else blocks the 
justification of a reliability belief downstream, that seems irrelevant to the 
justification of one's beliefs upstream. If this assessment is correct, then [epistemic 
circularity] can explain the unacceptability of bootstrapping without bringing on the 
rollback problem.‖ (Ibid, 536)  As I understand it, Vogel‘s second comment directly 
relates to the first comment. His point seems to be that if S comes to realize that the 
inference from (4),… to (5) is in violation of NEC and thereby acquires a reason for 
thinking that the inference is illegitimate, which is sufficient for the justification for 
believing (5) to be defeated, S need not thereby acquire a reason for thinking that 
there is no justification for believing (4). Presumably this is because, as the first 
comment makes clear, the belief in (4), unlike the belief in (5), does not violate 
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NEC. So there is nothing in S‘s realization that the bootstrapping reasoning violates 
NEC that would provide him with a reason for thinking that he has, after all, no 
justification for (4).  
I believe that we can raise an objection to each of Vogel‘s two comments. 
One concern with the first comment is that while S‘s justification or warrant for (4) 
is not epistemically circular in the sense that it does not violate principle NEC, it 
does exhibit a different but similar, and seemingly equally crippling form of, 
epistemic circularity. Recall that (4) expresses S‘s belief that his having a perceptual 
experience in which it appears to him as the table is red [on the given occasion] is an 
accurate indication that the table is red. As we have seen this belief was based 
ultimately on the given perceptual experience. But certainly, if NEC is a plausible 
principle governing epistemic justification or warrant, then so is the following:   
 
NEC1 We cannot acquire knowledge that a perceptual experience E 
accurately indicates the truth of p on a given occasion by 
relying on E itself.  
 
Thus this principle states that S cannot come to know that his having a perceptual 
experience in which it appears to him as if the table is red is a correct indication that 
the table is red on a given occasion by relying in one way or another on that 
perceptual expeirence. It seems entirely plausible to assume that if NEC can operate 
as a defeater to the justification S‘s knowledge of (4) may provide for believing (5), 
NEC1 can operate as a defeater to the justification that S‘s knowledge of (1) may 
provide for believing (4) [via (2) and (3)]. Still, Vogel might say that NEC and 
NEC1 express different principles and as such, it is possible that S becomes aware of 
171 
 
the former without becoming aware of the latter.  In such a situation S‘s justification 
for (5) would be defeated while his justification or warrant for (4) may well remain 
intact. The problem with this response, however, is that it is simply difficult to 
imagine a subject who is acute to the fact that his reasoning violates NEC without at 
the same time being acute to the fact that his reasoning also violates NEC1. Even if it 
is possible, in principle, that such a situation obtains what we could say, at the very 
least, is that if S really is in such a situation, he shows a significant epistemic failing 
with respect to his belief of (4), so that there is a real question as to whether or not 
this belief is genuinely justified and thereby amounts to knowledge.  
 This brings us to the second of Vogel‘s two comments. To repeat, Vogel‘s 
point, as I understood it, was that when S becomes aware of a violation of NEC in 
his reasoning and thereby acquires a reason for thinking that the reasoning is 
illegitimate, S need not thereby acquire a reason for thinking that there is no 
justification for believing (4) either. Hence while S‘s justification for (5) may be 
defeated, his justification for (4) may well remain intact. Now I have just given a 
reason for why Vogel‘s contention here is doubtful: for, as I suggested, it is difficult 
to see how S can be acute to a violation of NEC in his reasoning while not being 
acute to the violation of NEC1. So, contra Vogel, a defeat in S‘s warrant for (5) 
should also involve a defeat in his warrant for (4).  
But there is another reason for doubting Vogel‘s contention. What we have so 
far is that when S becomes aware of the violation of NEC in his reasoning, he 
essentially becomes aware of the fact that his reasoning cannot provide him with 
justification for believing (5). But given our assumptions – namely that S has basic 
knowledge of premise (1) in his reasoning – S also has no further reasons he can 
avail himself of in support of (5). Thus, S should find himself in a situation in which 
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the rational thing for him to do is at the very least to withhold belief in (5). 
Withholding belief in (5), of course, is tantamount to withholding belief in the 
proposition that one‘s perceptual evidence is reliable. But if it is rational to withhold 
belief in the proposition that one‘s perceptual evidence is reliable, surely this 
justifies withholding any beliefs that are based on this evidence. Finally, it is 
plausible to think that if it is justified for S to withhold any beliefs based on his 
perceptual experience, then S is not justified in holding those beliefs, and this means 
that the original justification for those beliefs that S may have possessed is defeated.  
Earlier Vogel asked whether ‗your discovery of 
bootstrapping…[would]…indicate that your original beliefs…were false or 
unsupported?‘ There is a clear sense, contrary to Vogel‘s contention, that the answer 
to this question is yes. Given our assumptions, his discovery of bootstrapping leaves 
S with no justification for thinking that his perceptual experience is reliable, and that, 
if anything, should leave him with a sense that his original perceptual belief is not 
justified after all.  
With this, we can conclude that Vogel has not managed to solve the second 
easy knowledge problem in a way that avoids the dilemma we were faced with 
earlier. For one, Vogel‘s solution entails that bootstrapping does lead to knowledge 
of reliability in some cases, so to that extent he simply embraces one of the horns of 
the dilemma. According to Vogel, it is only in some restricted cases of when S has 
basic knowledge of (1) and also has knowledge of (2)-(4), that S fails to be in 
position to acquire knowledge of (5) by reasoning the way he does. It is in those 
cases, that we can supposedly explain how reliability knowledge via bootstrapping is 
impossible, while retaining the assumption that the subject knows the premises of the 
bootstrapping reasoning, without at the same time appealing to a problematic 
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principle like PR1. But as I have tried to argue, Vogel‘s attempt to explain the 
impossibility of acquiring reliability knowledge via bootstrapping by appeal to a 
principle like NEC, while preserving the thought that the subject knows the premises 
of the bootstrapping reasoning, ultimately fails.  
 In the end, I think there are more general and fundamental reasons for 
thinking why Vogel‘s strategy is bound to fail. That is, while the appeal to a 
principle such as NEC may explain, or rather may make explicit, why we think 
bootstrapping is illegitimate, it cannot be used to explain how we can have basic 
knowledge while not being in a position to acquire reliability knowledge via 
bootstrapping. The reason for this is that anyone taking such an approach will have 
to accept that a subject can know the premises of an inductively valid argument but 
essentially still fail to know the conclusion. In other words, such an approach would 
be in contradiction with some inductive closure principle.  
 
IC If S knows p, competently inductively infers q from p, and 
believes q on this basis while retaining knowledge of p, then S 
knows q.  
 
Just like NEC, IC seems entirely plausible. But I suggest that it is the combination of 
these two principles that makes the second easy knowledge problem so seemingly 
intractable for us. For according to NEC, the bootstrapping reasoning cannot provide 
S with knowledge of reliability. But if the bootstrapping reasoning cannot provide S 
with knowledge of reliability, then given IC, the rollback problem seems to follow; 
that is, it seems to follow that S cannot know the premises of the bootstrapping 
reasoning either.  
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Knowing vs. Claiming to Know  
 
The question that we raised earlier was whether in light of the bootstrapping problem 
there was any way to avoid the dilemma of having to accept either the possibility of 
easy knowledge or a principle like PR. The discussion of Vogel‘s attempt to solve 
the bootstrapping problem, however, shows the difficulty in trying to avoid this 
dilemma. Rather than exploring any further attempts, it might be worthwhile to 
determine, at this point, if it is possible at to accept one of the two horns of the 
dilemma in an intellectually satisfying way. 
Now I take it here that acceptance of PR is more problematic than acceptance 
of the possibility of easy knowledge since the former, as we have seen, seems to 
imply the truth of scepticism about empirical knowledge. Thus if a choice has to be 
made between the possibility of easy knowledge on the one hand and the 
impossibility altogether of perceptual knowledge on the other, then the choice that 
we should make is clear enough. The only question remaining would then be 
whether acceptance of the possibility of easy knowledge could be made intellectually 
palatable. The task at hand here is to offer some considerations that might explain 
why, though entirely possible, the notion of easy knowledge by way of the 
bootstrapping process seems so counterintuitive.  
To this end, consider once again principle NEC. 
 
NEC We cannot acquire knowledge that our perceptual experience 
E is reliable by relying in part on E itself.   
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The suggestion earlier was that it is a principle of this kind that makes impossible 
knowledge of the reliability of perceptual experience by way of the bootstrapping 
process. Of course, if knowledge of the reliability of perceptual experience by way 
of the bootstrapping process is possible, then NEC cannot be a correct principle 
about perceptual knowledge and justification. However, to explain the 
counterintuitiveness of the possibility of easy knowledge and of the rejection of 
NEC, we can perhaps propose a somewhat different but related principle, concerning 
not knowledge but rather claims to knowledge.  
 
NEC‘ We cannot appropriately claim to know that our perceptual 
experience E is reliable by relying in part on evidence 
gathered on the basis of E itself.  
 
How should we understand this principle? To answer this, I want to turn some 
suggestions Duncan Pritchard makes in a different context about the conditions 
under which it is appropriate to claim to know a proposition p. Pritchard begins with 
this observation:  
 
...we rarely convey our knowledge by making assertions which are prefixed 
with the phrase, ‗I know‘. Instead, one typically conveys one‘s knowledge of 
a proposition simply by asserting the proposition in question. Adding the 
further ‗I know‘ phrase is rare, and standardly reflects not just emphasis but 
also an ability to resolve a particular challenge that has been raised. 
(Pritchard, 2008, pp. 302-3) 
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The suggestion here is, first of all, that assertions or claims to know a proposition p 
are typically directed at particular challenges to one‘s knowledge of p. Furthermore, 
Pritchard suggests, or seems to do so, that there are two key elements to such claims 
to knowing that p. First, in claiming to know that p in response to a specific 
challenge, one represents oneself as having some reasons for believing p that 
specifically address the particular challenge at hand. Second, in claiming to know 
that p, one represents oneself as having reasons for believing p that are stronger (or 
relevantly different) than the reasons one would originally need for the piece of 
knowledge itself.
39
  These two elements to a claim to know a proposition p would 
seem to imply that such a claim is appropriate to the extent that one actually does 
have some reason for believing p that specifically address the particular challenge at 
hand and to the extent that one actually does have some reason for believing p that 
are stronger (or relevantly different) than the reason one would have originally 
needed for the piece of knowledge itself.  
To illustrate these points, consider the following familiar example from the 
epistemological literature. Thus, suppose that while visiting the zoo with my son, I 
see a zebra is an enclosure marked ‗Zebras‘. I direct my son‘s eyes to the animal and 
say to him that that‘s a zebra. It is of course entirely plausible to think that my 
assertion here expresses my knowledge of the fact that the animal I am pointing to is 
in fact a zebra. Furthermore, we can assume that my ground for knowing this to be 
the case consists simply in my having a visual experience of the zebra. But suppose 
that my rather sceptical son challenges my assertion by asking whether the animal I 
am pointing to might not instead be a mule cleverly painted to look like a zebra. This 
                                                 
39 Pritchard, p. 303 
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particular challenge by my son to my assertion that that‘s zebra thus consists of 
making me aware of a certain error possibility.  
Pritchard‘s suggestion here is that in insisting that I know that that‘s a zebra in 
response to the challenge my son has raised, I will essentially represent myself as 
having some reason for believing that that‘s a zebra which speaks specifically to the 
error possibility being raised. As such, it would seem inappropriate in this case to 
claim that I know that that‘s a zebra if I could not defend this claim by saying 
anything other than that I can see that that‘s a zebra. Thus the grounds that I 
originally had for properly asserting, and indeed for knowing, that that‘s a zebra are 
in this case insufficient to support my response to my son‘s challenge. This is 
because in claiming to know that that‘s a zebra in response to that challenge, I 
represent myself as having some reasons for insisting that that‘s a zebra that 
specifically address the challenge at hand and therefore as knowing, for example, 
that the authorities at the zoo are unlikely to engage in such a conspiracy. 
Consequently, the grounds that make my claim to knowledge appropriate may be 
different than the grounds that supported my original piece of knowledge.  
My suggestion is that we can apply a similar framework to assertions that one 
knows that a particular belief source such as one‘s perceptual experience is reliable. 
To illustrate this, consider the following case from Vogel‘s paper. Thus suppose that 
I am in the grocery store and perform a bootstrapping procedure that leads to my 
believing that my memory is reliable. Thus suppose that I remember that I am out 
milk. We can assume that my memory can provide me with knowledge that I am out 
of milk independently of my already knowing that my memory is reliable. I also 
come to know through introspection that I remember that I am out of milk and 
conclude on the basis of this introspective knowledge and my memorial knowledge 
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that I am out of milk that my memory in this instance accurately indicates the fact 
that I am out of milk. Suppose then that I repeat this process with respect to other 
things that I correctly remember that I am out of and conclude and assert in the end 
that my memory is reliable. By hypothesis, my assertion expresses my knowledge 
that my memory is reliable. (Of course, there is a strong intuition here that this 
hypothesis is false.) 
Next suppose that I am faced with a challenge to my assertion. We can assume 
that this challenge can simply consist of the question of how I know that my memory 
is reliable. Suppose, finally, that I respond to this challenge by insisting that I know 
that my memory is reliable and cite as a reason for believing that proposition to be 
true the bootstrapping reasoning I employed. Once again, there is a clear intuition 
here that it is inappropriate for me to insist that I know that my memory is reliable. 
We can explain this by saying that in responding to the challenge at hand by 
asserting that I know that my memory is reliable, I represent myself as having some 
evidence for thinking that my memory is reliable independently of evidence that I 
have gathered on the basis of that very belief source. Hence, intuitively, claims to 
know that a belief source is reliable seem to be governed by a general principle of 
which NEC‘ is a particular instance. This general principle would state:  
 
NEC‘‘ We cannot claim to know that a belief source S is reliable by 
relying on evidence acquired on the basis of S itself. 
 
Recall now that we earlier accepted the hypothesis that I know on the basis of the 
bootstrapping reasoning that my memory is reliable. Given the assumption that my 
claim to know that my memory is reliable is inappropriate, this would be a case in 
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which by claiming to know that p I represent myself as having grounds in support of 
believing that my memory is reliable that are different than the grounds that would 
be required in simply coming to know that proposition to be true. Since I do not have 
such grounds, I am not in a position to appropriately assert that I know that my 
memory is reliable.  
To sum up, we can say that knowledge of the reliability of perceptual experience 
by way of the bootstrapping process is counterintuitive because of the intuitiveness 
of a principle like NEC. The acceptance of the possibility of easy knowledge by way 
of bootstrapping, however, entails that NEC, though intuitive, is in fact false. The 
good news, though, is that we might be able to explain away that intuitiveness of 
NEC by appealing to a principle like NEC‘. Thus we might be able to say that NEC 
is intuitive, even if false, because in judging NEC to be true we are implicitly 
making a correct judgment about a principle like NEC‘. The consequence is that 
though knowledge of the reliability of perceptual experience by way of 
bootstrapping is strictly speaking possible, we cannot appropriately claim to have 
this knowledge if the only grounds we have for believing that our perceptual 
experiences are reliable is the bootstrapping reasoning itself.  
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